Benedetti, Riccardo
(2026)
Cyber Deception through LLM-Driven Infrastructure as Code: A Fine-Tuned Pipeline for Context-Aware Honeypot Generation.
[Laurea magistrale], Università di Bologna, Corso di Studio in
Informatica [LM-DM270]
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Abstract
Cyberattacks against modern organizations are growing in both frequency and
sophistication, exposing the limitations of traditional reactive defense strate-
gies that rely on perimeter security devices such as firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. Cyber deception has emerged as a promising proactive
approach that shifts the attacker-defender asymmetry by introducing decoys
and false targets into the network, forcing adversaries to expend significant re-
sources distinguishing real assets from fake ones. Honeypots, systems designed
to appear as legitimate targets while observing and recording attacker behav-
ior, are at the core of this paradigm. However, deploying realistic and effective
honeypots remains a labor-intensive process that requires deep knowledge of
both the target infrastructure and the specific attack vectors being defended
against. Manual configuration does not scale across diverse enterprise environ-
ments, and static deployments are vulnerable to fingerprinting by sophisticated
adversaries.
Abstract
Cyberattacks against modern organizations are growing in both frequency and
sophistication, exposing the limitations of traditional reactive defense strate-
gies that rely on perimeter security devices such as firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. Cyber deception has emerged as a promising proactive
approach that shifts the attacker-defender asymmetry by introducing decoys
and false targets into the network, forcing adversaries to expend significant re-
sources distinguishing real assets from fake ones. Honeypots, systems designed
to appear as legitimate targets while observing and recording attacker behav-
ior, are at the core of this paradigm. However, deploying realistic and effective
honeypots remains a labor-intensive process that requires deep knowledge of
both the target infrastructure and the specific attack vectors being defended
against. Manual configuration does not scale across diverse enterprise environ-
ments, and static deployments are vulnerable to fingerprinting by sophisticated
adversaries.
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di laurea
(Laurea magistrale)
Autore della tesi
Benedetti, Riccardo
Relatore della tesi
Correlatore della tesi
Scuola
Corso di studio
Indirizzo
Curriculum C: Sistemi e reti
Ordinamento Cds
DM270
Parole chiave
Cyber Deceptiom,Cyber Security,Honeypots,Infrastructure as Code,Large Language Models,Deception
Data di discussione della Tesi
26 Marzo 2026
URI
Altri metadati
Tipologia del documento
Tesi di laurea
(NON SPECIFICATO)
Autore della tesi
Benedetti, Riccardo
Relatore della tesi
Correlatore della tesi
Scuola
Corso di studio
Indirizzo
Curriculum C: Sistemi e reti
Ordinamento Cds
DM270
Parole chiave
Cyber Deceptiom,Cyber Security,Honeypots,Infrastructure as Code,Large Language Models,Deception
Data di discussione della Tesi
26 Marzo 2026
URI
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