Commercial Satellites in Hybrid Warfare: Corporate Responsibility and Gaps in International Law

For a long time, outer space was seen as a distant domain, reserved for scientific exploration, symbolic prestige and a limited set of military programmes. In just a few decades, this picture has changed deeply. The rise of the “New Space” economy and large commercial constellations has turned satellites into everyday critical infrastructure: they carry internet traffic, enable navigation and timing, support financial systems and power modern command and control in armed conflict. At the same time, the dominant form of contemporary conflict is becoming hybrid: states and non state actors combine military and non military means, including cyber operations, disinformation and economic pressure, to achieve strategic goals below the threshold of open war. In this environment, dual use commercial satellites have become both valuable tools and attractive targets. This thesis tries to examine how commercial satellite systems are integrated into hybrid warfare and what this implies for the responsibility of private operators and states. It analyzes technical and cybersecurity vulnerabilities and uses the ViaSat KASAT cyberattack and the deployment of SpaceX’s Starlink in Ukraine as central case studies. Showing how commercial systems can shape battlefield outcomes and expose serious vulnerabilities. It concludes that current international and European legal frameworks remain largely state centric and fragmented, leaving major gaps on liability, due diligence, neutrality and the lawful targeting of dual use satellites.