Vashisht, Joy
(2026)
Principal-Principal Conflicts, Corporate Governance, and Financial Reporting Quality in Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from the Global Automotive OEM Industry.
[Laurea magistrale], Università di Bologna, Corso di Studio in
International management [LM-DM270], Documento full-text non disponibile
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Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between family ownership structures, corporate governance models, and financial reporting quality in large publicly listed firms, using the global automotive OEM industry as the empirical setting. The research is motivated by an observation made during an internship (February–July 2026) at Aumovio in Regensburg, where proximity to Schaeffler—whose leveraged acquisition of Continental generated a decade-long principal-principal conflict—highlighted a core question: does family control enhance or impair disclosure quality for minority shareholders?
The study draws on four theoretical pillars: principal-principal agency theory (Type II conflicts), Socioemotional Wealth theory, stewardship theory, and cultural dimensions as cross-country moderators.
Using a qualitative comparative case study design, the research examines BMW AG, Ford Motor Company, and Toyota Motor Corporation across FY2021–2023, representing the German two-tier, Anglo-Saxon unitary, and Japanese keiretsu models. Grounded in each jurisdiction's institutional framework—legal origins, investor protections, accounting standards, and regulatory landscapes —financial reporting quality is evaluated via a qualitative four-dimension scorecard (Earnings Quality, Disclosure Completeness, Audit Quality, Non-Financial Transparency) to account for captive financial services arms.
The central finding is that financial statements reveal no evidence of earnings manipulation or preferential extraction. Instead, principal-principal conflicts manifest within governance architecture: the Quandt family’s boardroom influence at BMW; the Ford family’s defeat of equal voting rights proposals since 2011; and Toyota’s keiretsu cross-shareholding, which insulates control while evading regulatory mechanisms. Ultimately, formal structure is necessary but not sufficient: minority protection depends on the values, horizons, and reputational stakes of the controlling family.
Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between family ownership structures, corporate governance models, and financial reporting quality in large publicly listed firms, using the global automotive OEM industry as the empirical setting. The research is motivated by an observation made during an internship (February–July 2026) at Aumovio in Regensburg, where proximity to Schaeffler—whose leveraged acquisition of Continental generated a decade-long principal-principal conflict—highlighted a core question: does family control enhance or impair disclosure quality for minority shareholders?
The study draws on four theoretical pillars: principal-principal agency theory (Type II conflicts), Socioemotional Wealth theory, stewardship theory, and cultural dimensions as cross-country moderators.
Using a qualitative comparative case study design, the research examines BMW AG, Ford Motor Company, and Toyota Motor Corporation across FY2021–2023, representing the German two-tier, Anglo-Saxon unitary, and Japanese keiretsu models. Grounded in each jurisdiction's institutional framework—legal origins, investor protections, accounting standards, and regulatory landscapes —financial reporting quality is evaluated via a qualitative four-dimension scorecard (Earnings Quality, Disclosure Completeness, Audit Quality, Non-Financial Transparency) to account for captive financial services arms.
The central finding is that financial statements reveal no evidence of earnings manipulation or preferential extraction. Instead, principal-principal conflicts manifest within governance architecture: the Quandt family’s boardroom influence at BMW; the Ford family’s defeat of equal voting rights proposals since 2011; and Toyota’s keiretsu cross-shareholding, which insulates control while evading regulatory mechanisms. Ultimately, formal structure is necessary but not sufficient: minority protection depends on the values, horizons, and reputational stakes of the controlling family.
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di laurea
(Laurea magistrale)
Autore della tesi
Vashisht, Joy
Relatore della tesi
Scuola
Corso di studio
Ordinamento Cds
DM270
Parole chiave
Principal-principal conflicts,Family controlled firms,corporate governance,financial reporting quality,Socioemotional wealth,Automotive OEM Industry,BMW,Ford,Toyota,IFRS,CSDR,Governance,agency theory,Board Models
Data di discussione della Tesi
29 Ottobre 2026
URI
Altri metadati
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di laurea
(NON SPECIFICATO)
Autore della tesi
Vashisht, Joy
Relatore della tesi
Scuola
Corso di studio
Ordinamento Cds
DM270
Parole chiave
Principal-principal conflicts,Family controlled firms,corporate governance,financial reporting quality,Socioemotional wealth,Automotive OEM Industry,BMW,Ford,Toyota,IFRS,CSDR,Governance,agency theory,Board Models
Data di discussione della Tesi
29 Ottobre 2026
URI
Gestione del documento: