

ALMA MATER STUDIORUM UNIVERSITA' DI BOLOGNA

Corso di laurea magistrale in

Archeologia e Culture del Mondo Antico

TITOLO DELLA TESI

**THE *MĀYĀVIVARAṆA*: A CRITICAL STUDY OF
PSEUDEPIGRAPHY AND SYNCRETISM IN EARLY
MODERN ADVAITA**

Tesi di laurea in

Lingua e letteratura sanscrita 2

Relatore: Prof. Ciotti Giovanni

Correlatore: Prof. Marchignoli Saverio

Presentata da: Sonaglia Michele Dhruva

Appello

Terzo (Marzo 2026)

Anno accademico

2025-2026

Title (Index)	Pag.
INTRODUCTION	4
CHAPTER I: TRANSLATION	8
CHAPTER II: PHILOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION	49
Part 1: The Chronological Horizon (The "When")	49
Part 2: The Geographical Footprint (The "Where")	51
Conclusion	59
CHAPTER III: DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS AND DOXOGRAPHICAL PLACEMENT	61
1 - Contextualization: The Post-Śaṅkara Landscape	62
2 - Doctrinal Analysis: A Diagnostic Framework	63
I. The Propaedeutic Framework: Points 1, 3, 9 & 10	65
II. The Metaphysics of the Self	68
II.1 The Nature of the Soul: Points 5 & 15	69
II.2 The Locus of Ignorance: Points 6, 7 & 14	73
III. The Macrocosmic Order	76
III.1 Cosmogogenesis and Evolution: Point 11	76
III.2 Divine Omniscience: Point 12	78
IV. Epistemology and the Mind: Points 2, 4, 8 & 13	81
V. Liberation and the Knower: Point 16	86
3 - Comparative Exclusions: Defining the Text by Negation	89
I. Clarification: The Use of <i>cidābhāsa</i>	89
II. Doctrinal Exclusion: Rejection of <i>dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda</i>	91
III. Methodological Exclusion: Rejection of Navya-Nyāya	94
4 - Historical Triangulation and Theistic Synthesis	97

Title (Index)	Pag.
I. Reception of the Vidyāraṇya Synthesis	98
II. Stratigraphy of the <i>ṣaḍvidhaliṅga</i>	103
III. Divergence from the <i>Vedāntaparibhāṣā</i>	110
5 – Sectarian Demarcation: Devotion and Grace	116
I. Introduction: Theological Orientation	116
II. The Causal Economy of Grace	117
III. The Ritualization of Devotion (<i>bhakti</i>)	121
IV. The Metaphysics of Embodiment	125
V. The Soteriological Gradient	127
GENERAL CONCLUSION	129
BIBLIOGRAPHY	132
APPENDIX: ITALIAN SUMMARY	135

Introduction

The present study offers the first translation and analytical treatment—albeit partial—of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*. While the text formally presents itself as a *prakaraṇa-grantha* (pedagogical treatise) within the Advaita Vedānta tradition, its generic taxonomy proves more elusive than this designation implies. To date, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* has languished on the periphery of Indological scholarship, accessible solely through the *editio princeps* prepared by T. Chandrasekharan. Relying on a single manuscript witness (preserved in the composite codex GOML D. 1021), Chandrasekharan’s contribution was restricted to the constitution of the Sanskrit text; although he provided a cursory synopsis of the five *varṇakas*, the edition lacks both a translation and a critical apparatus.¹ The present dissertation endeavors to redress this lacuna by situating the *Māyāvivarāṇa* within the intellectual and historical currents of Early Modern India.

A methodological clarification regarding the textual basis of this enquiry is required. The decision to adopt Chandrasekharan’s printed text as the primary witness—while subjecting it to rigorous philological interrogation—is necessitated by the work’s specific material history. According to the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* appears to be a *unicum*; it is extant in a single original paper manuscript (GOML D. 1021) preserved at the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library in Madras.² This witness constitutes a composite codex comprising twenty-six independent works, a format suggesting it functioned as a preservation transcript derived from deteriorating palm-leaf antecedents.

Given the unavailability of digital surrogates for the GOML’s Sanskrit paper collection and the logistical impediments to an *in situ* autoptic examination, a direct collation of the manuscript was not feasible for the current project. Consequently, this thesis reconstructs the text by critically examining Chandrasekharan’s edition, identifying transmissional corruptions, and proposing emendations grounded in internal consistency and grammatical necessity.

Structure of the Dissertation To address the historical obscurity and doctrinal complexity of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*, this study is organized into three principal divisions, moving from the textual foundation to historical contextualization and finally to philosophical reconstruction.

¹ S. M. Fazlullah Sahib Bahadur and T. Chandrasekharan (eds.), “Māyāvivarāṇam of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya,” *Bulletin of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras*, Vol. I, No. I (Madras: Government Press, 1948), 23–48. In his editorial prolegomena, Chandrasekharan characterizes the source (D. 1021) as a “paper manuscript of the size 13 x 8 inches... written in Grantha Script.” He further identifies it as a composite codex containing “a collection of 26 independent works, of which the *Māyāvivarāṇa* forms the last.”

² *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 20, p. 153b, s.v. “Māyāvivarāṇa.” The NCC records the text with the identifiers MD. 4717 and MT. 7704. These abbreviations refer, respectively, to the *Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras* and the *Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts collected for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras*. While the NCC lists two distinct reference codes, they do not represent independent textual lineages. The entry MD. 4717 (in Vol. IX) describes the specific work *Māyāvivarāṇa*; however, the physical parent manuscript containing this text is a composite bundle registered as D. 1021 in Vol. II of the same *Descriptive Catalogue*. The second NCC entry, MT. 7704, refers to a modern restoration transcript (apograph) produced from that same manuscript in 1942–43 (assigned the shelfmark R. 7704 in Vol. XI of the *Triennial Catalogue*). Thus, the textual tradition of the *Māyāvivarāṇa* relies on a single witness (*unicum*), despite its dual attestation in the catalogues.

Chapter I: Translation presents the first complete English rendering of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*. This translation aims to balance philological fidelity to the Sanskrit original with readable English syntax, making the text's pedagogical definitions accessible to a non-specialist audience while retaining the technical precision required for doctrinal analysis.

Chapter II: Philological and Historical Contextualization undertakes a material and linguistic interrogation of the text to solve the problem of its authorship and date. By analyzing internal evidence—ranging from the architectural imagery of the *gopura* to the crucial technological anachronism of the *brhannālika* (cannon)—this chapter displaces the text from the authorship of Śaṅkara, re-situating it within the socio-political landscape of the Early Modern South.

Chapter III: Doctrinal Analysis and Doxographical Placement reconstructs the philosophical identity of the author. Moving beyond simple textual summary, this chapter applies a rigorous doxographical framework to test the *Māyāvivarāṇa* against the diagnostic tenets of the Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa schools. Through a comparative triangulation against major systematizers like Vidyāraṇya, Sadānanda, and Dharmarāja Adhvarin, the analysis further defines the text's position via its systematic exclusion of subjective idealism (*drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda*), Sureśvara's Vārttika polemics, and Navya-Nyāya logic. Ultimately, the chapter analyzes the text under the viewpoints of *bhakti* and grace, discovering that—despite its sectarian invocations—it strictly adheres to standard Advaita doctrine.

Synopsis of the *Māyāvivarāṇa* Having outlined the structure of the present study, a brief overview of the source text itself is required. The *Māyāvivarāṇa* is organized into five chapters (*varṇakas*), a pentadic structure designed to guide the aspirant (*adhikārin*) from the cosmology of ignorance to the cessation of suffering. As presented in the translation, the trajectory of the text proceeds as follows:

First *varṇaka*

This section establishes the metaphysical necessity of liberation by demonstrating the ontological impermanence of ritual results, thereby positioning *mokṣa* as the sole *paramapurūṣārtha*. It delineates a rigorous cosmogony based on *adhyāropa* (superimposition), tracing the evolution of the primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*)—illustrated via the *jatupiṇḍa* (lac-lump) analogy—into the triad of *māyā*, *avidyā*, and *tāmasī*. This differentiation grounds the distinction between creator (*īśvara*) and individual (*jīva*) in the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*). The text further maps the materialization of the subtle and gross worlds through the projecting power (*vikṣepa-śakti*) and the mechanics of quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*), establishing a precise homology between individual (*vyaṣṭi*) and cosmic (*samaṣṭi*) bodies. Crucially, it bifurcates the veiling power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) into modalities of "non-existence" (*asattva*) and "non-appearance" (*abhāna*); the former is dispelled by indirect knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*) arising from listening, while the latter is destroyed by direct knowledge (*aparokṣajñāna*) born of reflection and meditation, culminating in the "seven stages" (*saptāvasthā*) of realization. The chapter concludes by defining *apavāda* (rescission) as the ontological negation (*niṣedha*) of the effect within the cause, establishing that the *jīvanmukta* is one who realizes that apart from Brahman, nothing exists.

Second varṇaka

The second section transitions from the cosmological macrocosm to the requisite dispositions of the aspirant (*adhikārin*), elucidating the "fourfold means" (*sāadhanacatuṣṭaya*): *viveka* (discrimination), *vairāgya* (detachment), *śamādiṣaṭkasampatti* (sixfold virtues), and *mumukṣutva* (longing for liberation). It dramatizes the pedagogical encounter through the scriptural image of the student approaching the teacher with sacrificial firewood (*samitpāṇi*) to inquire about the nature of the *jīva*, *īśvara*, and the world. While the *guru*, out of compassion, elucidates these realities "like a fruit on the palm," the text asserts a devotional causality: the acquisition of the qualifications themselves is contingent upon the "ripening of merit" (*puṇya-paripāka*) and the "grace of the Lord" (*īśvarānugraha*). The chapter concludes by elevating the preceptor to a quasi-divine status, declaring that the *guru* who imparts this knowledge is to be regarded as if he were *īśvara* himself.

Third varṇaka

The third *varṇaka* interrogates the identity of the self (*ātman*) in a syncretic manner: the author explicitly delineates and presents both the limitation theory (*avacchedapakṣa*) and the reflection theory (*pratibimbapakṣa*) as complementary explanatory frameworks. The text validates the empirical efficacy of idol worship (*mūrtipūjā*) before culminating in a rigorous stratification of the *jīva*. Using the fluid analogy of water, wave, and foam, it distinguishes the absolute (*pāramārthika*), empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and illusory (*prātibhāsika*) selves, establishing the "immutable reality" (*kūṭastha*) as the sole substratum of the changing empirical order.

Fourth varṇaka

The fourth section presents an ontological deconstruction of suffering (*duḥkha*), demonstrating via dialectical negation that misery is not intrinsic (*svābhāvika*) to the self but an adventitious (*āgantuka*) condition strictly concomitant with embodiment. Establishing the "universal rule" (*vyāpti*) that the assumption of a body invariably generates suffering, the text extends this defect even to celestial deities, thereby dismantling the allure of heavenly worlds. Consequently, the text subordinates *jīvanmukti* to *videhamukti*, redefining the latter not as a post-mortem event but as a psycho-intellectual state accessible to the living. Validating this "disembodied" bliss against charges of nihilism (*śūnyatva*), the chapter concludes by elevating *sāyujya* as the sole primary liberation, achieved through the incinerating power of knowledge.

Fifth varṇaka

The final section begins by rigorously mapping the causal link between action (*karman*) and embodiment. It establishes a tripartite hierarchy of meritorious, demeritorious, and mixed actions, detailing their respective physiological fruitions ranging from celestial deities down to specific botanical forms. Crucially, the text enforces a strict ontological severance between the self (*ātman*) and agency (*kartr̥tva*), demonstrating that the self is an immutable witness (*sākṣin*) while agency resides solely in the "threefold faculties" (*trividhakarāṇa*). Based on this distinction, the chapter stratifies the grades of the illumined: while lower knowers (*brahmaavid*, etc.) must maintain righteous conduct for the welfare of the world (*lokānugraha*), the highest aspirant (*brahmaavidvariṣṭha*) alone attains the state of being void of mental modifications (*vṛttisūnya*), thereby transcending all scriptural injunctions.

The text then deepens the analysis of agency by examining "instigation" (*kārayitṛtva*); utilizing the dialectic of *anvaya-vyatireka* and the analogy of a cannon (*nālikā*), it proves that desire and aversion alone instigate the faculties, not the self. Finally, the treatise outlines the epistemological trajectory for removing the three obstacles to realization—doubt (*saṃśaya*), impossibility (*asaṃbhāvanā*), and contrary notion (*viparītabhāvanā*)—via the tripartite regimen of listening, reflection, and meditation. It concludes by validating the non-dual purport of scripture through the "six indicative marks" (*ṣaḍvidhaliṅga*), uniquely expanding the category of *arthavāda* into a "sevenfold system" of eulogies.

Chapter I: Translation

Notes on the Translation

The translation presented herein seeks to maintain the philological precision of the Sanskrit original while rendering its philosophical nuances in a clear and coherent English idiom. The following notes delineate the textual basis of this study, the conventions of notation employed to distinguish editorial layers, and the methodological principles guiding the translation.

I. Textual Basis and Critical Apparatus

The Sanskrit text accompanying this translation is based on the Devanagari edition published by the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (ed. T. Chandrasekharan) and has been transliterated into the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST). While generally faithful to the source, this presentation standardizes orthographic irregularities and idiosyncratic scribal habits—such as the inconsistent gemination of the dental sibilant (e.g., *satva* for *sattva*)—to ensure readability. All such standardizations, alongside substantive emendations where the text has been corrected (*recte*) against the manuscript or editor’s transcription for grammatical, metrical, or conceptual integrity, are rigorously documented in the footnotes.

These footnotes serve a strictly textual and philological function, recording:

1. **Manuscript Corruptions and Emendations:** Instances where the manuscript reading is doctrinally inconsistent, grammatically indefensible, or marred by physical lacunae (loss of ink or characters). This category records the reconstructed reading adopted in the translation, encompassing both the emendations proposed by the editor (T. Chandrasekharan) and those introduced in the present study to restore textual integrity.
2. **Scribal Redundancies:** Textual elements deemed to be scribal insertions or glosses.
3. **Source Identification:** Scriptural sentences or phrases quoted or alluded to by the author of the *Māyāvivaraṇa*, identified and extrapolated from foundational texts such as the *Bhagavadgītā*, various *Upaniṣads*, and the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

Note: doctrinal analysis and philosophical commentary have been reserved for the interpretative chapters; the footnotes herein serve solely to establish the text.

II. Conventions of Notation

To distinguish between the constitution of the Sanskrit text and the interpretive interpolations within the English translation, the following bracket conventions have been employed:

In the Sanskrit Text:

- **Square Brackets [...]** They indicate text that is missing from the manuscript, illegible, or has been substituted for the original reading by the editor (T. Chandrasekharan) to restore grammatical, metrical, or conceptual integrity.
- **Round Brackets (...)** They indicate text present in the manuscript but rejected by the editor as scribal error, hypermetrical insertion, or marginalia erroneously incorporated into the body text.

In the English Translation:

- **Square Brackets [...]** Primarily, they enclose syntactic supplements required by the English idiom (e.g., implied copulas, subjects, or connecting particles) which are not explicitly present in the Sanskrit but are necessary for intelligibility. Secondly, they indicate that the enclosed English text corresponds to a Sanskrit reading that was itself conjecturally supplied or reconstructed by the editor (T. Chandrasekharan) within the source text.
- **Round Brackets (...)** They enclose the original Sanskrit terms (cited in their stem form) corresponding to the preceding English translation; provide English equivalents where Sanskrit technical terms are retained in the main text for doctrinal precision; and supply brief editorial glosses or clarificatory insertions that do not necessarily correspond to a specific Sanskrit term.

III. Methodological Principles of Translation

1. Grammatical Standardization The author of the *Māyāvivarāṇa* occasionally employs varying grammatical constructions to articulate identical conceptual categories. Where such variation appears to be a matter of style rather than philosophical substance, this translation privileges uniform terminology to ensure conceptual coherence.

- *Example:* In chapter V, regarding the classification of action (*karman*), the text alternates between the instrumental phrase *vācā kriyamāṇam* (“action performed by speech”) and the adjectival nominal *vācikaṃ* (“verbal”). To maintain taxonomic clarity, both instances are rendered as “verbal action.”

2. Citation of Sanskrit Terms For the sake of morphological precision and uniform reference, Sanskrit terms cited within the translation are presented in their stem form (*prātipadika*), irrespective of their inflected form in the original sentence, and this convention is applied consistently to compound nouns as well. At the same time, certain key philosophical concepts—most notably Brahman—are rendered in capitalized Roman script without diacritics when denoting the absolute reality, in accordance with standard English philosophical usage, rather than as strictly italicized stems.

3. Treatment of Honorifics and Epithets Divine epithets and honorific titles (e.g., *śrī*, *bhagavatpāda*) have been retained in their original form or translated according to context, adhering to standard Indological conventions.

FIRST VARṆAKA

|| śrīḥ ||
śrīśaṅkarabhagavatpādaviracitaṃ
māyāvivarāṇam
bālānām upakārāya mamāpi jñānasiddhaye |
tatra śrībālagopālakṛṣṇaḥ sannihito bhavet ||

Māyāvivarāṇa (“The Unveiling of Illusion”), composed by the illustrious master, Śaṅkara. For the benefit of beginners, as well as for the accomplishment of my own knowledge, may Śrībālagopālakṛṣṇa be present therein.

iha khalu dharmārthakāmamokṣānām caturvidhapuruṣārthānām madhye mokṣa eva paramapuruṣārthaḥ nityatvāt na ca punar āvartata iti śruteḥ | itareṣāṃ trayāṇām na tathātvam anityatvāt tadyatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣāyate evam evāmutra puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣāyate iti śruteḥ |

Indeed, in this world, among the four ends of human life (*caturvidhapuruṣārtha*) – *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa* – *mokṣa* is certainly the supreme one; on account of [its] eternity, the Śruti [declares]: “It does not return again.”

For the other three (ends), [however,] this is not the case; owing to [their] impermanence, the Śruti [states]: “Just as the world attained here through action perishes, so too the world attained there through merit is destroyed.

sa mokṣaś ca brahmajñānād eva sidhyati; tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate’yanāya (iti) brahmavid āpnoti param ityādiśrutibhyaḥ |³ tad brahma [adhyāropāpavādapūrvam eva suvijñeyam] | adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ jñātavyaḥ tattvanirṇaya (iti) na karmaṇā na prajñāyā na tyāgena dhanena vā iti śruteḥ |⁴ tasmān mumukṣuṇā adhyāropāpavādān avāśyaṃ jñātavyau |

Indeed, the *mokṣa* mentioned above is attained through knowledge of Brahman; the Śruti [declares]: “Having truly known it, one overcomes death; there is no other path to this end,” “The knower of Brahman attains the other shore of *saṃsāra*,” and so on.

This Brahman [is to be properly understood through *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (withdrawal)]; the Śruti [further states]: “The determination of reality must be grasped through *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*, not through ritual action (*karman*), (conventional) knowledge (*prajñā*), renunciation (*tyāga*), or wealth (*dhana*).” Therefore, *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* must necessarily be understood by one who seeks liberation.

atrādhyāropo nāma śuktikāyāṃ rajatavat rajjau sarpavat marumarīcikāyāṃ jalavat sthāṇau puruṣavac ca niṣprapañcātmavastuni prapañcāropaḥ |⁵ ayam adhyāropo vastvajñānādāropaḥ | tad ajñānam evāvidyā tamaḥ mohaḥ mūlaprakṛtiḥ pradhānaṃ guṇasāmyam avyaktaṃ māyeti cocyate | mūlaprakṛtir nāma

³ *mokṣaś* is followed by an uncertain sign, which we interpret as *ca*; *tamave*, *recte tam eva*; *atimṛtyumoti*, *recte atimṛtyum eti*. “*tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate’yanāya*”, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8.

⁴ *tatvanirṇaya*, *recte tattvanirṇaya*.

⁵ *jalavata*, *recte jalavat*; *marumarīcikāyā*, *recte marumarīcikāyāṃ*.

**śuklakṛṣṇaraktatantusamudāyarūparajjuvat sattvarajastamoguṇasamudāyarūpā |⁶
asyāḥ pralayo mahāsuṣuptir iti ca nāma | asyāṃ mūlaprakṛtāv anantakoṭijīvāḥ
svasvakarmavāsanābhīḥ saha jatupiṇḍe svarṇareṇava iva sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvaṃ līnā vartante |
ayam anubhavaḥ sakalajanānāṃ suṣuptāv asti |**

Here, *adhyāropa* is defined as the superimposition of multiplicity (*prapañcāropa*) upon the true self, which is devoid of multiplicity (*niṣprapañcātmavastu*), like silver upon mother-of-pearl, a serpent upon a rope, water in a desert mirage, and a human being upon a post. This superimposition is the superimposition of ignorance (*ajñāna*) upon the true reality (*vastu*). Such non-knowledge is indeed termed ignorance (*avidyā*), darkness (*tamas*), perplexity (*moha*), primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*), primordial matter (*pradhāna*), equality of the qualities (*guṇasāmya*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*), [and] illusion (*māyā*).

The primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*) is said to consist of an aggregate of (the three) qualities (*guṇas*)—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*—like a rope formed of intertwined white, black, and red threads, and its dissolution is called the great deep sleep (*mahāsuṣupti*).

In this primary cause dwell innumerable multitudes of living beings (*jīva*), together with their karmic impressions (*karmavāsanā*), enveloped prior to creation (*sṛṣṭi*) like gold flakes embedded in a lump of lac. This experience exists for all people in deep sleep.

**sā mūlaprakṛtiḥ sṛṣṭikāle paripakvajīvakarmavaśān māyā avidyā tāmasīti tridhā jātā |⁷
tatra māyā śuddhasattvapradhānā |⁸ tatra pratibimbitaṃ satsṛṣṭeḥ pūrvaṃ vidyamānaṃ
brahmācāitanyam īśvara ity ucyate | asyāvyaḥkṛto'ntaryāmīti ca nāma |
sa eva jagatsraṣṭaḥ |⁹ sa eva paripūrṇabrahmācāitanyarūpeṇa tāmasyavacchinna eva san
jagadupādānakāraṇam api bhavati ūrṇanābhivat | sa
upādhiprādhānyenopādānakāraṇaṃ svaprādhānyena nimittam |**

This primary cause, at the time of creation (*sṛṣṭikāla*), manifests in three forms due to the force of the accumulated karmic impressions of living beings: illusion (*māyā*), ignorance (*avidyā*), [and] darkness (*tāmasī*). In this context, *māyā* is predominated by pure *sattva*. There, the reflection (*pratibimbita*), existing from before the ontologically real creation (*satsṛṣṭi*), is called *brahmācāitanya* or *īśvara*, and its elementary substance (*avyākṛta*) is called *antaryāmin*; this latter is indeed the creator of the world (*jagatsraṣṭa*).

Itself, in the form of complete Brahman—consciousness, [and] being separated from darkness (*tāmasī*), it also serves as the material cause of the world (*upādānakāraṇa*), like a spider. By virtue of the predominance of the adjuncts (*upādhi*), it is the material cause, and by virtue of its own predominance, it is the efficient cause (*nimitta*) [of creation].

**ayam īśvaraḥ kena prakāreṇa jagat mṛṣṭavān iti cet ucyate pūrvoktāvidyā rajaḥpradhānā
bahuprakārānantā | tadavidyāpratibimbicāitanyarūpā jīvā apy anantāḥ | anayor
jīveśvarayor vyaṣṭirūpāvidyā samaṣṭirūpā mūlaprakṛtiś ca krameṇa kāraṇaśarīre | tayoh
kāraṇaśarīrayor jīvasyeśvarasya cāvasthānaṃ suṣuptyavasthā | tayoh
svasvakāraṇaśarīram evānandamayakośa eva kāraṇaprapañcasṛṣṭiḥ |**

⁶ *satva*, recte *sattva*.

⁷ ms. lectio corrupta: [*illeg.*] *tradhā*; emend. *tridhā*.

⁸ *satva*, recte *sattva*.

⁹ *jagatsraṣṭā*, recte *jagatsraṣṭaḥ*.

If one asks, “In what manner did this *īśvara* fashion the world?”—as previously stated—ignorance (*avidyā*), predominated by *rajas*, manifests in innumerable forms.

The living beings (*jīva*), having the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*) reflected (*pratibimbita*) in that ignorance, are also innumerable.

For these two—*jīva* and *īśvara*—ignorance (*avidyā*) in the form of individuality (*vyaṣṭi*) and the primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*) in the form of totality (*samaṣṭi*) are, respectively, the causal bodies (*kāraṇaśarīre*). The abiding of the *jīva* and *īśvara* in these two causal bodies is the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti*). Their respective causal body is verily the sheath of bliss (*ānandamayakośa*) and is the creation of the causal universe (*kāraṇaprapañcasṛṣṭi*).

***atha sūkṣmaprapañcasṛṣṭir ucyate īśvarasyekṣaṇavaśāt tamoguṇarūpā prakṛtir
āvaraṇasaktir vikṣepasaktir iti ca dvidhā jātā | tatra vikṣepasaktir eva sūkṣma ākāśo’bhūt
ākāśād vāyuh | vāyoragniḥ | agnerāpaḥ | adbhyaḥ pṛthivī | eṣāṃ pañcabhūtānāṃ
sūkṣmabhūtāny apañcīkṛtāni tanmātrāṇi ceti nāma | eṣāṃ api sattvarajastamoguṇāḥ
kāraṇād ajñānād āgatāḥ santi |*¹⁰**

Now the creation of the subtle manifoldness (*sūkṣmaprapañcasṛṣṭi*) is described.

By the power of the glance of *īśvara*, *prakṛti*, in its form of the quality of *tamas*, manifested in two ways: as the veiling power (*āvaraṇasakti*) and as the projecting power (*vikṣepasakti*). It is indeed the projecting power that gave rise to subtle space (*sūkṣmākāśa*); from space [arose] air (*vāyu*), from air fire (*agni*), from fire water (*āpas*), [and] from water earth (*pṛthivī*). Among these five elements (*pañcabhūta*), the subtle elements are referred to as both *apañcīkṛtāni* and *tanmātrāṇi*; of these even the *guṇa*—*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*—arose from the cause of nescience.

***eteṣāṃ ākāśādīnāṃ pṛthak pṛthak sattvaguṇāṃśāc chrotram tvac cakṣur jihvā ghrāṇam
iti pañca jñānendriyāṇi krameṇa jātāni |*¹¹ *ākāśadisattvasamaṣṭyāntaḥkaraṇam jātam |*¹²
*manobuddhicittāhaṅkārabhedena tac caturvidham | tatra buddhāv ahaṅkārasya manasi
cittasya cāntarbhāvaḥ | evam ākāśadirajoguṇāṃśād vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthā iti pañca
karmendriyāṇi jātāni | ākāśadirajoguṇasamaṣṭyā prāṇo jātaḥ |
prāṇāpānavyānodānasamānabhedena sa pañcavidhaḥ |***

Of these—space (*ākāśa*), etc.—from the respective portions of the quality of *sattva* (*sattvaguṇāṃśā*), the five sensory organs (*jñānendriya*)—ear (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eye (*cakṣu*), tongue (*jihvā*), nose (*ghrāṇa*)—were successively manifested.

From the aggregate (*samaṣṭi*) of the sattvic [portions] of space and so on, the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) came into being. This (inner organ) is fourfold, distinguished into mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), memory (*citta*), [and] ego (*ahaṅkāra*). Therein, the inherent nature (*antarbhāva*) of ego resides in the intellect, and that of memory resides in the mind. Thus, from the portions of the rajasic quality (*rajoguṇāṃśā*) of space and so on, the five organs of action (*karmendriya*)—larynx (*vāc*), hand (*pāṇi*), foot (*pāda*), organ of excretion (*pāyu*), and organ of generation (*upastha*)—were manifested.

From the aggregate of the rajasic [portions] of space and so on, life force (*prāṇa*) came into

¹⁰ *satva, recte sattva.*

¹¹ *satva, recte sattva.*

¹² *satva, recte sattva; ms. lectio corrupta: samaṣṭrayāḥ; emend. samaṣṭyāḥ – corrected following a similar phrase later; final visarga obscured by sandhi.*

existence. This (*prāṇa*) is fivefold, distinguished into the inward-flowing vital force (*prāṇa*), the downward-flowing vital force (*apāna*), the circulatory vital force (*vyāna*), the upward-flowing vital force (*udāna*), and the digestive vital force (*samāna*).

***etaḥ jñānendriyapañcakam karmendriyapañcakam manobuddhiś caikībhūya
sūkṣmaśarīraṃ liṅgākhyam ucyate |¹³ idam eva bhogasādhanam | asmin sūkṣmaśarīre
jīveśvarayor avasthitih svapnāvasthā | asmin
jñānamayakośamanamayakośapraṇamayakośāḥ santi | evaṃ sūkṣmasṛṣṭiprakārah
(sūkṣmaśarīraṃ liṅgākhyam ucyate) |***

This subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*)—[comprising] the five sensory organs, the five organs of action, and mind and intellect, unified into one—is called the *liṅga*. It is indeed the instrument for enjoyment (*bhogasādhana*).

Within this subtle body, the abiding of the *jīva* and *īśvara* is the dream state (*svapnāvasthā*). Here are present the intellect sheath (*jñānamayakośa*), the mind sheath (*manomayakośa*), and the vital breath sheath (*prāṇamayakośa*).

Thus is the manner of the subtle creation (*sūkṣmasṛṣṭi*).

***atha sthūlasṛṣṭir ucyate | tamoguṇapradhānāni pañcabhūtāni pañcīkṛtāni ākāśādīni
pañcāpi bhūtāni pratyekaṃ dvidhā vibhajyaikaikam ardham caturdhā vibhajya
svārdhabhāgaṃ vihāyetarārdhabhāgeṣu saṃyojanam pañcīkaranam |¹⁴ evaṃ kṛte
pañcāpi pañcīkṛtāni bhavanti | ebhyaḥ pañcīkṛtebhyo brahmāṇḍam tadantaś caturdaśa
bhuvanāni teṣu codbhijjasvedajāṇḍajarāyuja[bhedāt] caturvidhasthūlaśarīrāṇi
annādibhogyavastūni ca jātāni | etasmin sthūlaśarīre jīveśvarayor avasthānam
jāgradavasthā | idam sthūlam evānnamayakośam |¹⁵ evaṃ sthūlasṛṣṭiprakārah |***

Now the process of gross creation (*sthūlasṛṣṭi*) is explained.

The five elements (*pañcabhūta*), predominated by the quality of *tamas* and quintuplicated—space (*ākāśa*) and so on—are each divided into two; each half is [further] divided into four. Leaving aside one's own half-part, [it] undergoes joining with the half-portions of the others. [This is called] *pañcīkaraṇa* (quintuplication).

Thus having been done, [all] five become quintuplicated.

From these fivefolded elements the universe (*brahmāṇḍa*) [arose]; the fourteen worlds having that as their boundary. Within these (worlds) the four kinds of gross bodies—distinguished as germinating (*udbhijja*), sweat-born (*svedaja*), egg-born (*aṇḍaja*), [and] viviparous (*jarāyuja*)—as well as objects of enjoyment, beginning with food, came into existence.

In this gross body (*sthūlaśarīra*), the abiding of the *jīva* and *īśvara* is the waking state (*jāgradavasthā*). This gross [body] is indeed the sheath constituted of food (*annamayakośa*). Thus is the manner of the gross creation (*sthūlasṛṣṭi*).

***idam kāraṇasūkṣmasthūlaśarīratritayam ca pratyekaṃ vyaṣṭisamaṣṭibhedena dvividham
| [yathā] vanam grāma ityādih samaṣṭih | vṛkṣo gṛham ityādir vyaṣṭih | evaṃ***

¹³ The editor proposes to read *liṅgākhyam utpadyate* as *liṅgākhyam ucyate*.

¹⁴ *catardhā, recte caturdhā*.

¹⁵ *evānnamayakośaḥ, recte evānnamayakośam*.

**sarvaśarīraṃ samaṣṭiḥ | ekaśarīraṃ vyaṣṭiḥ | tatra samaṣṭyupādhika īśvaraḥ |¹⁶
vyaṣṭayupādhiko jīvaḥ |**

This triad of bodies—causal (*kāraṇa*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), and gross (*sthūla*)—each, by the distinction of individuality (*vyaṣṭi*) and totality (*samaṣṭi*), is twofold. [Just as] a forest, a village, and similar entities constitute a totality, [and] a tree, a house, and the like exemplify individuality, so all bodies (collectively) form a totality, [whereas] a single body represents individuality. Accordingly, *īśvara* is the one with the universal adjunct (*samaṣṭyupādhika*), and the *jīva* is the one with the individual adjunct (*vyaṣṭyupādhika*).

**tatrāpi kāraṇasamaṣṭyeśvaraḥ |¹⁷ kāraṇavyaṣṭyā prājñāḥ | sūkṣmasamaṣṭyā
hiraṇyagarbhaḥ | sūkṣmavyaṣṭyā taijasaḥ | stūlasamaṣṭyā vaiśvānaraḥ | sthūlavyaṣṭyā
viśvaḥ | iti jīveśvarayor avāntarabhedaḥ |**

There too: from the causal totality (*kāraṇasamaṣṭi*), *īśvara* is manifest; from the causal individuality, the *prājñā* (*jīva*) is manifest. From the subtle totality, there is *hiraṇyagarbha*; from the subtle individuality, there is *taijasa*. From the gross totality, there is *vaiśvānara*; from the gross individuality, *viśva* manifests. Thus is the subdivision (*avāntarabheda*) of *jīva* and *īśvara*.

**ayam eveśvaraḥ sattvarajastamoguṇair upādhibhir brahmaviṣṇurudrarūpeṇa
sṛṣṭisthitisamhārāya karoti |¹⁸ brahmaṇo virāṭrūpe'ntarbhāvaḥ | viṣṇor hiraṇyagarbhe
'ntarbhāvaḥ |¹⁹ rudrasyeśvare'ntarbhāvaḥ | evaṃ prapañcotpattiḥ | ayam evādhyāropaḥ
|²⁰ idaṃ vikṣepaśaktikāryam |**

Indeed, this *īśvara*, through the *guṇa*—*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*—[which serve as its] adjuncts, manifests in the forms of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, [and] Rudra, acting for the sake of creation (*sṛṣṭi*), preservation (*sthiti*), and dissolution (*samhāra*). The inherent nature of Brahmā is present in the *virāṭrūpa*, that of Viṣṇu in *hiraṇyagarbha*, and that of Rudra in *īśvara*. Thus is the origination of the manifoldness (*prapañcotpatti*); this is the superimposition (*adhyāropa*); such is the effect of the projecting power (*vikṣepaśakti*).

**athāvaraṇaśaktikāryam ucyate īśvaram ātmajñāninaṃ ca viḥyānyeṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ
jīvānāṃ pañcakośānām ātmanaś cābhedam āvaraṇaśaktir andhakārarūpāvṛṇoti |²¹
āvaraṇaṃ ca dvidham | asattvāvaraṇam abhānāvaraṇaṃ ceti |²² vastu nāstīti
vyavahārakāraṇam asattvāvaraṇam |²³ vastu na bhātīti vyavahārakāraṇam
abhānāvaraṇam | āvaraṇaśaktikāryam eva saṃsāravṛkṣasya mūlaṃ na
vikṣepaśaktikāryam | etan mokṣasiddher api hetuḥ |**

¹⁶ *samaṣṭra*, recte *samaṣṭi*.

¹⁷ *kāraṇasamaṣṭyēvaraḥ*, recte *kāraṇasamaṣṭyēśvaraḥ*.

¹⁸ *satva*, recte *sattva*; ms. lectio corrupta: *samhārā*[illeg.]; emend. *samhārāya*.

¹⁹ *ca*, which was placed between *hiraṇyagarbhe* and *antarbhāvaḥ*, has been removed by the editor.

²⁰ *ayamevādhyāropaḥ*, recte *ayam evādhyāropaḥ*.

²¹ *ātmanaś*[illeg.]*ābhedam*; emend. *ātmanaś cābhedam*.

²² *asatva*, recte *asattva*.

²³ *asatva*, recte *asattva*.

Now, the effect of the veiling power (*āvaraṇaśakti*) is described.

Except for *īśvara* and the self-conscious (*ātmañānin*), the veiling power, in the form of darkness, covers the identity (*abheda*) between the five sheaths (*pañcakośa*) and the self (*ātman*).

The veiling power is twofold: veiling due to non-existence (*asattvāvaraṇa*) and veiling due to non-appearance (*abhānāvaraṇa*).

The cause for the common assumption (*vyavahāra*) that something does not exist is the veiling due to non-existence. The cause for the common assumption that something does not appear is the veiling due to non-appearance.

It is indeed the effect of the veiling power, rather than the projecting power, that constitutes the root of the tree of *saṃsāra*; this (same veiling power) is also the cause for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*).

dvividham apy āvaraṇaṃ tattvajñānena vināśyam |²⁴ tattvajñānam ca parokṣajñānam aparokṣajñānam iti dvividham |²⁵ atra gurumukhād vedānta[śravaṇa]janyam parokṣajñānam |²⁶ idam eva śravaṇam | anena vastu nāstīty evaṃ rūpam asattvāvaraṇaṃ naśyati |²⁷ tadā vastu astīti vyavahriyate |

Moreover, the twofold veiling power is to be dispelled by the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*), which itself is twofold: indirect (*parokṣajñāna*) and direct (*aparokṣajñāna*). Here, indirect knowledge arises from [listening to] Vedānta at the *guru*'s mouth. This, indeed, is *śravaṇa* (listening). By it, the veiling of this sort—the thing does not exist—is removed; thereafter, it is designated as—the thing exists.

śravaṇena saṃśayaṃ mananenāsambhāvanām nididhyāsanena viparītabhāvanām [ca] nivartayitvā dehātmañānād brahmātmajñānam (ca) jāyamānam aparokṣajñānam | anena vastu na bhātīti vyavahārahetur abhānāvaraṇaṃ vinaśyati | evaṃ parokṣajñānenāparokṣajñānena ca brahma nāsti na bhātīti vyavahārahetur āvaraṇadvayam api vinaśyati |²⁸ tadānarthanivṛttir ānandāvāptiś ca bhavataḥ iti saptāvasthāḥ siddhyanti |²⁹ evaṃ ākāśavan nirmalacaitanyavastuni mithyābhūtaprapañcakalpanam adhyāropaḥ |

Having removed the doubt (*saṃśaya*) through listening (*śravaṇa*), the non-acceptance (*asambhāvanā*) through reasoning (*manana*), [and] the contrary notion (*viparītabhāvanā*) through profound meditation (*nididhyāsa*), [there] arises, in place of the false identification of the self with the body, the direct knowledge (*aparokṣajñāna*) that the self is Brahman (*brahmātmajñāna*).

By this (knowledge), the veiling in the form of non-appearance, which is the cause of the common notion (*vyavahāra*) “this thing does not appear,” is destroyed.

Thus, by both direct (*aparokṣajñāna*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*), even the twofold veiling (*āvaraṇadvayam*), which is the cause of the common notion “Brahman does

²⁴ *tatva, recte tattva.*

²⁵ *tatva, recte tattva.*

²⁶ The editor omitted *jñāna* after *vedānta*, substituting it with *śravaṇa*.

²⁷ *satva, recte sattva.*

²⁸ *āvaraṇadvayam, recte āvaraṇadvayam.*

²⁹ *ānandāvāptiś* is followed by an uncertain sign, which we interpret as *ca*.

not exist, does not appear,” is destroyed. Then, cessation of evil (*anarthanivṛtti*) and attainment of bliss (*ānandāvāpti*) occur; thus the seven stages are fulfilled. In this way, like the sky, the illusory projection (*kalpana*) of the unreal multiplicity of elements (*mithyābhūtaprapaṅca*) is superimposed upon the reality of pure consciousness (*nirmalacaitanyavastu*).

***athāpavāda ucyate kāraṇavyatirekeṇa kāryaṃ nāstīti bodhena śuktikāyāṃ rajatavad
rajjau sarpavat brahmaṇi prapaṅco nāstīti niṣedho’pavādaḥ | yā mā sā māyā yā na
vidyate sāvidyā iti vyutpattyā māyāyāḥ kalpitatvaṃ siddham |³⁰ evaṃ yo
brahmavyatirekeṇa kimapi nāsti tad brahmāham eveti vicārya jānāti sa eva jīvanmukta iti
vedāntasiddhāntaḥ |***

Now withdrawal (*apavāda*) is described.

“Without the cause, the effect does not exist”; “through understanding, as silver upon mother-of-pearl, as a snake upon a rope, the multiplicity does not exist in Brahman”—this is negation (*niṣedha*), this is *apavāda*.

“That which does not exist, that is *māyā*; that which is unreal, that is ignorance (*avidyā*)” – by etymological derivation, the state of being imagined (*kalpitatva*) of *māyā* is established. Thus, one who, having reflected, understands: “Apart from Brahman nothing exists; that Brahman am I indeed,” he alone is a *jīvanmukta* (liberated while living). This is the established conclusion (*siddhānta*) of Vedānta.

***sthūlasūkṣmādidēhānām ātmany āropa eva ca |
apavādas tato’py eṣāṃ samyag atra pradarsītaḥ | |***

iti [māyāvivarāṇe] prathamavarṇakaṃ samāptaṃ |

The superimposition (*āropa*) of gross (*sthūla*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), and other bodies upon the self (*ātman*)—even for these, *apavāda* has been thoroughly demonstrated here.

Thus, the first chapter [in *Māyāvivarāṇa*] is concluded.

SECOND VARṆAKA

atha dvitīyavarṇakam

***sarvavedāntasāstreṣu hy anuba[ndha]catuṣṭayam |³¹
yathā pūrvoktam atrāpi tathaiva samudīryate | |***

Now, the second chapter.

In all Vedānta texts, the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*, as already mentioned, is likewise explained here.

³⁰ *vyutpattyā, recte vyutpattyā.*

³¹ The editor proposes to read *anubandhi* as *anubandha*.

***atha dvitīyavarṇake'nubandhacatuṣṭayam ucyate |³² viśayaḥ prayojanaṃ sambandhaḥ
adhikārī cety anubandhacatuṣṭayam |³³ asya vedāntaśāstrasya brahmaiva viśayaḥ |
mokṣa eva prayojanam | pratipādyapratipādakabhāvo bodhyabodhakabhāvo vā
sambandhaḥ | sādhanacatuṣṭayasampanna evādhikārī | yathā bṛhaspatisave brāhmaṇa
eva rājasūye kṣatriyaḥ stome vaiśya tathā vedāntaśāstre sādhanacatuṣṭayasampanna
evādhikārī |***

Now, in the second chapter, the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* is described.

The *viśaya* (subject), *prayojana* (purpose), *sambandha* (connection), and *adhikārī* (qualified student)—these four are [called] the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*.

The subject of this Vedānta scripture is Brahman alone; the purpose is indeed liberation (*mokṣa*); the connection is the state [of relation] between the revealed (*pratipādyā*) and the revealer (*pratipādaka*), or between the knowable (*bodhya*) and the instructor (*bodhaka*); the qualified student is indeed [the one] endowed with the four means (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*). Just as in the *bṛhaspatisava* only a *brāhmaṇa* is qualified, in the *rājasūya* only a *kṣatriya*, and in the *stoma* only a *vaiśya*, so in the scripture of Vedānta, only the one endowed with the four means is the qualified student.

***sādhanacatuṣṭayam nāma nityānityavastuvivekaḥ ihāmutrārthaphalabhogavirāgaḥ
śamādiṣṭakasampattiḥ mumukṣutvaṃ ceti | brahmaiva nityam jagad anityam iti
śrutismṛtipurāṇādīnā svayam eva jāyamānaṃ jñānaṃ nityānityavastuvivekaḥ |³⁴ iha
srakcandanavanitādiviśayabhogaḥ paratra svargādiṣu rambhādistrīviśayabhogaś
cobhayam apy anityam iti śvavāntāśanamalamūtrapurīṣādivat tatra vairasyam
ihāmutrārthaphalabhogavirāgaḥ |³⁵ śamadamoparatititikṣāśraddhāsamādhānam iti
śamādiṣṭakam |³⁶ śamo nāma śravaṇādivyatiriktebhyo nivṛtṭyātmany eva
śravaṇādiviśaye manasaḥ sthāpanam |³⁷ damo nāma jñānakarmendriyanigrahaḥ |
uparatir nāma sarvaprapaṅcoparamaḥ samnyāsaḥ niṣkāmakarmānuṣṭhānam
vyavahāralopo vā |³⁸ titikṣā nāma prārabdhagataśītoṣṇādisahanam |³⁹ śraddhā nāma
guruvedāntavākyeṣu viśvāsaḥ | samādhānaṃ nāma śravaṇādyanukūlavīṣaye
manaḥsamādhīḥ | mumukṣutvaṃ nāma tatra svagrhe dahyamāne
tatrasthadahyamānapuruṣo yathā kalatraputrādikaṃ [tyaktvā] svatāpopaśamanārtham
eva bahirnirgatya tāpopaśamaṃ kartum icchati evaṃ sāmśārikatāpopaśamaṃ
sampādayitum tyaktasarvaiṣaṇasya brahmatātmyabhāve tīvrecchā (mumukṣā) |⁴⁰***

³² *anubandhacatuṣṭayam, recte anubandhacatuṣṭayam.*

³³ *anubandhacatuṣṭayam, recte anubandhacatuṣṭayam.*

³⁴ *brahmava, recte brahmaiva; jñāna, recte jñānaṃ.*

³⁵ The manuscript reads *srakcandanavanitādiviśayabhogaḥ*, but the editor has emended it to *srakcandanavanitādiviśayabhogaḥ*; the manuscript reads *bhogaścatyubhayam*, but the editor has emended it to *bhogaś cobhayam*; the manuscript reads *rambhādistrīviśayo bhogaś*, but we emended it to *rambhādistrīviśayabhogaś*, following the editor's earlier correction of the same construction elsewhere.

³⁶ The manuscript reads *titikṣaḥ*, but the editor has emended it to *titikṣā*; the manuscript reads *samādhāneti*, the editor has emended it to *samādhānā iti*, but we have emended it to *samādhānam iti*.

³⁷ *nivṛtyātmani, recte nivṛtṭiyātmani.*

³⁸ *sanyāsaḥ, recte samnyāsaḥ.*

³⁹ The manuscript reads *prārabdhagataśītoṣṇādisahanam*, but the editor has emended it to *prārabdhagataśītoṣṇādisahanam*.

⁴⁰ In this context, *tyaktasarvaiṣaṇasya* has been emended to *tyaktasarvaiṣaṇasya*, considering that *eṣaṇa* ("ardent desire") better fits the semantic and philosophical context than *iṣaṇa* ("haste"); *brahmatādātmyabhāve, recte brahmatātmyabhāve.*

The four means are defined as: discrimination (*viveka*) between the eternal and the non-eternal things; detachment (*vairāgya*) toward enjoying the fruits of worldly and otherworldly pursuits; the sixfold virtues (*ṣaṭkasampatti*), beginning with control of the mind (*śama*); desire of liberation (*mumukṣutva*).

The discrimination (*viveka*) between the eternal and the non-eternal things is the self-arising knowledge, by the Śruti, Smṛti, Purāṇa, and so on: “Brahman alone is eternal, [while] the world is transient.”

In this world, enjoyment of objects such as garlands (*sraj*), sandal (*candana*), women (*vanitā*), and so on; and in the other world, enjoyment of objects such as (celestial) women of the like of Rambhā and others in heaven and so on—both kinds (of enjoyments) are transient. They are like eating the vomit, bodily secretions, urine, feces, and the like of a dog. In that context arises disgust (*vairasya*): this is detachment (*vairāgya*) toward enjoying the fruits of worldly and otherworldly pursuits.

Calmness (*śama*), self-control (*dama*), desisting from sensual enjoyment (*uparati*), forbearance (*titikṣā*), faith (*śraddhā*), and concentration (*samādhāna*): the hexad beginning with calmness.

Śama is defined as: the establishment of the mind, by withdrawing it from things other than *śravaṇa* and the rest, in the self alone—the subject-matter of *śravaṇa* and the like.

Dama is defined as the restraining (*nigraha*) of the organs of knowledge (*jñānendriya*) and of action (*karmendriya*).

Uparati is defined as: giving up the entire world (*sarvaprapañcoparama*), renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*), the performance of desireless action (*niṣkāmakarmānuṣṭhāna*), or the neglect of ordinary life (*vyavahāralopa*).

Titikṣā is defined as patient endurance (*sahana*) of [conditions] such as cold (*śīta*) and heat (*uṣṇa*), coming forth from *prārabdhakarman*.

Śraddhā is defined as trust (*viśvāsa*) in the words of the *guru* and in the statements of the Vedānta scriptures.

Samādhāna is defined as the concentration of the mind (*manāḥsamādhi*) on the object pertaining to listening (*śravaṇa*) and so on.

Mumukṣutva is defined as: just as, when his own house is on fire, a man who is being burned by staying there—[abandoning] wife, children, and so on—goes out only for the sake of quelling his own burning, desiring to effect the cessation of the heat; in the same way, to accomplish the alleviation of worldly affliction (*sāṃsārikatāpa*), in one who has renounced all ardent desires (*tyaktasarvaiṣaṇa*), an intense longing (*tivrecchā*) for one’s own nature as Brahman (*brahmatātmyabhāva*) arises.

***loke keṣāṃcin nityānityavastuviveke saty api vairāgyasyādarśanād
ihāmutrārthaphalabhoge virāgeṇāpi bhavitavyam ity uktam | tadubhaye saty api
keṣāṃcid ṛṣīśvarāṇāṃ kopatāpādidarśanāc chamādināpi bhavitavyam ity uktam |
etatritraye saty api keṣāṃcid bhaktyeśvaropāsakānāṃ jñānādhikārādarśanān
mumukṣayāpi bhavitavyam [iti] |***

It is said that in the world, due to a lack (*adarśana*) of detachment (*vairāgya*) in some people, even though they discriminate between the eternal and the non-eternal, they should also cultivate dispassion (*virāga*) regarding the enjoyment of the fruits of worldly and otherworldly pursuits.

It is said that even if both of them [—discrimination (*viveka*) and dispassion (*virāga*)—] are there, since we observe the anger, affliction, and the like of some sages (*ṛṣi*) and gods (*īśvara*), quietude and similar virtues must be cultivated.

Even if the three of them [—discrimination, dispassion, quietude and the like—] are there, since in the case of some devotees of *īśvara* the qualification for knowledge is not evident, the desire for liberation (*mumukṣā*) must also be cultivated.

***evaṃ rūpo'dhikārī upahārasamītpāṇiḥ sansadgurūpagamya namaskṛtya
viśvāsavinayābhyāṃ saha he svāmin he bhagavann iti sambodhya jīvaḥ kaḥ īśvaraḥ ka iti
jagat kīdṛśam etattrayaṃ kasmād āgatam kasmād gamiṣyatīti praśnaṃ kuryāt parīkṣya
lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedam āyān nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena |⁴¹ tadvijñānārtham sa
gurum evābhigacchet samītpāṇiḥ śrotriyaṃ brahmaniṣṭham ityādiśruteḥ | tad viddhi
praṇipātena paripraśno na sevaye'ti gītāvacanāc ca |⁴²***

Thus, the manner of the qualified [student]: holding the firewood for the sacrifice in hand, having approached the assembly and the teacher, [and] having done homage, having uttered with confidence and humility “O master! O lord!”, he should ask the question(s) “Who is the *jīva*? Who is the *īśvara*? Of what kind is the world? From where has this triad come? To where will it go?”

[He should do so] because the Śruti [declares]: “Having examined the worlds attained through action, the *brāhmaṇa* should attain disregard [towards worldly objects and reflects]: 'The eternal (*akṛta*) is not [attained] through the created (*kṛta*).' For the sake of its knowledge (*tadvijñānārtham*), he should indeed approach a *guru*, with sacrificial firewood in hand, [one who is] learned in the scriptures (*śrotriya*) and established in Brahman (*brahmaniṣṭha*),” and so on; and the *Gītā* [states]: “Know that (*tad viddhi*) by prostration (*praṇipāta*), by questioning (*paripraśna*), and by service (*sevā*)”.⁴³

***evaṃ viśeṣeṇa prārthito gurur dayayā sattvarajastamoguṇair jīveśvarajagatām
āgamanaprakāraṃ bodhayitvātmasvarūpam api karatalāmalakavad bodhayati |⁴⁴
asyādhikāriṇaḥ sādhanacatuṣṭayaṃ ca bahujanmārjitapuṇyapuñjaparipākavaśād
īśvarānugraheṇa labhyam iti veditavyam | etattattvajñānapradāyakaṃ gurum īśvaram
eva vidyāt |⁴⁵ evaṃ yo gurumukhāj jīvātmaparamātmābhedam vicārya jānāti sa eva
muktim gamiṣyatīti siddham | iti [māyāvivarāṇe] dvitīyavarṇakaṃ samāptam |***

Thus, having been specially requested, the *guru*, out of compassion, teaches regarding the manner of manifestation (*āgamanaprakāra*) of the *jīva*, the *īśvara*, and the world (*jagat*), through the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* [and] also about the nature of the self

⁴¹ The manuscript reads *upāhārasamītpāṇiḥ*, but the editor has emended it to *upahārasamītpāṇiḥ*. *sansadgurūpagamya*, recte *sansadgurūpagamya*; in this context, *sansadgurū* has been interpreted as a *dvandva* compound whose last member is in the dual form. “*parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedam āyān nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena tadvijñānārtham sa gurum evābhigacchet samītpāṇiḥ śrotriyaṃ brahmaniṣṭham*”, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 1.2.12.

⁴² *paripraśno na sevaye'ti*, recte *paripraśnena sevayeti*. “*tad viddhi praṇipātena paripraśnena sevayā*”, *Bhagavadgītā* 4.34.

⁴³ In both *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (1.2.12) and *Bhagavadgītā* (4.34), *tad* and *tat* (“that”), respectively, denote Brahman, the supreme reality to be realized through the teacher’s instruction.

⁴⁴ *satva*, recte *sattva*.

⁴⁵ *tatva*, recte *tattva*.

(*ātmasvarūpa*), as [distinctly as] a small myrobalan fruit (*āmalaka*) on the palm [of his hand] (*karatala*); and it must be understood that for such a qualified [student], the fourfold means (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*) is attainable through the favour of *īśvara* (*īśvarānugraha*), by force of the ripening of the mass of merit (*puṇya*) accumulated over many lives. This must be known. [He] should think that the *guru* who imparts the knowledge of this ultimate reality (*etattattva*) is indeed *īśvara* himself.

Thus, one who, discriminates and realizes the identity (*abheda*) between the individual self (*jīvātman*) and the supreme self (*paramātman*) through the mouth of the *guru*, he alone attains liberation (*mukti*). So it is established.

Thus, the second chapter [in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*] is concluded.

THIRD VARṆAKA

atha tṛtīyavarṇakam

cetanācetane ye vai śrutau samyak samarthite |⁴⁶
ucyete śruṇutām te dve tṛtīye varṇake'dhunā ||

Now, the third chapter.

Those two—the conscious (*cetana*) and the unconscious (*acetana*)—which indeed are thoroughly explained in the Śruti, are now described in the third chapter; listen to them all!

ayaṃ prapañcaḥ katividha iti cet ātmety anātmety ca dviprakāraḥ |⁴⁷
prapañcātītyātmanaḥ katham prapañcāntarbhūtatvam iti na śaṅkanīyam | *katham iti cet asya prapañcasya cetanācetanātmakatvād ātmanaś cetanārūpatvād ātmānaṃ vinā prapañcasyābhāvād ātmanaḥ prapañcāntarbhāvo vaktavya eva* |⁴⁸ *tarhi cetanaṃ kim acetanaṃ kim iti cet jaṅgamaṃ sarvaṃ cetanaṃ | sthāvaraṃ sarvaṃ acetanaṃ | tarhi cetanānām acetanānām ca pratyekaṃ bahuprakāratvāt katham dviprakāra eva prapañca iti cec chr̥ṇu ātmaika(rūpa) eva saha kāryarūpeṇānekarūpo'bhūt | ātmā caikarūpa eva | sa cānātmakāryopādhibhir aneka jīvā ity anekeśvarā iti ca bhāti* |

If [it be asked], “Of how many kinds (*prakāra*) is this multiplicity (*prapañca*)?”—it is twofold: the self (*ātman*) and the non-self (*anātmān*). It is not to be doubted, “How can the self, which is beyond the multiplicity (*prapañcātīta*), be included within it?”

If [it be asked], “How (can that be)?”—since this multiplicity consists of both the conscious and the unconscious, since the self is of the nature of consciousness, and since the multiplicity cannot exist without the self, it must indeed be said that the self is included within it.

If [it be asked], “What is the conscious? What is the unconscious?”—all that moves (*jaṅgama*) is conscious, [and] all that is stationary (*sthāvara*) is unconscious.

Then if [it be asked], “Since each of the conscious and the unconscious has many forms (*bahuprakāra*), how can the multiplicity be only twofold (*dviprakāra*)?”—listen: the single self (*ātmaikarūpa*) manifested as many (*anekarūpa*) along with the form of its effects

⁴⁶ The editor proposes to read *samarthyate* as *samarthite*.

⁴⁷ *ānmety, recte ātmety.*

⁴⁸ *ānmanaś, recte ātmanaś.*

(*kāryarūpa*). The self has just one form, but because of the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the effects of the non-self (*anātmakārya*), it appears as many *jīvas* and as many *īśvaras*.

ekasyeśvarasya jīvatat katham anekatvam iti cet puṇyakṣetreṣu grāmeṣu grheṣu ca śivakṛṣṇādīmūrtibhedena sthitatvād iti brūmah |⁴⁹ mṛcchilādirūpāṇāṃ tāsāṃ mūrtīnāṃ katham īśvaratvam iti cet ucyate sarvair api tāsū mūrtiṣu bahudravavyayaṃ kṛtvābhīṣekanaivedyādeḥ kriyamāṇatvāt | yeṣāṃ śāstraviśvāso nāsti te mlecchādayo mūrtīnāṃ pūjane nodāharaṇīyāḥ | sarvatra śraddhāvanām evodāharaṇīyatvāt |

If [it be asked], “How does the one *īśvara* appear as many *jīvas*?”—we say: by abiding in holy places, villages, and houses, through the variety (*bheda*) of idols (*mūrti*) of Śiva, Kṛṣṇa, and so on.

If [it be asked], “How can those idols made of clay, stone, and so on be *īśvara*?”—it is answered: because on those idols all [people] carry out [rituals] such as *abhīṣeka* (bathing), *naivedya* (food offering), and so on employing many substances (*bahudrava*). Those who have no faith in the scriptures—such as outcasts (*mleccha*) and so on—are not eligible for the worship (*pūjana*) of idols, because this is appropriate only for those who possess faith at all times.

kiṃca heye malamūtrātmakē'smin śarīre ātmabuddhiṃ kurvatāṃ jīvanām atyantaśuddhāsu mūrtiṣu īśvarabuddhikaraṇe ko doṣaḥ evam ekasyā[nā]tmanāḥ kāryarūpeṇānekatve ekasyātmāno'nātmakāryopādhibhir anekatve ca dṛṣṭāntaḥ ka iti cec chṛṇu | yathā ekaiva pṛthivī kāryarūpeṇa pariṇatā satī parvato vṛkṣo gopuraṃ kuḍiyam kusūlam grhaṃ maṭhaḥ paṭaḥ śarāva iti bhedaṃ gacchati yathā [ca] ākāśa eka eva pṛthivyādikāryopādhiṣu praviṣṭa iva pratīyamāno'yaṃ ghaṭākāśo'yaṃ maṭhākāśa ityādirupeṇānekadhā bhāti tathā mūlaprakṛtir anātmā eka eva kāryaśarīr[ādī]rūpeṇāneko jātaḥ |⁵⁰ tathātmā svayam eko'pi tat tac charīropādhibhis tatra tatra praviṣṭa iva san devo manuṣyo rāmaḥ kṛṣṇo brāhmaṇaḥ kṣatriyo vaiśyaḥ śūdraḥ paśupakṣikṛmīkīṭā iti bahudhā bhāti | ayam avacchinnapakṣe dṛṣṭāntaḥ |

Moreover, for those living beings who identify the self with this body—a body to be abandoned, composed of bodily secretions and urine—what fault could there be in identifying *īśvara* with idols that are absolutely pure?

Thus, if [it be asked], “What is the analogy (*dṛṣṭānta*) for the multiplicity (*anekatva*) of the one non-self (*anātmā*) in the form of [its] effects (*kārya*), and for the multiplicity of the one self (*ātman*) through the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) that are the effects of the non-self?”—listen:

Just as the one earth, being transformed into effects, differs in mountain, tree, monumental tower, wall, granary, house, monastery, cloth, plate [and so on], and just as the one space, appearing as though entered into the limiting adjuncts such as earth, etc., appears manifold—as “the space of this jar,” “the space of this hut,” and so forth—in the same way, the primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*), the non-self, though one, has appeared as many in the form of effects such as bodies and other manifestations. Likewise, the self, though itself one, through various bodily adjuncts (*śarīropādhi*), being as if entered here and there, appears manifold—as god, human, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya*, *śūdra*, animal

⁴⁹ *śivakṛṣṇānādimūrtibhedena, recte śivakṛṣṇānādimūrtibhedena.*

⁵⁰ *vṛkṣa, recte vṛkṣo.*

(paśu), bird (pakṣin), worm (kṛmi), [and] insect (kīṭa).

This is the analogy (dṛṣṭānta) in the case (pakṣa) of delimitation (avacchinna).

pratibimbapakṣe tu samudro nadī taṭākāḥ kūpo ghaṭajalam ity ekam eva jalaṃ yathā bahudhā jātaḥ tathā[nā]tmāpi bahudhā jātaḥ | teṣu samudrādiṣu [yathā] āditya eka eva pratibimbataḥ san bahudhā jātas tathaika evātmāntaḥkaraṇasahiteṣu sarveṣv api pratibimbataḥ san aneko jāta ity ubhayatrāpi dṛṣṭānto jñātavyaḥ | yathā [ca] jaladharmāḥ śītalacalanādaya ādityaṃ bimbaṃ na sprśanti tathāntaḥkaraṇadharmāḥ kartṛtvabhokṛtvādayo’pi tattadantaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭacidābhāsā eva bhānti bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ na sprśanti |⁵¹ tasmāj jīvātmaiva paramātmā | paramātmaiva ca jīvātmā | katham iti cet yathā mahākāśa eva ghaṭākāśa evam iti jānīhi |

Thus, according to the theory of reflection (pratibimbapakṣa), the ocean, a river, a lake, a well, and the water in a pot are all but one and the same water, appearing in many forms; likewise, the non-self appears manifoldly.

Just as the Sun, though one, appears as many when reflected in the ocean and other bodies of water, so too the ātman, though single, being reflected in all [beings] endowed with the thinking faculty (antaḥkaraṇa), appears manifold—in both cases, the analogy (dṛṣṭānta) is to be understood accordingly.

Just as the properties (dharma) of water—such as coolness, movement, and so on—do not affect the prototype Sun, so too the properties of the thinking faculty—such as agency (kartṛtva), enjoyership (bhokṛtva), and the like—appear as reflections of the [single] consciousness (cidābhāsa) that are specific to each thinking faculty. They do not touch the prototype self (bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ).

Therefore, the individual self (jīvātman) is none other than the supreme self (paramātman), and the supreme self is none other than the individual self. If [it be asked], “How?”—just as the space in a pot (ghaṭākāśa) is nothing other than the great space (mahākāśa), thus know it.

nanu jīvātmanaḥ kalpitavāt kalpitasya cāsatyavāt katham tasya satyaparamātmābheda iti cet pāramārthiko vyāvahārikaḥ prātibhāsikaś ceti jīvas trividhaḥ | ete jīvāḥ suṣuptijāgratsvapnābhīmāninaḥ | yathā jale taraṅgaḥ kalpitaḥ taraṅge ca phenāḥ kalpitaḥ tathā pāramārthike vyāvahāriko vyāvahārike prātibhāsikaś ca kalpitaḥ | yathā mādhyadravaśaityāni paramārthato jalaniṣṭhāny eva santi taraṅge bhānti tadvā phene’pi bhānti tadvat saccidānandāḥ kūṭasthapāramārthikaniṣṭhāḥ santo vyāvahārike bhānti [tadvā ca prātibhāsike] |⁵² yathā phenas taraṅgaṃ vinā nāsti taraṅgo’pi jalaṃ vinā nāsti jalaṃ tu paramārthabhūtam eva bhāty evaṃ prātibhāsiko vyāvahārikaṃ vinā nāsti vyāvahāriko’pi pāramārthikaṃ vinā nāsti | tasmād yathā paramārthito ghaṭākāśo mahākāśa eva evaṃ pāramārthikaḥ kūṭasthaparamātmaiveti siddhāntaḥ |

If [it be asked], “But, since the individual self (jīvātman) is imagined, [and] since what is imagined is unreal, how then is there a non-difference between it and the supreme self (paramātman)?”—the jīva is threefold: the absolute (pāramārthika), the empirical (vyāvahārika), and the illusory (prātibhāsika). These jīvas identify themselves [respectively]

⁵¹ We have emended [sa] eva bhānti to eva bhānti.

⁵² The manuscript readings tadvārā and the editorial adjunct ddvārā have been emended here to tadvā. This form conveys “even that” or “also that” in the context, preserving the parallelism of the metaphor.

with [the states of] deep sleep (*suṣupti*), waking (*jāgrat*), and dream (*svapna*). Just as a wave is imagined in water and foam is imagined in a wave, so too, in the absolute self, the empirical self is imagined, and in the empirical, the illusory self is imagined. Just as sweetness, fluidity, and coolness truly belong only to water, yet appear in the wave and also in the foam, so too existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*), abiding in the immutable absolute self (*kūṭasthapāramārthika*), appear in the empirical self (*vyāvahārika*) [and in the illusory one (*prātibhāsika*) as well]. Just as foam cannot exist without the wave, and the wave cannot exist without water, while water itself, being the ultimate reality, alone truly is, so too, the illusory self cannot exist without the empirical, nor the empirical without the absolute. Therefore, just as the jar-space is, in truth, nothing other than the great space, so too the absolute self is indeed the immutable supreme self (*kūṭasthaparamātman*)—this is the established conclusion.

sa eva neti neti iti vākyena dehādipañcakośebhyaḥ pāramārthikakūṭasthaṃ pṛthakkr̥tya taṃ pāramārthikaṃ kūṭasthaṃ aham iti jānann ahaṃ brahmāsmīti śrutivicāreṇa yuktibhir dṛḍhaniścayena ca sākṣātkr̥tya tiṣṭhati | sa eva paripūrṇaḥ brahmasvarūpaḥ | tam eva puṇyapāpakarmāṇi na spr̥śantīti sarvā apy upaniṣadaḥ ekatātparyeṇa ghuṣyanti |

He himself, separating the absolute, immutable [self] from the five sheaths (*pañcakośa*)—such as the body and so on—by means of the statement “not this, not this,” and knowing that absolute, immutable (*kūṭastha*) self as “I,” stands having directly realized [this] through the analysis on the scriptures (*śrutivicāra*) [teaching] “I am Brahman,” reasoning (*yukti*), and firm conviction (*dṛḍhaniścaya*).

He himself is the complete essence of Brahman (*brahmasvarūpa*). All the Upaniṣads, with one and the same purpose, proclaim: “Indeed, meritorious (*puṇya*) and sinful (*pāpa*) actions do not touch him.”

ātmānātmavivekena puṃsaḥ saṃsāranihnutiḥ | tadvinā janmakotyāpi bandhacchedo na sidhyati |⁵³

iti māyāvivarāṇe prapañcavimarśanaṃ nāma tṛtīyaṃ varṇakaṃ samāptam |

Through discrimination between the self (*ātman*) and the non-self (*anātman*), the cessation of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāranihnuti*) is attained by a person; without that, even in countless births, cutting of bondage is not accomplished.

Thus, the third chapter, called “Investigation into the Multiplicity”, in the *Māyāvivarāṇa* is concluded.

FOURTH VARṆAKA

atha caturthaṃ varṇakam

⁵³ *siddhyati, recte sidhyati.*

***janau yad duḥkham ante tat kiṃ svarūpam utāsyā tat |⁵⁴
samyag āgantukaṃ veti mayā buddhyā vicāryate | |***

Now, the fourth chapter.

The sufferance that is in embodied existence—what, in the end, is its true nature? Whether that (sufferance) is thoroughly adventitious (*āgantuka*)—this is examined by means of my intellect.

***idānīm asya jīvasya yad duḥkham ca janma ca karma ca rāgadveṣādi cābhimānaś
cāvivekaś cājñānaṃ ceti eteṣu pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ praty uttarottaraṃ hetuḥ | tatra
duḥkhādicatuṣṭayaṃ caturthe varṇake vicāryate |***

Now, for this individual self (*jīva*), whatever sufferance (*duḥkha*), birth (*janma*), action (*karman*), attachment and aversion (*rāgadveṣa*) and the like, pride (*abhimāna*), absence of discrimination (*aviveka*), and ignorance (*ajñāna*)—among these, each preceding one is the cause of the one that follows.

Therein, the quaternion beginning with sufferance is examined in the fourth chapter.

***jīvātmano duḥkham svābhāvikaṃ vāgantukaṃ veti cedāgantukam iti jñeyam |
svābhāvikaṃ ced anekadoṣāḥ santi | tat katham iti cet asya jīvasya duḥkham
svābhāvikaṃ ced duḥkhanivṛttiḥ kadāpi na syāt | sukham api kasyāpi na syāt |
duḥkhanivṛtṭyai sukhaprāptyai ca karma māstu |⁵⁵ satkarmayogadhyānopāsaneṣu
kasyāpi prayatno māstu | vedaśāstrapurāṇāni ca vyarthānīti jānīhi | [tarhi] duḥkham
svābhāvikaṃ astu tannivṛtṭyai prayatnaṃ karotv iti cet kadācid api etan na sambhavati
|⁵⁶ svābhāvikasya svarūpatvāt | svasvarūpanāśārthaṃ ko vā prayatnaṃ kuryāt |⁵⁷
svarūpanāśe sati kaḥ puruṣārthabhāk syāt | svābhāvikaṃ eva svarūpaṃ katham iti cet
guḍasya madhuraguṇaḥ svabhāvaḥ | tasya madhuraguṇasya nāśe bhavitavye guḍasyaiva
nāśo bhavet | tathā jīvātmano duḥkham svābhāvikaṃ ced duḥkhanāśe bhavitavye
ātmasvarūpanāśa eva syāt | [naśyatv ātmāpīti ced] ātmano nāśo nāsti | avināśīti nitya iti
ca avināśī vāre'yam ātmā ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityaḥ na jāyate mriyate vā vipāścin
nāyaṃ kutaścin na babhūva kaścit | ajo nityaḥ śāśvato'yam purāṇo na hanyate
hanyamāne śarīre ityādīśrutayo vadanti | tasmād ātmano duḥkham svābhāvikaṃ na
bhavati | āgantukam eva |***

If [it be asked], “Is the sufferance (*duḥkha*) of the individual self (*jīvātman*) inherent (*svābhāvika*) or adventitious (*āgantuka*)?”—it should be known that it is adventitious. For, if it were inherent, numerous defects would follow.

If [it be asked], “How so?”—if the sufferance of this individual self were inherent, then the cessation of sufferance (*duḥkhanivṛtti*) would never be possible, nor could there ever be happiness for anyone; no one would undertake actions for the cessation of sufferance or the attainment of happiness, and no one would exert effort in virtuous acts (*satkarmān*), in discipline (*yoga*), in meditation (*dhyāna*), or in worship (*upāsana*). Know also that the Vedas,

⁵⁴ *yaddukham, recte yadduḥkham*; the manuscript reads *antye*, but the editor has emended it to *ante*.

⁵⁵ *duḥkhanivṛtṭyai, recte duḥkhanivṛtṭyai*.

⁵⁶ *tannivṛtṭyai, recte tannivṛtṭyai*.

⁵⁷ *prayatna, recte prayatnaṃ*.

scriptures, and Purāṇas would then be useless.

If [it be asked], “[Then,] if sufferance were inherent, yet one made an effort for its cessation?”—this is never possible: because of the state of one’s own nature (*svarūpatva*) of the inherent, who would ever strive to destroy his own essential nature? And if one’s essential nature were destroyed, who would then be intent on pursuing any human end (*puruṣārtha*)?

If [it be asked], “How can that which is inherent be one’s own nature itself?”—sweetness is the inherent nature of sugar; if that sweetness were to perish, the sugar itself would necessarily perish. Likewise, if the sufferance of the individual self were inherent, and if sufferance were to perish, one’s own essential nature would also perish.

[If it be asked:] [“Let the self perish too”,] the self cannot perish, for he is imperishable and eternal. The scriptures declare: “This self indeed is imperishable (*avināśin*);” “Like space, it is all-pervading (*sarvagata*) and eternal (*nitya*);” “It is not born, nor does it die; this wise one did not come from anywhere, nor was it anything, unborn (*aja*), eternal (*nitya*), everlasting (*śāśvata*), ancient (*purāṇa*), [and] it is not slain when the body is slain,” and so forth.⁵⁸

Therefore, the sufferance of the self is not inherent; it is only adventitious.

svābhāvikaṃ naśyatu svarūpaṃ tiṣṭhatu iti cet na sambhavati | nanv agneḥ svābhāvikaṃ uṣṇatvaṃ maṇimantrādibhir gacchati svarūpanāśas tu nāsti anyacchaityam apy āgacchati tathātmano’pi duḥkhaṃ svābhāvikaṃ bhavatu | tad utkṛṣṭakarmopāsanāyogabalena gacchatu | sukhaṃ cāgacchatv iti vadasi cet sā nivṛttis tātkāliky eva nātyantikī | katham iti cet | karmajanyaṃ sakalam api tannāśe naśyati | tvaduktadṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayor agnyātmanor uṣṇatvaṃ duḥkhavattvaṃ ca maṇimantrādibhir utkṛṣṭakarmopāsanayogaiś ca gatam api tatkarmaḥsaye śāityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca gacchet | punaḥ svābhāvikaṃ uṣṇattvaṃ duḥkhavattvaṃ cāgacchet | evaṃ sati sarvajīvanāṃ tātkālikamuktiṃ vinā punarjanmarahitā muktir na syāt | kiṃca mokṣasya janyatve’nityatvam api syāt |⁵⁹ na sa punar āvartata iti mukter nityatvapatipādakaśruteḥ akhaṇḍam ānandam arūpam adbhutam iti śruteś ca virodhaḥ syāt | [kiṃca] ātmano duḥkhasvabhāvavte susuptyavasthāyāṃ tūṣṇībhāve yogināṃ samādhau ca duḥkham eva pratīyāt | tathā na dṛśyate | kiṃtu trayāṇāṃ apy utthānānantaraṃ etāvat paryantam ahaṃ sukham evāsam iti sukham eva smaryate |⁶⁰ tasmād ātmanaḥ sukham eva svābhāvikaṃ | duḥkham āgantukam iti jānīhi | sukhasvarūpasyāpy ātmano duḥkhaṃ śarīraparigraheṇāgatam yatra yatra śarīraparigrahas tatra tatra duḥkham iti vyāpṭeḥ |⁶¹

If [it be said], “Let what is inherent (*svābhāvika*) perish, [yet] let one’s own essential nature (*svarūpa*) remain,” this is impossible.

If you say: “[Just like] the inherent heat of fire disappears through the power of moongems, mantras, and the like, yet the destruction of its essential nature does not occur, and even an opposing coolness arises, in the same way, let the sufferance of the self also be inherent, and let it vanish through the power of excellent acts (*utkṛṣṭakarman*), worship (*upāsanā*), and discipline (*yoga*), and let happiness arise”—[the answer is that] that cessation (of

⁵⁸ “*avināśī vā are’yam ātmā*”, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.14; “*ākāśavat sarvagatāś ca nityaḥ*”, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; “*na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścin nāyaṃ kutaścin na babhūva kaścit ajo nityaḥ śāśvato’yam purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre*”, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.2.18.

⁵⁹ *kiṃ ca, recte kiṃca.*

⁶⁰ *kiṃ tu, recte kiṃtu.*

⁶¹ *tratra tatra, recte tatra tatra.*

sufferance) would be temporary (*tātkālikī*), not permanent (*ātyantikī*).

If [it be asked], “How so?”—because everything that is produced by action (*karmajanya*) perishes when that action ceases. In both your examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) and its intended applications (*dārṣṭāntika*)—in the case of fire and of the self—the heat and the sufferance, even if extinguished by moongems, mantras, etc. and excellent acts, worship, or discipline, [respectively,] once those actions end (*tatkarmakṣaya*), the coolness and happiness would disappear as well; and again, the inherent heat and the inherent sufferance would return. In such a way, without a permanent liberation (*tātkālikamukti*), there would be no liberation free from re-birth (*punarjanman*) for the living beings.

Moreover, if liberation were produced, it would also be non-eternal. This would contradict the scriptures asserting the eternity of liberation—“It does not return again—and the scriptures [asserting that liberation is]—“Non-fragmentary (*akhaṇḍa*), blissful (*ānanda*), formless (*arūpa*), marvellous (*adbhuta*).”⁶²

[Furthermore,] if the self’s nature were truly sufferance, then in the state of deep sleep (*suṣuptyavasthā*), in the state of quiescence (*tūṣṇībhāva*), and in the *yogis’* absorption (*samādhi*), sufferance alone would be experienced; yet thus is not observed. Instead, immediately after awakening from each of these three states, [one recollects]: “Indeed, I was entirely happy till now.” Thus, only happiness is remembered.

Therefore, know that happiness alone is inherent in the self, whereas suffering is adventitious. The sufferance of the self, despite its essential nature being happiness, arises through assuming a body; for wherever there is embodiment, there is sufferance—such is the universal rule (*vyāpti*).

nanu loke rājādīnām api śārīraparigraheṇa duḥkham asti veti cet asty eva teṣām api śatruvardhanena rājyabhāreṇa dhanadhānyakṣayeṇa strīputrādīmaraṇena jarādīnā svamaraṇena ca duḥkhadarśanāt |⁶³ loke kecit sukhena vartanta iti vyavahāro vṛthā moha eva |⁶⁴ mohenāpi [yato] duḥkhasya sukhatvavyavahārah | katham iti cet | bhāravāhako bahuyojanadūraṃ kāryārthatvarayā dhāvan santatam api kṛṣyādikarmakaraṇāśīlāś caivamādayaḥ sarve’pi svasvakarmaṇo duḥkhasvarūpatve’pi mohena tattatkarma sukhaṃ matvā santuṣṭā gānaṃ kurvantaḥ santa utsāhavantaś ca vartante | tasmān mohena duḥkham eva sukhaṃ bhātīti jñātavyam |

If [it be asked], “But in the world, even for kings and others, through the possession of a body, there is sufferance, is it not?”—indeed, it is so. For even in their case, sufferance is observed: due to the increase of enemies, the burden of kingship, the loss of wealth and grain, the death of wife, son, and others, through old age and the like, and even through their own death.

The common expression “Some people live happily in the world” is mere illusion; [for] it is through illusion that sufferance is experienced as happiness in ordinary life.

If [it be asked], “How so?”—[consider] a porter, running hastily over many leagues to accomplish his task, [or the farmer], incessantly engaged in ploughing and other tasks, and all others similarly occupied. Though their respective actions are of the very nature of sufferance, through illusion, each is regarded as [producing] happiness; [and thus these

⁶² “na ca punar āvartate na ca punar āvartate”, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.15.1; “cidānandam arūpam adbhutam”, *Kaivalya Upaniṣad* 6.

⁶³ *śatruvardhanena, recte śatruvardhanena.*

⁶⁴ *vṛthāmoha, recte vṛthā moha.*

individuals] are seen content, singing, and energetic. Therefore, it is to be understood that by illusion sufferance itself appears as happiness.

***tarhi vivekinām api śarīraparigrahād duḥkham asti ceti cet teṣām api kṣutpipāsādinā
 śītoṣṇādinā vyādhinā sarpavṛścikavyāghrādinā [ca] duḥkham asty eva | tarhi
 vivekyavivekinoḥ ko viśeṣa iti cet tayor bāhyavyāpāreṇa viśeṣābhāve’pi antarvyāpāreṇa
 viśeṣo’sti | yo vivekī sa mahātmā sakalam api duḥkham antaḥkaraṇasyaiva nātmanaḥ
 saccidānandasvarūpasya ātmano vṛtajaḍaduḥkhasvarūpāntaḥkaraṇadharmair
 aṇumātram api sambandho nāsti iti śrūtiyuktyanubhavair vicārya jñātvā tiṣṭhati |⁶⁵ tathā
 hi asaṅgo hy ayaṃ puruṣa iti śruteḥ | niravayavatvasatyatvādikā yuktayaḥ |
 suṣuptimūrchāsamādhiṣu anubhavo veditavyaḥ |⁶⁶***

If [it be asked], “Then even for the discriminative ones (*vivekin*), because of possessing a body, there is sufferance, is it not?”—indeed, even for them, sufferance arises from hunger and thirst, from cold and heat, from disease, [and] from serpents, scorpions, tigers, and the like.

If [it be asked], “Then what distinction is there between the discriminative and the non-discriminative?”—although there is no difference between them in external conduct (*bāhyavyāpāra*), a distinction exists with regard to the internal (*antarvyāpāra*).

He who is discriminative is a magnanimous one (*mahātman*): “All the sufferance pertains only to the thinking faculty (*antaḥkaraṇa*), not to the self, whose nature is being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*). The self has no connection, not even the slightest, with the properties of the thinking faculty, whose nature is concealed (*vṛta*), inert (*jaḍa*), and constituted by sufferance (*duḥkha*).” Thus, having reflected upon and realized this through scripture (*śruti*), reasoning (*yukti*), and direct experience (*anubhava*), he abides. For thus the Śruti [declares]: “Indeed, this person is unattached (*asaṅga*).” And there are also logical arguments (*yuktayaḥ*), such as the [self’s] indivisibility (*niravayavatva*) and reality (*satyatva*), among others. Furthermore, the direct experience is to be recognized even in deep sleep (*suṣupti*), fainting (*mūrchā*), and meditative absorption (*samādhi*).

***yo’vivekī sa durātmā tu ātmasvarūpam avicārya dehādikam evātmānaṃ matvā
 anātmadharmān ātmani ā[tmadharmāṃś cānātmāny ā]ropyavam anyonyādhyāsaṃ
 kurvann ahaṃ devo’haṃ manuṣyo’haṃ āndhro’haṃ drāviḍo’haṃ karṇāṭako’haṃ
 mahārāṣṭro’haṃ gūrjaro’haṃ brāhmaṇo’haṃ kṣatriyo’haṃ vaiśyo’haṃ śūdro’haṃ
 brahmacāry ahaṃ grhastho’haṃ vānaprastho’haṃ sanyāsy ahaṃ śrīvatsagotro’haṃ
 bhāradvājagotro’haṃ vāsiṣṭhagotra ityādiprakāreṇa jāti[deśa]varṇāśramā[dya]bhimānī
 tiṣṭhati |⁶⁷ evaṃ vivekyavivekinor bahubhedo’sti |***

But he who is non-discriminative (*avivekin*) is indeed a wicked one (*durātmāna*): without reflecting upon the true nature of the self, he regards the body and the rest as the self, and, by superimposing the qualities of the non-self upon the self, and those of the self upon the non-self, thus engages in mutual superimposition (*anyonyādhyāsa*), [thinking]: “I am a god; I am a man; I am an Āndhra; I am a Drāviḍa; I am a Karṇāṭaka; I am a Marāṭha; I am a Gūrjara;

⁶⁵ *ātmano’vṛtajaḍaduḥkhasvarūpāntaḥkaraṇadharmair, recte ātmano vṛtajaḍaduḥkhasvarūpāntaḥkaraṇadharmair.*

⁶⁶ *suṣuptimūrchāsamādhiṣu, recte suṣuptimūrchāsamādhiṣu.*

⁶⁷ *evātmāna, recte evātmānaṃ.*

I am a *brāhmaṇa*; I am a *kṣatriya*; I am a *vaiśya*; I am a *śūdra*; I am a *brahmacārin* (celibate student); I am a *gṛhastha* (householder); I am a *vānaprastha* (forest-dweller); I am a *saṃnyāsīn* (renunciator); I am of the Śrīvatsa lineage; I am of the Bhāradvāja lineage; I am of the Vasiṣṭha lineage,” and so forth.

In this way, he abides identifying himself with caste (*jāti*), region (*deśa*), class (*varṇa*), stage of life (*āśrama*), and the like.

Thus, there exists a great distinction between the discriminative and the non-discriminative.

vicāryamāṇe tayor bāhyavyavahāreṇāpi na sāmīyam | katham iti cet vivekī prapañcaṃ sarvaṃ mithyeti niśritya prārabdhabhogam api svapnabhogatulyam eva paśyati | avivekī tu prapañcaḥ satyaḥ ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhānubhavo’pi satya eveti paśyati | evaṃ vivekinām api śarīraparigrahād duḥkham asty eva |

Upon proper deliberation, even with regard to external conduct (*bāhyavyavahāra*), there is no likeness (*sāmīya*) between them.

If [it be asked], “How so?”—the discriminative one, relying on the conviction that the entire multiplicity is unreal (*mithyā*), regards even the experience of the fruition of past actions (*prārabdhabhoga*) as no different from enjoyment in a dream (*svapnabhoga*). But the non-discriminative one considers the multiplicity to be real (*satya*), as well as the self’s experiences of happiness and sufferance.

Thus, even for the discriminative one, sufferance indeed exists due to the possession of a body.

devānām api vajrahastaḥ purandara ityādinā vedeṣu śarīraparigrahasya darśanād duḥkham asty eva | katham iti cet anyonyam yuddhataḥ kopaśāpābhyām asurārākṣasopadravāt puṇyakarmaphalanāśe sati bhāvyadhahapatānabhayād api duḥkham asty eva |⁶⁸

Even for the gods, since in the Vedas there is mention of their possessing bodies—[such as in the expression] “Purandara, wielder of the thunderbolt,” and the like—sufferance indeed exists.

If [it be asked], “How so?”—they also experience sufferance since they engage in mutual conflict, are subject to anger and curses, are afflicted by demons and *rākṣasas*, and, when the results of their meritorious deeds are exhausted, fear their impending fall from heaven.

[nanv evaṃ] kathaṃ duḥkhinām api teṣām itarair upāsyatvam | kathaṃ [ca] tatsukhadātṛtvam iti cet asmin loke rājaprabhṛtīnām duḥkhinām api [svāśritopāsyatvam] svāśritaparipālānādikaṃ yathā tatheti jñeyam |⁶⁹ ***devaloke devā ānandarūpās tiṣṭhanti iti śruteḥ devā duḥkhaṃ sarvaṃ apy antaḥkaraṇadharmam matvātmānam ānandarūpam sadānubhavanta eva tiṣṭhantīti tātparyam | teṣām api duḥkham astīti vadantyaḥ tā etā devatāḥ sṛṣṭā asmin mahaty arṇave prāpatan iti śruteś ca devānām api śarīraparigrahād duḥkham asty eveti tātparyam |***⁷⁰ ***tasmād eveha muktyartham eva prayatnaḥ kartavyaḥ |***⁷¹

⁶⁸ The manuscript reads *yudhyataḥ*, but the editor has emended it to *yuddhataḥ*.

⁶⁹ *svāśritopāsyatva*, recte *svāśritopāsyatvam*.

⁷⁰ “*tā etā devatāḥ sṛṣṭā asmin mahaty arṇave prāpatan [...]*”, *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 1.2.1.

⁷¹ *muktyartham*, recte *muktyartham*.

If [it be asked], “If this is so, how can they—though themselves subject to sufferance—be worshiped by others? And how can they give them happiness?”—it is to be understood as follows: just as, in this world, even kings and the like—though themselves afflicted by sufferance—are objects of reverence to their dependents, owing to their protection and so forth, so also [is it in the divine sphere].

For the Śruti [declares], “In heaven, the gods abide as forms of bliss”—the import of which is that the gods, regarding all sufferance as merely a property of the thinking faculty, abide continually experiencing their own self as of the nature of bliss.

As the Śruti [declares] that “even for them there is sufferance,” and further states that “those very deities that have been mentioned, having been created, fell into this vast ocean,” the intended meaning is that even for the gods, sufferance indeed exists, arising from their possession of bodies.

Therefore, one must strive here alone for the sake of liberation.

***nanv aśarīramukter eva muktitvaṃ cen na | [sa]śarīrā ākāśe nakṣatrarūpeṇa
paridṛśyamānāḥ kecana devā muktā iti manuṣyaiḥ kathyante iti cec chṛṇu |⁷² sālokyam
sārūpyam sāmīpyam sāyujyam ceti caturvidhā muktiḥ | caryā kriyā yogo jñānam iti
catvāri sādhanāni | bhagavatkaikānyarūpadāsabhāvaś caryā | śivaviṣṇupūjāvidhiḥ kriyā
| yamaniyamādyasṭāṅga yogah | jīvaparayor aikyasākṣātkāro jñānam |***

If [it be said], “But liberation consists only in disembodied liberation (*aśarīramukti*),” [we reply]: no. If [it be said], “Certain deities, though possessing bodies, are seen in the sky in the form of constellations and are said by men to be liberated,” then listen: liberation is fourfold: *sālokya*, *sārūpya*, *sāmīpya*, and *sāyujya*.

There are [likewise] four means (*sādhana*): *caryā* (ritual service), *kriyā* (religious rite), *yoga* (meditative discipline), and *jñāna* (knowledge).

Caryā is the attitude of a servant, characterized by service (*kāinkarya*) to the Lord (*bhagavat*).

Kriyā denotes the prescribed rite of worship (*pūjāvidhi*) to Śiva, Viṣṇu, [and others].

Yoga is the eightfold (*aṣṭāṅga*) [discipline] comprising restraints (*yama*), observances (*niyama*), and so on.

Jñāna is the direct realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of the oneness (*aikya*) of the individual self (*jīva*) and the supreme (*para*).

***atrādyaś tisro muktayo mukhyā na bhavanti punarāvṛttisadbhāvāt | sāyujyam eva
mukhyā muktiḥ punarāvṛttivarjanāt | yogena sāyujyam iti śāstraṃ nirguṇabrahmajīvayor
aikyayogaviṣayam | [sa]śarīramuktānām ivāśarīramuktānām kadāpi kutracid api kenāpi
kathaṃcid api darśanābhāvāc chūnyam evāśarīramuktir iti na mantavyam |⁷³***

Of these, the first three kinds of liberation are not primary (*mukhya*), owing to the possibility of return (*punarāvṛtti*); only *sāyujya* constitutes the primary liberation, because it excludes return. The scriptural statement “Through *yoga*, *sāyujya* is attained” pertains to the discipline (*yoga*) that realizes the oneness of the attribute-less (*nirguṇa*) Brahman and the individual self (*jīva*).

⁷² The manuscript reads *śarīrā*, but the editor has emended it to *saśarīrā*.

⁷³ The manuscript reads *śarīramuktānām*, but the editor has emended it to *saśarīramuktānām*.

It should not be supposed that disembodied liberation (*aśarīramukti*) is mere voidness (*śūnya*), simply because those liberated without a body (*aśarīramukta*) are never, anywhere, by anyone, or in any manner perceived, unlike those liberated while possessing still a body (*śarīramukta*).

aśarīramuktānāṃ śarīrasyaiva śūnyatvaṃ na svarūpasukhasya | svarūpasukhaṃ tu suṣuptisukhavat aśarīratvāt svasaṃvedyam eva nānyasaṃvedyam | suṣuptir muktisamānā cet sāpi muktiḥ syād iti na vācyam | sukhānubhavamātreṇa sām्यe'pi suṣuptāv ajñānaṃ punarutthānaṃ cāsti | muktau [tu] tadubhayam api nāsti | tataḥ suṣupter muktitvaṃ na sambhavati | ata eva pralayasāpi na muktitvam | evaṃ suṣuptisukhavan muktisukhasyāpi svānubhavadagamyatvāt pratyakṣatvam eva na śūnyatvam |

For those liberated without a body, any notion of voidness pertains only to the body, not to the happiness inherent in one's essential nature (*svarūpasukha*). Their essential happiness, however, being disembodied, is directly accessible only to themselves (*svasaṃvedya*), like the happiness experienced in deep sleep (*suṣuptisukha*), and cannot be perceived by others. If [it be said], "Since deep sleep resembles liberation, it too should be regarded as liberation," this is incorrect. For although there is similarity between the two in respect of the mere experience of happiness, yet deep sleep is accompanied by both ignorance (*ajñāna*) and return [into waking] (*punarutthāna*); whereas, in liberation, both of these (ignorance and return) are absent.

Therefore, deep sleep cannot be considered liberation; for the same reason, dissolution (*pralaya*) is likewise not liberation.

Thus, just as the happiness of deep sleep is directly experienced, so too the happiness of liberation is [directly experienced] because it can be known through one's own perception; it is indeed [real and] not mere voidness (*śūnyatva*).

tarhi saśarīramuktānām ivāśarīramuktānām api pratyakṣatve ko bheda iti cet ajñānanivṛttiḥ punarutthānābhāvaś ca bheda ity uktam | evaṃ śrutiyuktibhyām aśarīramukteḥ paramasukhatvaṃ śarīraparigrahaṇena duḥkham coktam | idānīm anubhavenāpi tadubhayam vadāmaḥ | nityaṃ suṣuptau śarīraparigrahābhāvād duḥkhābhāvaś ca jāgratsvapnayoḥ śarīraparigraheṇa duḥkham ca sarvair anubhūyate | tasmād yatra yatra śarīraparigrahas tatra tatra duḥkham iti vyāpter ānandarūpasyātmanaḥ śarīraparigrahād eva duḥkham āgacchati na tu svataḥ |

If [it be asked], "Then, if even the disembodied liberated beings are, like the embodied liberated ones, directly perceptible, what distinction exists between them?"—it has been explained that the distinction lies in the cessation of ignorance (*ajñānanivṛtti*) and the absence of return [to awakesness] (*punarutthānābhāva*).

Thus, on the authority of scripture (*śruti*) and reasoning (*yukti*), it has been established that disembodied liberation is of supreme happiness (*paramasukhatva*), whereas the assumption of a body entails sufferance.

Now, we shall demonstrate both (points) also on the basis of experience (*anubhava*). It is a constant that in deep sleep (*suṣupti*), owing to the absence of bodily appropriation, there is an absence of sufferance; whereas in the waking (*jāgrat*) and dream (*svapna*) states, because of embodiment, sufferance is experienced by all.

Therefore, according to the universal rule, “Wherever there is embodiment, there is sufferance,” [it follows that] for the self, whose nature is bliss, sufferance arises solely from embodiment and not from its own nature.

tasya śarīrasya ko vā hetur iti cet pūrvakarmasahitapañcīkṛtabhūtāny eva na kevalabhūtāni | [ataḥ] teṣāṃ sarvatra vartamānavāt tebhyaḥ śarīraṃ syād iti na vaktavyam | nanu śuklaśoṇitarūpeṇa pariṇatānām eva bhūtānāṃ śarīrakāraṇatvena vivakṣitatvāt tādrśāny eva śarīrasya kāraṇam iti na vaktavyam vyarthaśuklaśoṇiteṣu śarīrotpattyadarśanāt |⁷⁴ tasmāt karmasahitāny eva śarīrasya kāraṇāni | pañcabhūtānāṃ deśakālādīnāṃ ca sarvasādhāraṇatvāt tattatkarmavaicitryam eva hetuḥ śarīravaicitrye | yathā mṛdādīnāṃ sādharmaṇatve’pi kulālavayāpāravaicitryam eva ghaṭādikāryavaicitrye hetuḥ yathā [ca] dṛṣṭānte mṛdupādānakāraṇaṃ kulālavayāpāro nimittakāraṇam evaṃ dārṣṭāntike’pi śarīrasya pañcīkṛtabhūtāny upādānam | tattatkarma nimittam | tasmād bhogapradakarmaṇi sati śarīraparigrahaḥ yathā jāgratsvapnayoḥ | karmany asati na śarīram |⁷⁵ yathā ca suṣuptau karmābhāve śarīrābhāvaḥ |

If [it be asked], “What, then, is the cause of the body?”—it is indeed the quintuplicated elements (*pañcīkṛtabhūtāni*) conjoined with past *karman* (*pūrvakarman*), not the mere elements alone. Therefore, it cannot be said that, merely because the elements are universally present, a body could arise from them [anywhere].

Nor should one argue: “But since it is intended that only those elements transformed into semen and blood are involved in body-formation, such [elements] alone must be the cause of the body.” For it is observed that bodies do not arise from semen and blood that are unproductive (*vyartha*). Hence, it is only the [elements] conjoined with *karman* that serve as the cause of the body.

Since the five elements, as well as space, time, and the rest, are common to all beings, it follows that the diversity of various *karmas* (*tattatkarmavaicitrya*) alone determines the diversity of bodies (*śarīravaicitrya*).

Just as, although clay and the like are common, the diversity of the resulting pots and other products depends solely on the diversity of the potter’s activity, and as in the analogy the clay serves as the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) while the potter’s activity serves as the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*), so too, in the parallel, the quintuplicated elements are the material cause [of the body] and the respective *karmas* are the efficient cause.

Therefore, when *karman* productive of experience exists, embodiment occurs, as in the waking and dream states. When *karman* is absent, there is no body; similarly, in deep sleep, the absence of *karman* entails the absence of the body.

kiṃca [yathā] mṛdi satyām api kulālavayāpārābhāve ghaṭotpattyabhāvaḥ tathā īśvarasṛṣṭapañcābhūteṣu satsv api ātmajñānena karmasu naṣṭeṣu tasya jñāninaḥ śarīraṃ notpadyate |⁷⁶

Furthermore, just as, even when the clay exists, no pot is produced in the absence of the

⁷⁴ *śarīrotpattyadarśanāt, recte śarīrotpattyadarśanāt.*

⁷⁵ The manuscript reads *karmaṇi sati śarīram*, but the editor has emended it to *karmany asati na śarīram*.

⁷⁶ *ghaṭotpattyabhāvaḥ, recte ghaṭotpattyabhāvaḥ; the manuscript reads nopapadyate, but the editor has emended it to notpadyate.*

potter's activity, so too, even when the five elements created by *īśvara* are present, once all *karmas* are destroyed through self-knowledge, no body arises for the wise.

nanu karmaśāstre avaśyam anubhoktavyam iti nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karmeti ca jñānaśāstre jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt kurute tathā iti vacanayoḥ parasparaṃ virodhe kathaṃ nirṇayaḥ kartavya iti cec chr̥ṇu |⁷⁷ śāstre [hi] prabalavacanam durbalavacanam cāsti | prabalaṃ siddhāntavacanam | durbalaṃ pūrvapakṣavacanam | prabalaṃ durbalaṃ nirasyati | tadyathā ahiṃsā paramo dharma iti vacanam durbalam |⁷⁸ tad yāge paśubandhaḥ kartavya iti vacanam prabalaṃ nirasyati | evaṃ avaśyam anubhoktavyam iti vacanam tapasā kalmaṣaṃ hantīti prabalavacanena durbalaṃ nirasyate | tasmāt sañcīteṣu karmasu bahuṣu satsv api jñānena tāni naśyanty eva | karmābhāve janmābhāvaḥ | janmābhāve duḥkhābhāvaḥ | duḥkhābhāve ānandāvīrbhāvaḥ ity ayam eva siddhāntaḥ |

If [it be asked], “But is it not that the *karmaśāstra* (the scriptural science of action) declares that ‘(*karman*) must be inevitably experienced’ and ‘Unexperienced *karman* does not perish,’ whereas the *jñānaśāstra* (the science of knowledge) states that ‘the fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes’? Since these two scriptural statements appear to contradict one another, how is the conclusion (*nirṇaya*) to be drawn?” Listen.⁷⁹

For in the scriptures, there are statements of greater authority (*prabalavacana*) and of lesser authority (*durbalavacana*). A strong statement expresses the final conclusion (*siddhānta*), whereas a weak statement represents merely the opposing view (*pūrvapakṣa*). The stronger [statement] overrules the weaker.

For example: the weak statement “Non-violence is the highest *dharma*” is overridden by the strong statement, “In the context of sacrifice, the slaughter of animals is to be performed.” In the same way, the weak statement “(*karman*) must be inevitably experienced” is negated by the strong statement “Impurity is destroyed through austerity.”

Therefore, although many accumulated *karmas* may exist, they are indeed destroyed through knowledge. When *karman* is absent, there is no birth; when birth is absent, there is no sufferance; and when sufferance is absent, bliss manifests itself.

This alone, indeed, constitutes the established conclusion.

***saśarīrasya duḥkhitvavyāptir anyāhatā yataḥ |
ataḥ śarīramuktyarthaṃ yatnaḥ kuryād atandritaḥ ||
na bhūtapañcakān nāpi karmaṇaḥ kevalād api |
ubhābhyāṃ militābhyāṃ tac charīram upajāyate ||
tac charīrānavāptiś ca jñānād eva na cānyataḥ |
ataḥ sarvaprayatnena jñānābhyāsarato bhavet ||***

Because the state of being embodied is invariably accompanied by sufferance, one should make unremitting effort for liberation from the body. The body does not arise from the five elements alone, nor from *karman* alone, but solely from the conjunction of both.

Its non-arising comes through knowledge alone, and by no other means. Therefore, one should devote oneself, with every possible effort, to the practice of knowledge

⁷⁷ *karme'ti, recte karmeti.*

⁷⁸ *dharmam, recte dharma.*

⁷⁹ “*jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasāt kurute tathā,*” *Bhagavadgītā* 4.37.

(jñānābhyaśa).

iti śrīmacchaṅkarācāryaviracite māyāvivarāṇe caturthaṃ varṇakaṃ samāptam |

Thus, the fourth chapter in *Māyāvivarāṇa*—composed by the illustrious Śaṅkarācārya—is concluded.

FIFTH VARṆAKA

atha pañcamaṃ varṇakaṃ |

kasmād ātmano duḥkham | śarīraparigrahaḥ | śarīraṃ [ca] karmaṇety uktam | tat karma kiṃ katividham iti cec chṛṇu | karma trividham | puṇyaṃ pāpaṃ miśraṃ ceti | devādiśarīraṃ puṇyakarmaphalam | manuśyādiśarīraṃ puṇyapāpamiśrakarmaphalam | tiryagādiśarīraṃ sarvaṃ pāpakarmaphalam |

Now, the fifth chapter.

Whence arises sufferance for the self? — From the assumption of a body. And it has been said that the body itself arises from *karman*.

If [it be asked], “What is that *karman*, and how many kinds are there?”—listen:

karman is threefold: meritorious (*puṇya*), demeritorious (*pāpa*), and mixed (*miśra*).

A body such as that of the gods (*deva*) and the like is the fruit of meritorious *karman*; a body such as that of humans (*manuśya*) and the like is the fruit of mixed *karman*—comprising both merit and demerit; a body such as that of animals (*tiryāñc*) and the like is entirely the fruit of demeritorious *karman*.

evam uktatrividham api karma utkr̥ṣṭaṃ madhyamaṃ sāmānyam iti pratyekaṃ trividham | evam uktakarmabhedenā janmabhedaś ca nānāprakāraḥ |

Moreover, each of these three kinds of *karman* just described is itself threefold—excellent (*utkr̥ṣṭa*), middling (*madhyama*), and ordinary (*sāmānyā*). Thus, owing to the diversity of *karmas* so delineated, the varieties of births too are manifold.

tathā hi hiranyagarbhādiśarīraṃ puṇyotkr̥ṣṭam |⁸⁰ indrādiśarīraṃ puṇyamadhyamam | yakṣarākṣasapīśācādiśarīraṃ puṇyasāmānyam | paratāpakaram | kaṅṭhakavṛkṣaviṣavṛkṣavyāghrasarpavṛścikolūkamaśakajalūkādiśarīraṃ sarvaṃ pāpotkr̥ṣṭam | panasāmrakadalīnārikelādīphalapattrapuṣpaviniyogavad vṛkṣalatādi (ca) grāmasūkaramahiṣagardabhoṣṭrādīkaṃ sarvaṃ śarīraṃ pāpamadhyamam |⁸¹ aśvatthatulasībilvagavāśvādīkaṃ sarvaṃ pāpasāmānyam |

For thus, a body such as that of Hiranyagarbha and the like is of the highest merit (*puṇyotkr̥ṣṭa*); a body such as that of Indra and the like is of middling merit (*puṇyamadhyama*); a body such as that of *yakṣas*, *rākṣasas*, and *pīśācas* is of ordinary merit (*puṇyasāmānyā*).

⁸⁰ *tathāhi, recte tathā hi.*

⁸¹ *patra, recte pattra.*

A body such as that of thorn-trees, poison-trees, tigers, serpents, scorpions, owls, mosquitoes, leeches, and the like—all of which cause distress to others—is of the highest demerit (*pāpotkṛṣṭa*).

A body such as that of trees and creepers which offer fruits, leaves, and flowers—such as the jackfruit, mango, plantain, coconut, and the like—as well as domestic pig, buffalo, donkey, camel, and others, all such bodies are of middling demerit (*pāpamadhyama*).

A body such as that of the holy fig tree, holy basil, wood-apple tree, cow, horse, and the like is of ordinary demerit (*pāpasāmānya*).

iha manuṣyaloke

***niṣkāmakarmānuṣṭhānasādhanacatuṣṭayasadgurulābhaśravaṇamananātmaññānakrameṇ
-a jīvanmukter videhamuktes ca yogyaṃ manuṣyaśarīraṃ miśrakarmotkṛṣṭam |
svāśramocitakarmanāṃ kāmyakarmanāṃ cātuṣṭhānayogyaṃ śarīraṃ
miśrakarmamadhyamaṃ caṇḍālapulkasakirātayavanādīśarīraṃ miśrakarmasāmānyam |
tasmād vivekinā puruṣeṇaitat karmaphalatāratamyāṃ vicārya bhūmau manuṣyajanmani
miśrakarmotkṛṣṭajanma yathā siddhyeta tathā [sva]svavarṇāśramakarmāṇi kṛtvā
phalecchāṃ vihāyeśvarārpaṇaṃ kṛtvātmavicāraṇadvārā mokṣaprāptāv eva prayatnaḥ
kartavya iti siddhāntaḥ |⁸²***

Here, in the human world, that human which is fit for liberation while still alive (*jīvanmukti*) and for liberation upon the fall of the body (*videhamukti*) arises from the most excellent form of mixed action (*miśrakarmotkṛṣṭa*). This is attained through the means of selfless performance of duties (*niṣkāmakarmānuṣṭhāna*), the acquisition of the four means (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*), the attainment of a true teacher (*sadgurulābha*), and the sequential process of listening (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), and self-knowledge (*ātmaññāna*).

A body fit for the performance of duties proper to one's own stage of life (*svāśramocitakarman*), and for desire-motivated rites (*kāmyakarman*), is of middling mixed action (*miśrakarmamadhyama*). A body such as that of Cāṇḍālas, Pulkasas, Kirātas, Yavanas and the like, is the result of ordinary mixed action (*miśrakarmasāmānya*).

Therefore, a discriminative person, having reflected upon this gradation of the fruits of action, should [strive] to attain, in respect to the human birth upon this earth, a birth arising from the most excellent form of mixed action; accordingly, performing one's own *varṇa* and *āśrama* duties, renouncing desire for their fruits (*phalecchā*), and offering [them] to *īśvara*, he should make effort solely towards the attainment of liberation through the reflecting on the self (*ātmavicāraṇa*).

This is the established conclusion (*siddhānta*).

***etat trividham api karma kena kriyata iti cet trividhakaraṇair eva kriyate iti jānīhi | nanv
asmiml loke'haṃ karomy ahaṃ karomīti vadatāṃ sarveṣāṃ anubhavenāsmīn dehe
dehābhīmānī sann ahaṃśabdārthatayā ya ātmā vartate tasyātmanaḥ kartṛtve vaktavye
taṃ vihāya trividhakaraṇānāṃ bhavadbhiḥ kartṛtvaṃ katham ucyata iti cec chrṇu | ātmā
avikārī niṣkriyaḥ svagatabhedaśūnyaḥ | tasmād ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṃ vaktuṃ na śakyate |***

If [it be asked], “By whom are these three kinds of action performed?”—know that they are performed solely through the threefold faculties (*trividhakaraṇa*).

⁸² *siddhayet, recte siddhyeta.*

“But in this world, once it is admitted that the experience (*anubhava*) of all who say ‘I act, I act’ indeed shows that the self—existing in this body, identified with the body, and functioning as the referent of the word ‘I’—must indeed possess agency (*kartṛtva*), then, how can you set aside that [very self] and ascribe agency to the three faculties?”

Listen: the self is unchangeable (*avikārin*), inactive (*niṣkriya*), and devoid of internal differentiation (*svagatabhedaśūnya*).

Therefore, agency cannot be predicated of the self.

***nanu kartṛtvaṃ svātmaniṣṭhatayā bhāti | kartā cānyo na dṛśyate | katham iti cec chr̥ṇu |
ātmani pratīyamānaṃ kartṛtvaṃ adhyāsān na svabhāvata iti jānīhi | svābhāvikaṃ iti cet
na kenāpi vedāntavicāraṃ kṛtvā mamedam kartṛtvaṃ parihaṇāyāṃ | asyānapāye
saṃsārabandho’pi nāpayāsyatīti vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ karaṇīyaḥ |***

If [it be asked], “But agency appears as if inherent in the self; and no other agent (*kartṛ*) is perceived—how can this be otherwise?”

Listen: the agency that seems to pertain to the self arises through superimposition (*adhyāsa*), not from its own inherent nature (*svabhāva*)—thus know.

If [it be said] that it is inherent (*svābhāvikaṃ*), [we reply]: no. For anyone who has undertaken reflection on Vedānta, [this notion]—‘This is my agency’—must indeed be renounced. For so long as this does not cease, the bondage of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsārabandha*) will not cease either; therefore, any further effort [towards liberation] would be in vain.

***ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṃ svābhāvikaṃ bhavatu | prayatnaviśeṣeṇa naśyatv iti cen na |
svabhāvasya svasvarūpatvāt | kiṃ ca svarūpanāśārthaṃ ko vā prayatnaṃ kuryāt |
svarūpanāśe sati ko vā puruṣārtham anubhavet | kiṃ cākartā jīvanmukto na cet tadā
vedāntasampradāyo guruḥ śiṣyaś ca na syuḥ | kiṃ cātmā kartā sākṣī niṣkriya iti
pratipādakasya niṣkriyaṃ niṣphalaṃ śāntaṃ niravadyaṃ nirañjanam | sākṣī cetā kevalo
nirguṇaś ca | ityādiśrutivākyasyāpi hāniḥ syāt |***

If [it be said], “Let agency be inherent in the self; yet let it perish through a special effort,” [we reply]: no. For inherent nature constitutes one’s very essence (*svasvarūpa*).

Furthermore, who would make effort to destroy his own essential nature? And if that nature were destroyed, who would remain to experience any human end (*puruṣārtha*)?

If [it be said], “Again, if [the self] were a non-agent (*akartṛ*), then the liberated person while still alive (*jīvanmukta*) would not exist; and consequently, the entire Vedānta tradition—including teacher and student—would cease to be.” [We reply:] if the self were regarded as an agent (*kartṛ*), witness (*sākṣin*), [and] actionless (*niṣkriya*), then even the scriptural statement such as—“The self is actionless (*niṣkriya*), fruitless (*niṣphala*), calm (*śānta*), unblamable (*niravadya*), spotless (*nirañjana*),” and “the witness (*sākṣin*), the observer (*cetā*), solitary (*kevala*), attribute-less (*nirguṇa*)”—would be invalidated.⁸³

***suṣuptāv ātmani vidyamāne’pi kartṛtvaṃ na dṛśyate | yadi kartṛtvaṃ svābhāvikaṃ agner
ūṣṇatvam ivopalabheta | tathā nopalabhyate | tasmād ātmana kartṛtvaṃ na
svābhāvikaṃ |***

⁸³ “*niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śāntaṃ niravadyaṃ nirañjanam,*” Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.19; “*sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaś ca,*” Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.11.

Even in deep sleep, when the self continues to exist, no agency is found.

If agency were inherent in the self—as heat is in fire—it would necessarily be perceived, but such is not the case.

Therefore, agency (*karṭṛtva*) is not inherent in the self (*svābhāvika*).

nanu suṣuptau karṭṛtvānupalambhaḥ karaṇavīyogāt | yathā takṣādeḥ karṭṛtve vidyamāne’pi snānabhojanādisamaye tadanupalambhas tadvad bhavativ iti cen na | tūṣṇīmbhūtāvasthāyāṃ antaḥkaraṇasamyoge vidyamāne’pi karṭṛtvānupalambhāt karṭṛtvaṃ na svābhāvīkam | kiṃtv ādhyāsīkam eva |

If [it be asked], “In deep sleep, the non-perception of agency is due to the disjunction from the faculties (*karaṇa*); just as, in the case of a carpenter or the like, although [his] agency continues to exist, it is not perceived at times such as bathing or eating—so too should it be [with the self],” —[we reply:] no.

Even in a state of quiescence, when conjunction with the thinking faculty (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is present, since agency is still not perceived, it cannot be inherent (*svābhāvika*).

Rather, it is superimposed (*ādhyāsika*).

adhyāso nāmānyaniṣṭhadharmāṇām anyatrāvabhāsaḥ | yathā nauniṣṭhagamanasya tīrasthavṛkṣe vṛkṣaniṣṭhācalatvasya nāvi cādhyāsavaśād bhānam | evaṃ trividhakaraṇaniṣṭhakarṭṛtvasyātmani ātmaniṣṭhākarṭṛtvasya trividhakaraṇe ca bhānam ajñānavasād eva | tasmād ātmanaḥ karṭṛtvaṃ āropād iti jānīhi |

Superimposition (*adhyāsa*) is the appearance of attributes (*dharma*)—which properly belong to one thing (*anyaniṣṭha*)—in another (*anyatra*).

Just as, through the power of superimposition, the motion that truly belongs to the boat appears in the tree standing on the shore, and the stillness belonging to the tree appears in the boat—so too, solely through the power of ignorance (*ajñāna*), the agency that properly belongs to the threefold faculties appears in the self, and the non-agency that belongs to the self appears in those faculties.

Therefore, know that the agency ascribed to the self is a mere superimposition.

nanu jaḍasya trividhakaraṇasyācetanatvād acetanasya kathaṃ karṭṛtvaṃ | karaṇatrayasyaiva karṭṛtve tasya karaṇāntareṇāpi bhavitavyam iti cec chṛṇu | yathā loke’cetanasya vāyor vṛkṣādīnām unmūlane teṣāṃ dūranirasane ca yathā [vā] jalapravāhasyāpy acetanasya vṛkṣādīnām unmūlane teṣāṃ dūranirasane ca karaṇaṃ vinā karṭṛtvaṃ dṛśyate tathā trividhakaraṇasyāpi karaṇāntaraṃ vinā karṭṛtvaṃ upapadyate |

If [it be asked], “But since the threefold faculties (*trividhakaraṇa*) are unconscious (*acetana*) and inanimate (*jaḍa*), how can agency belong to what is without consciousness? And if agency resides in the instruments themselves, then they too would require yet another faculty (*karaṇāntara*) [to act]” —listen: just as in ordinary experience, the unconscious wind uproots trees and the like and scatters them afar; and likewise, the unconscious current of water uproots and carries away trees and the like—thus, even without any auxiliary means (*karaṇa*), agency is perceived [in them]. In the same way, the threefold instruments too can

reasonably be understood to possess agency without dependence on any further faculty.

evam trividhakaraṇakṛtāni karmāṇi kānīti ced ucyate | saviśeṣacintā nirviśeṣacintā paralokacintā bhaktijñānavairāgyacintā ityādivikārāḥ sarve manasā kriyamāṇāni karmāṇi mānasapuṇyakarmāṇi | viśayacintā pareṣām apakāracintā vedaśāstrayor aprāmāṇyacintā dharmādharmaḍyabhāvacintā ityādibuddhivikārāḥ sarve mānasapāpakarmāṇi | saviśeṣacintāyā nirviśeṣacintāyāḥ puṇyacintāyā api viśayacintādipāpacintāyā miśrīkṛtyānuṣṭhānaṃ mānasamiśrakarma |

If [it be asked], “What, then, are the actions performed by the threefold faculties?”—this is explained: reflections upon the qualified (*saviśeṣa*) [absolute], the unqualified (*nirviśeṣa*) [absolute], the next world (*paraloka*), devotion (*bhakti*), knowledge (*jñāna*), and detachment (*vairāgya*), and similar modifications [of thought]—all these, being performed by the mind, constitute meritorious mental actions (*mānasapuṇyakarmāṇi*). Reflections upon sense-objects (*viśaya*), the harming of others (*pareṣām apakāra*), the unauthoritativeness (*apramāṇya*) of the Vedas and Śāstras, the non-existence (*abhāva*) of righteousness (*dharma*) and unrighteousness (*adharmā*), and similar such modifications of the intellect—all these constitute demeritorious mental actions (*mānasapāpakarmāṇi*). And when reflections upon the qualified or unqualified [absolute], or other meritorious contemplations, are combined with demeritorious contemplations on sense-objects and the like, their conjunction constitutes mixed mental action (*mānasamiśrakarman*).

vedādhyayanaṃ śāstragītāsahasranāmādīpaṭhanaṃ pañcākṣarādīmantrajapaḥ bhagavannāmasaṅkīrtanaṃ paropakāravārtā satyavākyaṃ mṛdupūrvabhāṣaṇaṃ ca vācā kriyamāṇaṃ puṇyakarma | vedaśāstradevatādidūṣaṇaṃ asatyapīśunapāruṣyāpahāsavārtā cetyādi sarvaṃ vācikaṃ pāpakarma | vedādhyayanapūjākālādīpuṇyavārtāsu paranindāyā asatyasya parihāsasya laukikavārtāyās caivamādīpāpānāṃ miśrīkṛtyānuṣṭhānaṃ vācikaṃ miśrakarma |

Recitation of the Vedas, study of the Śāstras, the *Gītā*, the Sahasranāmas, and similar texts; repetition of mantras such as the five-syllabled (*pañcākṣara*), chanting of the divine names, discourse on charity, speaking the truth, and gentle speech—all such constitute meritorious verbal action (*vācikapuṇyakarman*).

Disparaging the Vedas, the scriptures, the deities, and the like; speech involving falsehood, calumny, harshness, or ridicule—all such constitute demeritorious verbal action (*vācikapāpakarman*).

When these demeritorious acts—such as reviling others, falsehood, mockery, or idle wordly talk—are intermingled with meritorious speech, such as discussions of Vedic recitation, worship, or time [for auspicious observances], that constitutes mixed verbal action (*vācikamiśrakarman*).

punya-tīrthas-nānaṃ gurudevatānamaskāraḥ devapūjā pradakṣiṇaṃ sajjanadarśanaṃ tyāgaḥ lokānugrahasaṃcāraḥ evamādīni kāyena kriyamāṇāni karmāṇi kāyikaṃ puṇyakarma | parahiṃsāparastrīsaṅgacaurya-duṣṭasaṅgādi kāyena kriyamāṇaṃ kāyikaṃ

pāpakarma* |⁸⁴ *brāhmaṇabhojanārthaṃ brāhmaṇopadravaḥ devālayanirmāṇārthaṃ paradrvyāpahāraḥ prapāṃ sthāpayitvā bhṛtakasyāpradānam evamādīni puṇyāni pāpāni ca miśrīkṛtya kāyenānuṣṭhīyamānāni kāyikaṃ miśrakarma | etāni trividhāny api karmāṇi samyagvicāraṇīyāni |

Bathing in sacred waters, offering homages to [one’s] teacher and to the idols, worship of the gods, circumambulation, visiting the virtuous, charity, and going about for the welfare of the world—such actions performed by the body constitute bodily meritorious action (*kāyikapuṇyakarman*).

Injury to others, association with another’s wife, theft, companionship with the wicked, and similar deeds performed by the body constitute bodily demeritorious action (*kāyikapāpakarman*).

When, [for instance], in order to feed *brāhmaṇas* one harasses *brāhmaṇas*; or, for the construction of a temple, one misappropriates another’s wealth; or, after establishing a public water supplier, one fails to pay the hired worker; such actions, wherein meritorious and sinful elements are intermingled and performed by the body, constitute mixed bodily action (*kāyikamiśrakarman*).

All these threefold kinds of action should be properly examined.

vicārasya phalaṃ kim iti cet | mukhyaphalam avāntaraphalam iti dvayam asti | katham iti cet | imāni trividhakarmāṇi trividhair eva karaṇaiḥ kriyante | ātmā tv ayam ākāśavad asaṅgaḥ niraṃśaḥ paripūrṇaḥ caitanyasvarūpaḥ | ato na kasyāpi karmaṇaḥ kartā | ata eva

If [it be asked], “What is the result of inquiry?”—there are two kinds of results: the primary result (*mukhyaphala*) and the subsidiary result (*avāntaraphala*).

If [it be asked], “How so?”—these three kinds of actions are performed solely by the three faculties.

But the self, like space, is unattached (*asaṅga*), partless (*niraṃśa*), complete (*paripūrṇa*), and of the very nature of consciousness (*caitanyasvarūpa*).

Therefore, [the self] is not the agent (*kartr*) of any action. And for this very reason, [it is said]:

yac cāpnoti yad ādatte yac cātti viṣayān iha | yac cāsya santato bhāvas tena cātmeti gīyate | |

“That which reaches out, that which grasps, that which enjoys the objects here, and that whose being is constant—by that, indeed, the self is denoted.”⁸⁵

ityuktātmaśabdārthaḥ |⁸⁶ tasmān naikam api karma cidākāśasvarūpaṃ mām sprśatīti

⁸⁴ *parasstrī, recte parastrī.*

⁸⁵ “*yad āpnoti yad ādatte yac cātti viṣayān ayam yaccāsya satataṃ bhāvas tasmād ātmā nirucyate*”, *Liṅga Purāṇa* 1.70.96.

⁸⁶ The manuscript reads *ityuktatma*, but the editor has emended it to *ityuktātma*.

***jñātvā saṃśayaṃ vihāya dṛḍhānubhavenāvasthānaṃ mukhyaphalam | brahmajñāne saty
 api trividhakarāṇam api puṇyakarmaṇy eva sthāpayitavyam | tadasambhave
 miśrakarmaṇi vā sthāpayitavyam | na kadācid api pāpakarmaṇīti jñātvā
 tathāivāvasthānam avāntaraphalam | yathā kadalīpośakasya kadalīphalam
 mukhyaphalam | tatpatrapuṣpādikam avāntaraphalaṃ tathāiva
 trividhakarāṇakṛtakarmaṇo’pi pūrvoktaphaladvayam iti jñeyam |⁸⁷***

Thus, the meaning of the term *ātman* has been explained.

Therefore, knowing that “no action touches me, whose nature is infinite consciousness (*cidākāśa*)” and, having cast aside [all] doubt, abiding in firm realization (*dṛḍhānubhava*), constitutes the primary result (*mukhyaphala*).

Knowing that “even when knowledge of Brahman has arisen, the threefold faculties should still be employed only in meritorious action; [that], if this is not possible, they should be engaged in mixed action; [and that] never should [they] be involved in sinful action”—and abiding accordingly, constitutes the subsidiary result (*avāntaraphala*).

Just as, for he who has the nourishment [produced] by a plantain tree, the plantain fruit is the primary result, while its leaves, flowers, and the like are subsidiary results, so too, in the case of any action performed through the three faculties, there are likewise the two results described above. This should be understood.

***nanv ambhasā padmapatram iva karmaṇā jñānī na lipyate |⁸⁸ tasya na ko’pi vidhir
 niṣedho vā | sa tv akartā karmasākṣī kṛtakṛtya iti siddhāntitatvāt tasya jñāninaḥ
 ātmājñānina iva puṇyaṃ karmaiva anuṣṭheyam iti niyamaḥ katham iti cet satyam | jñānī
 kṛtakṛtya eva | kartāpi na bhavati | na tatra sandehaḥ tathāpi brahmavid
 brahmavidvaraḥ brahmavidvarīyān brahmavidvariṣṭhaḥ ity eteṣāṃ madhye
 brahmavidvariṣṭha eva videhamuktaḥ | asau variṣṭha eva vṛttiśūnyaḥ |⁸⁹ tasya na vidhir
 na niṣedhaś ca |***

[It may be asked:] “Is it not, just as a lotus leaf is untouched by water, so too the knower [of the self] is untouched by action?”

For him, there is neither injunction (*vidhi*) nor prohibition (*niṣedha*), since it is an established truth that he is a non-agent (*akartṛ*), a witness of action (*karmasākṣin*), and one who has fulfilled all of his duties (*kṛtakṛtya*).

If [it be asked], “How, then, could there be any rule (*niyama*) according to which even the knower [of the self], like the ignorant, should perform only meritorious actions?”—it is true: the knower has indeed fulfilled all duties; he is not an agent, there is no doubt about that. Nevertheless, among those distinguished as the knower of Brahman (*brahmavid*), the excellent knower (*brahmavidvara*), the more excellent knower (*brahmavidvarīyas*), and the most excellent knower (*brahmavidvariṣṭha*), it is only the last who is liberated without a body (*videhamukta*). That most excellent [knower] is indeed free from all mental activity

⁸⁷ *patra, recte pattra*; the editor substituted *jñānasyāpi* with *karmaṇo’pi*.

⁸⁸ *patram, recte pattram*.

⁸⁹ *vṛti, recte vṛtti*.

(*vṛttiśūnya*).

For him, there is neither injunction nor prohibition.

***anyeṣām api trayāṇāṃ jñānamahimnā vidhiniṣedhābhāve’pi vṛttiśūnyatvābhāvād
vyavahāritvāc ca lokānugrahārthaṃ sadācāra eva sthātavyam ity ucyate | na tu
niyamyate | tasmāt tatvajñāninā karmināṃ madhye karmivat karmānuṣṭheyam |⁹⁰
jijñāsūnāṃ madhye tat karma tyaktvā brahmaiva satyam anyat sarvam asatyam iti
jñānam evopadeṣṭavyam | atra prakṛtaṃ kim iti cet | trividhakaraṇasyaiva kartṛtvaṃ
nātmana iti niścitam |***

For the other three [grades of knowers of Brahman] as well—although injunctions and prohibitions no longer apply owing to the majesty of their knowledge—since the state of absence of mental activity (*vṛttiśūnya*) has not yet been attained, and since they still participate in worldly dealings (*vyavahāra*), it is said that they should remain established in righteous conduct (*sadācāra*), for the welfare of the world (*lokānugraha*); yet they are not bound by any obligation to do so.

Therefore, the knower of truth, [when] among those who act, should perform action like an ordinary doer. Among seekers, however, having renounced such action, it is only the knowledge that “Brahman alone is real, all else is unreal” that is to be imparted.

If [it be asked], “What then is the topic presently under discussion?”—it has been established that agency belongs solely to the threefold faculties, [and] not to the self.

***atha trividham api karaṇaṃ kiṃ svayam eva kartṛ anyena preritaṃ veti vicāryamāṇe
rāgadveṣādīnā preritam eva kartṛ na svayam | rāgadveṣādau sati karaṇatrayaṃ
pravartate asati na pravartata ity anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ rāgadveṣādeḥ
karaṇappravartakatvasyānubhavasiddhatvāt | nanv ahaṃ devālayaṃ kārayāmi taṭākāṃ
khānayāmi ityādivyavahārād ātmā kārayitā bhavatv iti cen na | ātmano nirvikāratvān na
kutṛāpi kārayitṛtvaṃ upapadyate | ātmani kārayitṛtvaṃ bhāti cej japākusumanīṣṭhaṃ
lauhityaṃ sphaṭika iva rāgadveṣādiniṣṭhaṃ kārayitṛtvaṃ ātmani bhrāntyāropyata iti
jñeyam | svābhāvikaṃ cet tannāsārthaṃ na ko’pi prayatnaṃ kuryāt | svābhāvikasya
svarūpatvāt | kathaṃcit tasya nāśe svarūpanāśa eva syāt |***

Now, as to whether the threefold faculty acts on its own or is impelled by something else—when this is examined, [it is found that] it acts only when impelled by desire, aversion, and the like, not independently. By the method of concomitance (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*), it is confirmed by direct experience that desire, aversion, and the rest are indeed the instigators of the faculties: “when desire (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) are present, the three faculties operate; when they are absent, they do not.”

If [it be asked], “But from common expressions such as, ‘I cause a temple to be built,’ or ‘I have a tank excavated,’ and so on, does it not follow that the self is the instigator (*kārayitṛ*)?”—not so. Because the self is changeless (*nirvikāra*), instigation (*kārayitṛtva*) cannot, in any manner, truly belong to it.

⁹⁰ *atuṣṭhayaṃ, recte anuṣṭheyam.*

It must be understood that if instigation appears to exist in the self, it is only because that instigation—which pertains to desire, aversion, and the like—is superimposed upon the self through error (*bhrānti*), just as the redness of a hibiscus flower [appears reflected] in a crystal.

If, moreover, that instigation were inherent (*svābhāvika*) [in the self], nobody would try to remove it; for what is inherent constitutes one’s very nature (*svarūpa*), and to destroy it in whichever way possible would be to destroy one’s very nature.

ātmano’pi kārayitṛtvaṃ yadi syād ātmāsaṅgo niṣkriyo’kārayiteti pratipādikā adṛśyam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasāraṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śāntaṃ śivam advaitaṃ caturthaṃ manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeya itī śrutir bhajyeta |⁹¹ (kārayitṛtvasya janyatve tajjanyamukter api janyatvaṃ syāt) suṣuptāv api kārayitṛtvaṃ dṛśyeta | tan na dṛśyate | tasmād ātmanaḥ kārayitṛtvaṃ na svābhāvikaṃ | kintv āgantukam eva |

If even the self possessed instigation, it would contradict the scriptural declaration that “the self is unattached (*asaṅga*), inactive (*niṣkriya*), and a non-instigator (*akārayitṛ*)” —“Unseen (*adṛśya*), unactionable (*avyavahārya*), unperceivable (*agrāhya*), without any characteristic (*alakṣaṇa*), inconceivable (*acintya*), undefinable (*avyapadeśya*), the essence of the consciousness of oneness (*ekātmapratyayasāra*), the cessation of all phenomena (*prapañcopaśama*), peaceful (*śānta*), auspicious (*śiva*), non-dual (*advaita*), the fourth (*caturtha*); this, they hold, is the self; this is to be realized.”⁹²

Moreover, even in deep sleep, instigation would have to be perceivable, but it is not. Therefore, instigation is not inherent (*svābhāvika*) in the self; it is merely adventitious (*āgantuka*).

nanu suṣuptau kārayitṛtvādarśanamātreṇātmanaḥ kārayitṛtvaṃ nāstīti vaktuṃ na śakyate | yathopādhyāyakasyādhyāpakatvaṃ vidyamānam api śiṣyavargāsannidhau na dṛśyate tadvat suṣuptau karaṇasaṃyogābhāvāt vidyamānam api kārayitṛtvaṃ na dṛśyate | jāgratsvapnayoḥ karaṇasaṃyoge sati dṛśyate iti vaktuṃ śakyatvād iti cet | tarhi jāgraty udāsīnatūṣṇīmavasthāyāṃ karaṇasaṃyogasya vidyamānatvāt kārayitṛtvaṃ dṛśyeta |⁹³ tan na dṛśyate | tasmād āgantukam eveti vaktavyam | yathānyonyādhyāsād ayoniṣṭhadīrghahrasvatvādayo’gnau agniṣṭhalauhityauṣṇyaprakāśādayo’yasi ca bhānti tadvad ajñānād eva rāgadveṣādiniṣṭhakārayitṛtvaṃ ātmani ātmaniṣṭhākārayitṛtvaṃ rāgadveṣādau ca bhāti |

If [it be asked], “It cannot be maintained that the self has no instigation merely because instigation is not perceived in deep sleep. For, just as a teacher’s capacity to instruct, though existing, is not perceived when the class of students is absent, so too, in deep sleep

⁹¹ The manuscript reads *ātmaññānino’pi*, but the editor has emended it to *ātmano’pi*.

⁹² “*nāntaḥprajñam na bahiḥprajñam nobhayataḥprajñam na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adṛśyamavyavahāryamagrāhyamalakṣaṇamacintyamavyapadeśyamekātmapratyayasāraṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śāntaṃ śivamadvaitaṃ caturthaṃ manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ,*” *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 7.

⁹³ *udāsīna, recte udāsīna.*

(*suṣupti*), owing to the absence of connection with the faculties, instigation, though existent, is not perceived; [whereas] in both the waking (*jāgrat*) and dream (*svapna*) states, where connection with the faculties exists, it is perceived—such an explanation is tenable, then, in the waking state itself, instigation ought to be perceived, since connection with the faculties remains even in the states of detachment and stillness.” [We reply:] it is not perceived. Therefore, instigation must be admitted to be merely adventitious. Just as, through mutual superimposition (*anyonyādhyāsa*), properties not belonging to iron—such as length, shortness, and the like—appear in fire, and properties belonging to fire—such as redness, heat, light, and so forth—appear in iron, so too, through ignorance alone, the instigation pertaining to desire and aversion appears to belong to the self, while the non-instigation pertaining to the self appears to belong to desire and aversion.

nanv acetanasya rāgadveṣādeḥ katham kārayitṛtvam na ghaṭo ghaṭāntaram prerayatīti cet satyam | tathāpi kutracid yogyatāvasāt [jaḍo] jaḍam prerayati | yogyatābhāvāt kutracin na prerayati yathā jaḍo’py agnir gandhakādisaṃyukteṅgālādicūrṇaviśeṣaiḥ sahitaḥ san jaḍam eva bṛhannālikānta[stha]sthūlapāṣāṇam preṣayitvā tena caturaṅgasenām hanti |⁹⁴

If [it be asked], “How can desire, aversion, and the like—being inanimate (*acetana*)—function as instigators? For one pot cannot set another pot in motion”—that is true. Nevertheless, in some cases, owing to a certain suitability (*yogyatā*), one inanimate (*jaḍa*) entity does indeed move another; while in other cases, where such suitability is absent, it does not.

For instance, even fire, though itself inanimate, when combined with sulphur and particular powders of charcoal and other combustibles, propels a large inanimate stone placed within a cannon, and with it destroys an entire fourfold army.

kiṃca pretaśarīram jaḍam api svajñātikriyamāṇām aparakriyām prati svayaṃ kārayitṛ bhavati | evam acetanam api rāgadveṣādi kārayitṛ bhavati | tarhy ātmā hṛṣīkeśaḥ sarvāntaryāmīti vadantyāḥ śruteḥ kiṃ tātparyam iti cet ādityavat sannidhānamātreṇa sarvakāryānukūlo bhavatīti tātparyam |

Moreover, even a corpse, though inanimate, itself becomes an instigator with respect to the funeral rites performed by its kinsmen.

In the same way, desire, aversion, and the like, though inanimate, function as instigators. If [it be asked], “Then what is the purport of the scriptural statement, ‘The self is Hṛṣīkeśa, the inner controller of all’?”—the meaning is that, like the Sun, the self becomes related to all activity merely by its presence (*sannidhāna*).

nanv ātmā sannidhānamātreṇāpi sarvaprāṇikarmahetur hi | ata ātmano’pi tatpuṇyapāpatatphalasambandho’pi syād iti cen na | yathādityasya sannidhimātreṇa sakalajanapuṇyapāpānukūlasyāpi tatpuṇyam ca pāpam ca tatphalam ca na syāt

⁹⁴ *katracin, recte kutracin; saṃyukteṅgālādi, recte saṃyukteṅgālādi.*

***tathātmano’pi mantavyam | ayaśśreṣṭhāpi sannidhānamātreṇa svānukūlāṃ kāntaśilāṃ
yathā na sprśati tathā prāṇikarmāpy ātmānam iti ca jñeyam |⁹⁵ tasmād ātmano
nirañjanatvaṃ nirvikāratvam |***

If [it be asked], “But since the self, even by its mere presence, is the cause of the actions of all living beings, would it not then also be connected with their merit, demerit, and their results?”—not so. Just as the Sun, related to everyone’s merits and demerits by its mere presence, does not thereby partake of the merit, demerit, or the fruits thereof, so too must it be understood in the case of the self. Just as a piece of the finest iron does not, merely by its proximity, touch the magnet suited to it, in the same way, the actions of living beings do not affect the self—this should be understood.

Therefore, the self is spotless (*nirañjana*) and changeless (*nirvikāra*).

***evam ātmasvarūpe prasiddhe guruṇopadiśyamāne’pi pratibandhatrayeṇa na nīcayo
bhavati | pratibandhatrayaṃ ca saṃśayabhāvanā asaṃbhāvanā viparītabhāvanā ceti |
ṛgādiśākhāsūpadiśyamānam upanayanādikarma yathānekavidhaṃ tathā
ṛgādiśākhāsūpadiśyamānam ātmatattvam api anekaparakāraṃ vā na veti saṃśayaḥ
saṃśayabhāvanā |⁹⁶ sā sakalavedāntatātparyāvadhāraṇarūpaśravaṇena naśyati |***

Even though the true nature of the self is thus well established and is being imparted by the teacher, firm conviction does not arise because of three obstacles.

These three obstacles are: the tendency to doubt (*saṃśayabhāvanā*), the sense of impossibility (*asaṃbhāvanā*), and the contrary notion (*viparītabhāvanā*).

Just as the rites such as initiation, as taught in the various Vedic branches like the *Ṛgveda*, are of many kinds, so too one may doubt whether the truth concerning the self, as taught in the different Vedic branches such as the *Ṛgveda*, is likewise manifold or not. Such uncertainty constitutes the [obstacle called] the “tendency to doubt” (*saṃśayabhāvanā*); it is removed through listening (*śravaṇa*), which ascertains the purport of the entire Vedānta.

***evam sarveṣāṃ vedāntānām advaite brahmaṇy eva tātparyam iti śravaṇena
pramāṇaviśaye saṃśaye naṣṭe’pi idam advaitaṃ kathaṃ sambhāvyaṭe satyatvena
pratīyamāneṣu jīveśvarajagatsu parasparabhinneṣu satsv iti buddhir asaṃbhāvanā | iyaṃ
svapnadṛṣṭāntādirūpayuktyātmakamananena naśyati |***

“All the Vedānta scriptures have their purport in non-dual (*advaita*) Brahman,”—by such hearing, even though the doubt regarding the means of knowledge is dispelled, [the mind may still wonder:] “How can this non-duality be possible, when the *jīva*, *īśvara*, and the world, all apprehended as real, appear mutually distinct?”

Such notion constitutes [the obstacle called] the “sense of impossibility” (*asaṃbhāvanā*); it is dispelled through reflection (*manana*) based on reasoning such as the dream analogy and the like.

⁹⁵ *ayaśśreṣṭha, recte ayaśśreṣṭha.*

⁹⁶ *ātmatatva, recte ātmatattva.*

***evaṃ śravaṇe manane ca kṛte'pi anādyavidyāvāsanayā sarvasyāpi yathāpūrvam
satyatvapratītir viparītabhāvanā | sā
brahmaikākārapratyayappravāharūpanididhyāsanena naśyati | evaṃ
pratibandhakatrayanāsākaraṇe yathā sarvasya dāhako'py agnir
maṇimantrādipratibandhair ekam tṛṇam api dagdhuṃ na śaknoti evaṃ jñānāgnir api
pratibandhaiḥ pratibaddhaiḥ sann ajñānatatkāryeṣu kiṃcid api dagdhuṃ na śaknoti |⁹⁷
pūrvoktaprakāreṇāsmiṃ pratibandhatraye'panīte sati sadya evāgnis tṛṇam ivāvidyāṃ
tatkāryam api sarvaṃ dagdhuṃ śaknoti |⁹⁸ kiṃca***

Even when hearing (*śravaṇa*) and reflection (*manana*) have been accomplished, owing to the latent impressions (*vāsanā*) of beginningless ignorance (*anādyavidyā*), there still persists in everyone, as before, the apprehension of reality (*satyatva*) [in the unreal]—this is [the obstacle called] the “contrary notion” (*viparītabhāvanā*); it is dispelled through deep meditation (*nididhyāsana*), which takes the form of a continuous current of cognition having Brahman alone as its content.

Thus, in the context of removing the three obstacles: just as fire, though it is the incinerator of everything, is unable to consume even a single blade of grass when impeded by obstructions such as a gem, a mantra, and the like, so too the fire of knowledge (*jñānāgni*), being obstructed by impediments, cannot burn away even a trace of ignorance (*ajñāna*) and its effects (*tatkārya*). But when, in the manner previously described, these three obstacles have been removed, then immediately—like fire that [at once] consumes grass—[the fire of knowledge] is able to burn up ignorance together with all its effects.

Furthermore:

***upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso'pūrvatā phalam |
arthavādapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyanirṇaye | |***

“The beginning (*upakrama*) and conclusion (*upasaṃhāra*), repetition (*abhyāsa*), novelty (*apūrvatā*), result (*phala*), eulogy (*arthavāda*), and reasoning (*upapatti*) are the indicatory marks for discerning the intended purport [of a scriptural passage].”

***iti vacanena śaḍvidhaliṅgais tātparya[nirṇayaḥ] kartavyaḥ | atra
chāndogyaśaṣṭhādhyāye sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyaṃ ity
upakramyaitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ ity akhaṇḍaikarasa evopasaṃhṛtaṃ ity
upakramopasaṃhāraikarūpyam ekam liṅgam |⁹⁹***

By this statement, the ascertainment of a [passage's] purport is to be made through the sixfold indicators (*śaḍvidhaliṅga*).

Here, for instance, in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, [the teaching] begins

⁹⁷ *dāhako'py, recte dāhako'py.*

⁹⁸ *puvotka, recte purvokta.*

⁹⁹ The manuscript reads *rūpam*, but the editor has emended it to *rūpyam*.

with the text, “O gentle one, in the beginning, this was being alone, one only, without a second”, and concludes with, “All this has the nature of that; that is the truth.” [The teaching] is concluded as being of a single, undivided essence.

Thus, the uniformity of the beginning (*upakrama*) and conclusion (*upasamhāra*) is one indicator [for determining the intended purport].¹⁰⁰

***tat tvam asīti navakṛtvas tasyaivābhyāso dvitīyam | akhaṇḍaikarasasya
pratyakṣādīpamāṇāntarāviśayatvam apūrvatā tṛtīyam | tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na
vimokṣye'tha sampatsya ity akhaṇḍaikarasajñānasya prārabdhabhogānantaram
videhakaivalyarūpaphalavacanam caturtham | yathā somyaikena mṛtṭpiṇḍenetyādinā
dṛṣṭāntakathanam upapattīyākhyam ṣaṣṭham |¹⁰¹ arthavādas tu pañcamam |
sṛṣṭisthitipralayaprevaśasam[ni]yamanatattvam padārtha[śodhana]phalapatipādakā iti
saptārthavādāḥ |***

The statement “That thou art” (*tat tvam asi*) occurs nine times; its repetition (*abhyāsa*) constitutes the second [indicator].

The fact that the one, undivided essence (*akhaṇḍaikarasa*) is not an object of any other means of knowledge, beginning with perception, represents novelty (*apūrvatā*), the third [indicator].

The passage, “For him, there is delay only so long as [his firm knowledge is]: 'I am not yet freed (from the body); then I shall be united (with Brahman),’” expresses the result (*phala*)—[namely,] incorporeal liberation (*videhakaivalya*) immediately after the exhaustion of *prārabdhakarma*—arising from the knowledge of the one, undivided essence; this constitutes the fourth [indicator].¹⁰²

The mention of the example, “O gentle one, it is like this: by knowing a single lump of clay...” and so on, constitutes reasoning (*upapatti*), the sixth [indicator].¹⁰³

Eulogy (*arthavāda*) is the fifth. There are seven kind of eulogies here, which respectively present: creation (*sṛṣṭi*), sustenance (*sthiti*), dissolution (*pralaya*), penetration (*praveśa*), governance (*saṃniyamana*), elucidation of the meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam* (*tattvam padārthaśodhana*), and the declaration of the result (*phalapatipādaka*).

***tatra tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūta ityādyāḥ sṛṣṭyādyarthavādarūpāḥ
śrutayaḥ ākāśādeḥ sarvasya brahmaṇy evotpattes tasminn evāvasthānāt tasminn eva
layān mṛdūtpattisthitilayātmakasya ghaṭādeḥ mṛdabhedavat kāraṇabrahmamātratām
avagamayantyo mahāvākyoktaṃ brahmaṇo'dvitīyatvam sambhāvayām āsuḥ |***

In this context, the scriptural passages beginning with “From that, verily—from this self—is

¹⁰⁰ “*sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata,*” *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.2.1. “*aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ*”—this specific teaching forms the core of the *sadvidyā* (“knowledge of being”) in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*; the formula is repeated nine times by the sage Uddālaka Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu: 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3, 6.11.3, 6.12.3, 6.13.3, 6.14.2, 6.15.3, and 6.16.3.

¹⁰¹ *upapatti, recte upapatti.*

¹⁰² “*tasya tāvadeva ciraṃ yāvanna vimokṣye'tha sampatsya iti,*” *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2.

¹⁰³ “*yathā somyaikena mṛtṭpiṇḍena,*” *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1.4.

space born,” and so on—eulogies concerned with creation and related topics—teach that everything, beginning with space, originates from Brahman alone, abides in Brahman alone, and finally dissolves into Brahman alone.¹⁰⁴ Just as the jar and similar objects, whose origination, existence, and dissolution consist in clay, are in reality nothing but clay, so too do [these texts] indicate that [all] is nothing but the causal Brahman.¹⁰⁵ [In this way,] they serve to elucidate the non-duality of Brahman proclaimed in the main proposition (*mahāvākya*)[—“That thou art,” etc.].

tathaitam eva sīmānaṃ vidāyaitayā dvārā prāpadyata tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇvāṇītyādyāḥ śrutayo brahmaṇa eva jīvarūpeṇa praveśaṃ bruvatyo bahiḥ sthivāntargṛhe praviṣṭadevadattavaj jīvabrahmaṇor abhedam mahāvākyaṛthaṃ sambhāvayām āsuḥ |¹⁰⁶

Likewise, the scriptural passages such as, “Having made just this opening, through this door he entered,” “Having created that, he indeed entered into it,” “Entering into [it] as the individual self, I shall differentiate name and form,” and others of this kind, declare that Brahman penetrated [into the creation] in the form of the *jīva*.¹⁰⁷

[The scriptures] make intelligible the non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman—which is the meaning of the main proposition (*mahāvākya*)—just as [in the example of] Devadatta, who, having stood outside, entered into the house.

tathā yaḥ pṛthivyām tiṣṭhan pṛthivyām antaro yaṃ pṛthivī na veda yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yaḥ pṛthivīm antaro yamayaty eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛta ityādiniyamanaśrutis cātyantābhedenā niyamaniyāmakabhāvānupapattes tayor abhedam eva sambhāvayati |¹⁰⁸

Likewise, the scripture on governance (*niyamanaśruti*)—beginning with “He who dwells in the earth and is within it, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within—he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal”—by reason of complete non-difference (*abheda*), since a relation of controller (*niyāmaka*) and controlled (*niyamya*) would be impossible [in such a case], establishes their non-difference alone.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ “*tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūta*”, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1.

¹⁰⁵ The Sanskrit terms used in this paragraph for this causal process—*utpatti* (origination), *avasthāna* (abiding), and *laya* (dissolution)—correspond directly to the triad of *sṛṣṭi* (creation), *sthiti* (sustenance), and *pralaya* (dissolution) enumerated in the preceding paragraph's classification of eulogies. The author uses them as synonyms.

¹⁰⁶ *bruvanyo, recte bruvatyo*.

¹⁰⁷ “*eva sīmānaṃ vidāyaitayā dvārā prāpadyata*”, *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 1.3.12; “*tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat*”, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.6.1; “*anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇvāṇi*”, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.3.2. While the English translation uses a verb (“penetrated”), the original Sanskrit text uses the noun *praveśa* (“penetration”)—the fourth of the seven eulogies enumerated previously.

¹⁰⁸ The manuscript reads *niyāmakābhāva*, but the editor has emended it to *niyāmakabhāva*.

¹⁰⁹ “*yaḥ pṛthivyām tiṣṭhan pṛthivyām antaro yaṃ pṛthivī na veda yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yaḥ pṛthivīm antaro yamayaty eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*”, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.7.3; the term *niyamana* (governance) used here is synonymous with *saṃnyamana*, which the author previously enumerated as the fifth eulogy.

***tathā sa vā eṣa puruṣo’nnarasamayaḥ | yad agne rohitaṃ rūpam ityādyas
tattvaṃpadārthaśodhanarūpāḥ śrutayo
jīveśvarobhayagataviruddhadharmanirasanaadvārā tayor aikyam eva sambhāvayanti |***¹¹⁰

Likewise, the scriptural passages such as “He, verily, is this person, formed of the essence of food,” and “That which is the red hue of fire,” and others of this kind—which serve to elucidate the meanings of the words “That” (*tat*) and “Thou” (*tvam*)—through the negation of the [mutually] contradictory attributes belonging to both the *jīva* and *īśvara*, make intelligible their oneness (*aikya*) alone.”¹¹¹

***tathā brahmavid āpnoti param amṛtaḥ samabhavad ityādyas cābhedajñānasya
niratisayaphalapradarśanenābhedasya vivakṣitatvaṃ vijñāpayatyas tam eva
sambhāvayānti |***¹¹²

Likewise, [scriptural passages] such as “The knower of Brahman attains the supreme” and “He became immortal,” and others of this kind, by presenting the unsurpassed fruit of the knowledge of non-difference, indicate that non-difference (*abhedā*) is the intended purport [of the scriptures], and thus make it intelligible.¹¹³

***itthaṃ dṛḍhaṃ
sṛṣṭisthithisaṃhārapraveśasaṃ[ni]yamanatattvaṃpadārthapariśodhanaphalapratipādakai
-ḥ saptavidhārthavādair anugṛhītaṃ sajjīvabrahmaikyarūpam akhaṇḍaikarasam
evāvāntaravākyaiḥ saha sahitaṃ sat pratipādayati | tato’khaṇḍaikarasatvenaiva
mahāvākyārtho vaktavya iti ṣaḍvidhaliṅgaiḥ śrutitātparyāvadhāraṇaṃ śravaṇam ity
uktam |***¹¹⁴

Thus, [the main proposition (*mahāvākyā*)], being firmly supported by the sevenfold eulogies (*arthavāda*)—which set forth creation (*sṛṣṭi*), sustenance (*sthiti*), dissolution (*saṃhāra*), penetration (*praveśa*), governance (*saṃniyamana*), the elucidation of the meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam* (*tattvaṃpadārthapariśodhana*), and the declaration of the result (*phalapratipādaka*)—and being in conjunction with the subsidiary statements (*avāntaravākyā*), establishes the one, undivided essence (*akhaṇḍaikarasa*), the nature of which is the oneness of *sat* (being), *jīva*, and Brahman.

Therefore, since the meaning of the main proposition (*mahāvākyā*) is to be understood as being the one, undivided essence, the ascertainment of the purport of the scripture

¹¹⁰ *ityādyās, recte ityādyas.*

¹¹¹ “*sa vā eṣa puruṣo’nnarasamayaḥ,*” *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.2.1; “*yad agne rohitaṃ rūpam,*” *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.4.1; the term *tattvaṃpadārthaśodhana* used here corresponds to the sixth eulogy enumerated previously.

¹¹² *ityādyās, recte ityādyas; vijñāpayatyas, recte vijñāpayatyas.*

¹¹³ “*brahmavid āpnoti param,*” *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1; “*amṛtaḥ samabhavat,*” *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 2.1.6; the term *phalapradarśana* used here is synonymous with *phalapratipādaka*, which the author previously enumerated as the seventh eulogy.

¹¹⁴ *rasatvainaiva, recte rasatvenaiva.*

(*śrutitātparya*) through the sixfold indicatory marks (*ṣaḍvidhaliṅga*) is what is termed listening (*śravaṇa*).

***idānīm kiṃ prakṛtam iti cet | mayoktaprakāreṇa vicārya rāgādinā preritam tat
trividhakaraṇaṃ trividhaṃ karma karoti | pradhānipreritasenayā sampāditaṃ jayaṃ rājā
ahaṃ jitavān ity ātmany āropayati yathaivam ātmā rāgadveṣādiniṣṭhaṃ prerakatvam
ajñānād ātmany abhimanyate |***

Now, if it be asked, “What is the subject [under discussion]?”—upon examination in the manner I have already described, it is seen that the threefold faculties (*trividhakaraṇa*), impelled by attachment and the like, perform the three kinds of action[—bodily, verbal, and mental].

Just as a king attributes to himself a victory won by the army set in motion by the commander-in-chief, thinking, 'I have conquered,' in the same way, the self, due to ignorance, wrongly assumes the agency [for actions] which actually belongs to attachment, aversion, and the like.

***evam ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṃ kārayitṛtvaṃ ca nāstīti yo dṛḍhaṃ niścīnoti sa eva muktaḥ sa
eva kṛtakṛtyaḥ |***¹¹⁵

Thus, he who firmly realizes that the self has neither agency (*kartṛtva*) nor instigation (*kārayitṛtva*) is truly liberated; he alone has accomplished all of his duties (*kṛtakṛtya*).

***trividhair eva karaṇaiḥ puṇyaṃ pāpaṃ ca miśrakam |
kriyate na mayā karmety evaṃ buddhir vimucyate ||
rāgāder eva nirvartyaṃ prerakatvaṃ na me kvacit |
iti yasya dṛḍhā buddhiḥ sa muktaḥ sa ca paṇḍitaḥ ||***

He whose understanding is, “Meritorious (*puṇya*), demeritorious (*pāpa*), and mixed (*miśraka*) actions (*karman*) are performed solely by the threefold faculties (*trividhakāraṇa*), not by me,” is [thereby] liberated.

He whose firm conviction is, “The power of setting in motion belongs only to attachment and the like, and never to me,”—such a one is liberated, such a one is the truly wise (*paṇḍita*).

***iti śrīmacchaṅkarabhagavatpūjyapādaviracite māyāvivaraṇe
kartṛtvakārayitṛtvavimarśanaṃ nāma pañcamaṃ varṇakaṃ samāptam |
|| śam ||***

Thus concludes the fifth chapter, entitled “Investigation into Agency and Instigation,” in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*, composed by the illustrious and venerable master, Śaṅkara.

¹¹⁵ *ānmanaḥ, recte ātmanaḥ.*

Chapter II: Philological and Historical Contextualization

The *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s claim to authenticity is emphatic and repeatedly asserted throughout the work. The opening verse attributes the text "to the illustrious master, Śaṅkara" (*śrīśaṅkarabhagavatpādaviracitam*), and the concluding chapter closes in nearly identical terms: "Thus... in the *Māyāvivarāṇa* composed by the illustrious and venerable master, Śaṅkara" (*iti śrīmacchaṅkarabhagavatpūjyapādaviracite...*). A third attribution, however, appears in the colophon to chapter 4, where the author is styled Śaṅkarācārya (*iti śrīmacchaṅkarācāryaviracite māyāvivarāṇe...*).

The repetition—and, significantly, the shift—between these titles situates the *Māyāvivarāṇa* within one of the central problems of Advaita textual history: pseudepigraphy. The predominance of the Bhagavatpāda form might at first seem to anchor the work in the authentic Śaṅkarian tradition, yet the intrusion of Ācārya introduces precisely the kind of internal inconsistency that Paul Hacker identified as a hallmark of later imitation rather than original authorship. As presented in Halbfass's collection, Hacker explains:

"Since Śaṅkara's contemporaries styled him Bhagavat, Bhagavatpāda, and Bhagavatpūjyapāda, and the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, which surely has been composed by him, is invariably ascribed to Śaṅkara-Bhagavat, -Bhagavatpāda, or -Bhagavatpūjyapāda in the colophons, we are entitled to regard provisionally as genuine those works that are described in their colophons as productions of the Bhagavat, whereas all the works that are usually attributed to Śaṅkarācārya in the colophons are suspicious of being spurious."¹¹⁶

The present study applies this approach to the *Māyāvivarāṇa*, but extends it beyond Hacker's primarily philosophical scope to construct a broader authorial "fingerprint." This composite profile integrates philological, linguistic, and socio-historical evidence to recover the true context of composition behind the text's Śaṅkarian façade.

To reconstruct the work's historical identity, the analysis proceeds through two interlocking dimensions:

Part 1: The Chronological Horizon (The "When")

Part 2: The Geographical Footprint (The "Where")

As this investigation unfolds, the contradictory colophons emerge as only the first of many clues. The text is, in fact, replete with anachronisms.

Part 1: The Chronological Horizon (The "When")

1.1 The Technological Anachronism: The Cannon (*brhannālika*)

Among the various categories of evidence that place the *Māyāvivarāṇa* in a post-classical

¹¹⁶ Paul Hacker, "Śaṅkarācārya and Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda: Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Authorship Problem," in *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta*, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 50.

period, the most decisive is a technological anachronism found in chapter 5, where the author refutes the objection that an inanimate object (*acetana*) cannot impel another; to do so, the author employs a vivid, contemporary military analogy:

***yathā jaḍo'py agnir gandhakādisamyukteṅgālādicūrṇaviśeṣaiḥ sahitaḥ san jaḍam eva
brhannālikānta[stha]sthūlapāṣāṇam preṣayitvā tena caturaṅgasenām hanti |***

“For instance, even fire, though itself inanimate, when combined with sulphur and particular powders of charcoal and other combustibles, propels a large inanimate stone placed within a cannon, and with it destroys an entire fourfold army.”

The terminological precision here is striking. The author is not describing a vague "fire weapon" but a specific technology:

- **The propellant:** “sulphur, etc.” (*gandhakādi*) and “charcoal, etc.” (*iṅgālādi*) refer to ingredients used in the preparation of gunpowder, whose primary components are saltpetre, sulphur, and charcoal.¹¹⁷
- **The weapon:** *brhannālika* ("great tube") is a standard Sanskrit neologism used in the medieval period to designate a cannon or bombard.¹¹⁸
- **The ammunition:** *sthūlapāṣāṇam* ("a large stone") accurately describes the stone cannonballs used in early bombards before the widespread adoption of cast-iron shot.

The presence of this analogy allows for precise historical dating. The history of gunpowder in India is a subject of robust scholarship, with a clear consensus on its timeline.

1. **Arrival (13th-14th centuries):** In the mid-thirteenth century, gunpowder technology entered India with the Mongol incursions, appearing first as incendiary devices and pyrotechnics—employed for psychological effect and conflagration—rather than as a propellant in artillery. While the first ambiguous mentions of "artillery" appear in 14th-century Delhi Sultanate texts, scholarly analysis shows these do not refer to true cannons. Key terms, like *kashkanjīr* and *maghribi*, were once misinterpreted as firearms. However, contemporary dictionaries and later historical comparisons reveal they were, in fact, names for mechanical siege engines, such as catapults and mangonels, not gunpowder weapons.¹¹⁹
2. **Establishment (15th century):** The earliest unequivocal evidence for true cannons—such as the *brhannālika*—appears in the first half of the 15th century. They were adopted by the Bahmani Sultanate in the Deccan and in Gujarat during the 1420s–1430s, most likely introduced through maritime trade and contacts with the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁰
3. **Widespread proliferation (16th century):** The "gunpowder revolution" in India is definitively marked by the First Battle of Panipat in 1526. It was Babur's superior use

¹¹⁷ Iq̄tidar Alam Khan, *Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2.

¹¹⁸ Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), 737.

¹¹⁹ Iq̄tidar Alam Khan, *Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 18–22, 208, 210–13.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 41–6.

of field artillery and firearms that secured his victory and established the Mughal Empire. Following this event, the manufacture and use of cannons became a standard and essential feature of all major Indian armies, including the Mughals, the Vijayanagara Empire, and later the Marathas.

The *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s reference to artillery is a detailed and casual analogy that provides a firm chronological anchor. The author's confidence in using cannon-fire to teach beginners (*bālānām*) reveals a period not of technological novelty but of widespread public familiarity. The weapon described—a massive, stone-throwing bombard (*brhannālika*)—was used in India roughly from the early 15th to the early 19th century. This broad timeframe, however, can be narrowed dramatically.

The 15th century is highly improbable. The author describes the propellant as *gandhakādisamyukteṅgālādicūrṇaviśeṣaiḥ*—"powders of charcoal... combined with sulphur, etc."—omitting the essential oxidizer, saltpeter. This omission is not a primitive recipe; the explosive force required to propel a "large stone" (*sthūlapāṣāṇam*) is impossible without an oxidizer. The key lies in the suffix ...*ādi* ("and so on"), a deliberate shorthand presupposing an audience already familiar with the standard formula. Such casual familiarity is highly improbable in the early 15th century, when cannons were still rare, specialized marvels far too unfamiliar to serve as effortless teaching analogies.

This is reinforced by the weapon's described function: the claim that it "destroys an entire fourfold army" (*caturaṅgasenām hanti*). This aligns not with the 15th-century use of bombards primarily as anti-fortress siege engines, but with the battlefield revolution of the 16th century, exemplified by Panipat (1526), when artillery first proved capable of annihilating traditional armies.¹²¹

At the other end of the timeline, the 19th century is equally excluded. The text's *terminus ante quem* is the mid-18th century. After the Battle of Plassey (1757), the great stone-throwing *brhannālika* was decisively outclassed and rendered obsolete by standardized European artillery, making it a poor metaphor for overwhelming power.¹²²

Taken together, these details point decisively to the long, mature artillery era of the 16th through early 18th centuries, when massive bombards and modern field guns coexisted, gunpowder was universally understood, and the devastating power of artillery still commanded genuine awe.¹²³ The 16th, 17th, or the first half of the 18th century thus emerges as the most plausible window of composition.

Part 2: The Geographical Footprint (The "Where")

2.1 The "Geopolitical Fingerprint": The Regional List

¹²¹ Ibid., 46-7.

¹²² Ibid., 114-16, 125. As Khan makes clear, the traditional Indian bombard had become militarily obsolete by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, decisively outclassed by European cast-iron field artillery. A 19th-century author, writing after the Anglo-Mysore (1767-99), Anglo-Maratha (1775-1819), and Anglo-Sikh (1845-49) wars, would have known this weapon as a failed technology. The *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s use of it as the epitome of devastating power therefore points to an earlier milieu.

¹²³ Ibid., 98-107.

In chapter 4, while describing the mechanism of the ego's false identification (*abhimāna*) with the body and social status, the author provides a list of identities that the ignorant person claims:

...āndhro'haṃ drāviḍo'haṃ karṇāṭako'haṃ mahārāṣṭro'haṃ gūrjaro'haṃ...

("...I am an Āndhra; I am a Drāviḍa [Tamil]; I am a Karṇāṭaka [Kannada]; I am a Mahārāṣṭra [Maratha]; I am a Gūrjara [Gujarati]...")

This specific cluster of five regions is not a random assortment of Indian territories. It corresponds almost exactly to the medieval Brahminical classification of the Pañcadrāviḍa (the "Five Southern" groups). As Madhav Deshpande has shown, the earliest known textual occurrence of the rigid taxonomic division of the Brahmin community into two macro-groups—the Pañcagauḍa (Five Northern: Sārasvata, Kānyakubja, Gauḍa, Utkala, Maithila) and the Pañcadrāviḍa (Five Southern: Karṇāṭa, Tailaṅga [Āndhra], Drāviḍa, Mahārāṣṭra, Gūrjara)—is attested in the *Sahyādrīkhaṇḍa* of the *Skandapurāṇa*, with no reliably attested instance before c. 1200 AD.¹²⁴

The presence of this specific five-fold list serves as a definitive temporal marker that precludes authorship by Śaṅkara (c. 700–750 CE); during his time, while regional distinctions existed, the systematized binary of "Five North vs. Five South" Brahmin groups had not yet been codified.

This anachronism is most visible in the specific inclusion of Gūrjara and Mahārāṣṭra. In the 8th century, the term "Gūrjara" carried a distinct political weight, referring primarily to the vast Gurjara-Pratihāra empire which dominated North India.¹²⁵ In that early context, grouping the northern Gurjara power with the southern regions of Drāviḍa would represent an incoherent geopolitical taxonomy. It was only in the later medieval period, with the crystallization of the Pañcadrāviḍa system, that the region of Gujarat was culturally and ritually re-mapped as the northernmost extension of the "southern" Brahminical sphere.

A parallel anachronism appears in the category of Mahārāṣṭra. While the geographical term existed in Śaṅkara's time (referring to a polity ruled by Cālukya or Rāṣṭrakūṭa dynasties), it denoted a political region, not a self-conscious cultural or linguistic community.¹²⁶ The Marathi linguistic and cultural zone emerged only much later, when regional languages became markers of regional authority and identity. Its decisive expansion occurred under the Yādava dynasty in the 12th–13th centuries, when Marathi was adopted by popular devotional movements in the western Deccan, enabling broader cultural participation beyond Sanskrit elites.¹²⁷ By treating "Mahārāṣṭra" as a primary mode of self-identification alongside ethnic groups like Āndhra, the author projects these later medieval identity formations backward onto Śaṅkara's era.

¹²⁴ Madhav Deshpande, *Pañca-Gauḍa and Pañca-Drāviḍa: Contested Borders of a Traditional Classification*, *Studia Orientalia* 108 (2010): 30-34.

¹²⁵ Romila Thapar, *The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), 405, 407–408, 410.

¹²⁶ R. G. Bhandarkar, *Early History of the Dekkan* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1957), 20-22, 60.

¹²⁷ Romila Thapar, *The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), 395-6.

Furthermore, the list reflects a differentiated southern cultural geography that only fully solidified under the regional states of the second millennium CE. As regional polities began to operate within self-consciously bounded vernacular domains, political authority itself became tied to linguistic identity. In this context, the distinct political and linguistic identities of regions like Āndhra and Karṇāṭaka were sharpened during the rule of the Kakatiyas (12th–14th c.), Hoysalas (11th–14th c.), and Vijayanagara Empire (14th–16th c.), moving away from the looser and more diffuse geographical terms of the early medieval period.¹²⁸

In his analysis of the authentic *Upadeśasāhasrī*, published in Halbfass's collection, Hacker notes that the 'pupil's answer' to the question 'Who are you?' is framed entirely within the traditional social and physical order. The pupil identifies himself by "caste and lineage" (*jāti* and *anvaya*), his "previous life," and his current status as an ascetic. Similarly, in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śāṅkara illustrates the fundamental error of superimposition (*adhyāsa*)—the confusion of the self with the non-self—by citing universal physical and social misidentifications: "I am fat," "I am blind," or "I am a *brāhmaṇa*". Furthermore, when Śāṅkara requires a specific name for an individual agent, he employs generic, pan-Indian placeholders like "Devadatta" or "Yajñadatta," avoiding regional markers entirely.¹²⁹ By replacing these universal, ritual, and generic identifiers of the 8th century with the specific ethno-linguistic labels "I am an Āndhra" or "I am a Mahārāṣṭra," the *Māyāvivarāṇa* author abandons the "master's" anthropology.

Based solely on these geopolitical markers, the text may be assigned to the late medieval period (at least post-12th century), with the possibility that it extends into the early modern era, and may be taken as the work of an author operating within the southern cultural sphere.

2.2 The "Environmental Fingerprint": Architecture and Botany

In chapter 3, while illustrating the transformation of the single earth element into successive material modifications, the author provides a striking inventory of the built environment: *parvato vrkṣo gopuraṃ kuḍyaṃ kusūlaṃ grhaṃ maṭhaḥ* ("mountain, tree, town-gate, wall, granary, house, monastery"). The sequence is not a random list of objects but a highly structured enumeration whose internal logic reflects a specific spatial and institutional world. The selection and ordering of these terms should therefore be read as an index of the author's architectural and social horizon.

Philologically, it must first be acknowledged that in classical Sanskrit usage—especially in northern sources and epics prior to the second millennium—the word *gopura* generally denoted a city gate or defensive entrance structure, not a vertically dominant religious monument. In early architectural contexts, the true vertical and symbolic center of the temple was the sanctum tower (*śikhara*, *prāsāda*, or *vimāna*), while the gateway functioned as an ancillary threshold. Even in the south, from the Pallava period (6th–8th centuries)

¹²⁸ Sheldon Pollock, *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 381, 416–417, 419.

¹²⁹ Paul Hacker, *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta*, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 36, 59, 177.

through the early Cholas (9th–11th centuries), the architectural axis remained resolutely centered on the sanctum tower, as evidenced by the structural hierarchies at Mahabalipuram, Kanchipuram, and Thanjavur.¹³⁰ Within this horizon, the prototypical example of monumental stone construction would naturally be the shrine itself rather than its entrance.

The structure of the present list, however, tells a different story. It follows a descending scale from natural formations (*parvata*, *vṛkṣa*) to built and institutional structures, and the immediate transition from the natural verticality of the “tree” to the man-made “town-gate” (*gopura*) and “wall” (*kuḍya*) is especially telling. A structure introduced in this position is being conceptualized as the primary artificial rival to the mountain in terms of vertical and spatial dominance. This symbolic function aligns poorly with early northern and early southern architectural hierarchies but closely mirrors the built environment of the late medieval south.

While gateways began to increase in scale during the later Chola period, they remained subordinate to the central shrine until the late twelfth century.¹³¹ A decisive transformation occurs only with the Vijayanagara empire (14th–16th centuries) and its Nayaka successors. During this era, the monumental gateway tower—the so-called *rāya-gopura*—superseded the sanctum entirely, becoming the dominant architectural and visual marker of the sacred complex.¹³² These colossal pyramidal towers, frequently exceeding fifty meters in height, were paired with massive concentric enclosure walls (*prākāra*, *kuḍya*) and were designed not only for ritual spectacle but for defense in an era of persistent warfare.¹³³

Under this regime, the sacred landscape of the southern city was reconfigured into a fortified temple-town, and the gateway, not the sanctum, became the primary vertical landmark, often visible from great distances and rivaling the surrounding hills in visual impact. This contrasts sharply with late-medieval northern India, where fortification was concentrated in courts and citadels rather than in temples, and where the *śikhara* remained

¹³⁰ J. C. Harle, *The Art and Architecture of the Indian Subcontinent* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 320. On Pallava temple planning: at Mahabalipuram the “larger shrine facing east is hugged so tightly on three sides by a wall that the space between suggests an internal circumambulatory passage” (284); at Kanchipuram the eastern structure of the Kailāsanātha temple was not a *gopura* at all: “there is no question of the Mahendravarman... ever having been a *gopura*; not only does a contemporary inscription call it a shrine, but it houses an original black fluted *liṅga*” (286); and the Vaikuṅṭhaperumāḷ temple is planned so that the enclosure wall “follows the contour of the *vimāna*” (288), confirming the sanctum, not the entrance, as the architectural and ritual axis.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 320–321. Harle notes that although Chola *gopuras* were unprecedented in scale, they remained “dwarfed by the giant *vimāna*” (320), and prior to the late twelfth century “five storeys appears to have been the maximum” height for gateways (321), indicating that the shrine tower retained architectural primacy. Harle (317) further notes that it is only at Chidambaram that “by the end of the twelfth century... the *gopura* was ready to take over as the dominant feature of the temple complex in terms of height.”

¹³² G. Michell, *Architecture and Art of Southern India: Vijayanagara and the Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95–99. Michell describes the Kumbheshvara and Sārangapāṇi temples, and the Mīnākṣī–Sundarēśvara temple at Madurai, where the outer *gopuras* “dominate the skyline of the city” and “reach a height of almost 50 metres.”

¹³³ B. Stein, “The Medieval Past: Continuity and Disjunction,” in *Vijayanagara*, Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 27. Stein characterizes “large temple centres, with their high walls and lofty gateways” as “major military centres and protected places of commerce.”

the dominant vertical and symbolic element of Hindu temple architecture.¹³⁴ Read in this context, the collocation of *gopura* and *kuḍya* at the head of the built environment list reflects a spatial imagination shaped by precisely this late-medieval southern urban order. The author's instinct to position the gateway as the foremost man-made analogue to the mountain betrays a habitual acquaintance with a world in which the *gopura*—not the temple tower—dominated the skyline.

The final cluster (*kusūla*, *gr̥ha*, *maṭha*) further anchors the text in the institutional ecology of the late-medieval south. From the late medieval period onward, monastic establishments were increasingly incorporated into temple complexes that operated as agrarian, fiscal, and administrative centers as much as ritual sites.¹³⁵ Temples functioned as large landholding institutions controlling extensive agricultural territories, and the presence of substantial stone granaries (*kusūla*) within the precincts is consistent with the storage of rent and tax-grain.¹³⁶ The monastery appears here not as an isolated ascetic retreat but as an integrated component of a temple-based political economy.¹³⁷ This marks a distinct departure from the northern Indian model, where grain storage was typically associated with royal warehouses rather than temples, and monastic life remained largely peripatetic or extra-institutional.¹³⁸

This constellation of structures—the monumental gateway, the defensive wall, the granary, and the monastery—forms a distinctive institutional signature of the Vijayanagara and post-Vijayanagara order and sits uneasily with the decentralized monastic model reflected in early Advaita sources.¹³⁹ Taken together, the architectural vocabulary, ordering, and implied scale of the objects enumerated in this passage strongly suggest that the author's lived reference-world was not that of eighth-century India but reflects at least a late-medieval,

¹³⁴ J. C. Harle, *The Art and Architecture of the Indian Subcontinent* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 140, defining the North Indian temple as *śikhara*-dominated, where “the superstructure of the shrine proper almost invariably consists of a northern Nāgara tower,” crowned by the *āmalaka*; contrast *ibid.*, 317, where Harle assigns gateway-dominance exclusively to South India, stating that “by the end of the twelfth century...the *gopura* was ready to take over as the dominant feature of the temple complex in terms of height”; see also *ibid.*, 244, where late-medieval North India is characterised instead by massive courtly fortification, noting that “much energy was devoted... to fortresses and the fortification of older structures,” exemplified by Chitor, Raisen, Kalanjar, Ranthambhor, and Gwalior, thus identifying political and defensive architecture with courts and citadels rather than temples.

¹³⁵ B. Stein, *Vijayanagara*, Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, pt. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24, on temple landholding and irrigation investment; 90, on temple administration, accountants, irrigation specialists, and fiscal capacity (“It is difficult to conceive that even the Vijayanagara kings maintained an administrative capability much more elaborate than some temples...”); 103-4 on *mathādhipatis* as political and economic agents and on temples and *maṭhas* as “prime instruments for Vijayanagara political purposes.”

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 90 and 129. Stein notes the Tirupati temple holding 170 villages and the tax-free lands of religious institutions in the south. On the physical presence of granaries: see Michell, *Architecture and Art of Southern India* (Cambridge, 1995), 97 (on a probable granary within the Tiruvidaimarudur temple enclosure) and 146 (on the prominent vaulted granaries of the Nayaka royal complex at Gingee).

¹³⁷ George Michell, *Architecture and Art of Southern India* (Cambridge, 1995), 55, on the Vidyāśaṅkara temple at Śṛṅgeri and its likely patronage by the chief pontiff of the local *maṭha*.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 121, on granaries as prominent in the royal complex at Gingee, and 124 on fortified palace systems as the locus of administrative and logistical functions.

¹³⁹ See Paul Hacker, *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta*, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 28, 31. As observed in the collection *Philology and Confrontation*, Hacker finds no epigraphic evidence for Advaita *maṭhas* in South India prior to the fourteenth century and associates their institutionalisation specifically with Vidyāraṇya and the Vijayanagara state.

fortified, temple-centered landscape of the southern Deccan. The list is therefore best understood not as an innocent catalogue of material forms, but as an unintended historical marker embedded in philosophical abstraction.

In chapter 5, the author presents a catalogue of trees associated with “middling” karmic results. While this list may appear at first glance to be a generic enumeration of agriculturally useful species, it in fact serves as a significant ecological indicator that helps resolve the geographical ambiguity introduced by the regional identities listed in chapter 4. The specific cluster—*panāsāmtrakadalīnārikelādi* (“jackfruit [*panasa*], mango [*āmra*], plantain [*kadalī*], coconut [*nārikela*], etc.”)—does not represent a random selection, but rather reflects a coherent tropical plantation ecology.

Among these, mango has a genuinely pan-Indian distribution, having been “cultivated all over India from a very remote epoch,” with a range extending from the Himalayas to the southern peninsula, and across diverse soil regimes, thereby carrying minimal regional specificity.¹⁴⁰ Coconut, by contrast, is ecologically coastal, being “essentially a tropical plant” cultivated primarily “along the sea-coasts of India and Burma,” and constituting the very basis of west-coast economic development.¹⁴¹ Plantain, while more widely distributed, is likewise associated with humid lowland ecologies, being concentrated “along the banks of rivers, canals and tanks,” and notably absent from the extreme north-west.¹⁴²

The inclusion of the jackfruit (*Artocarpus heterophyllus*) introduces a significant ecological constraint. Watt describes it as “a large evergreen tree... occurring wild on the Eastern and Western Ghats,” and notes that it is cultivated only “in the warmer parts of India and Burma,” identifying its native range as the tropical forest belt of the southern peninsula.¹⁴³ Randhawa independently characterizes the forests of the Western Ghats as tropical evergreen rainforests, developed under conditions of heavy rainfall and persistent atmospheric moisture, thereby establishing the environmental regime associated with the species.¹⁴⁴

Randhawa repeatedly characterizes western India as a dry-zone agricultural system structured around cotton, millets, and date palms rather than perennial rainforest trees.¹⁴⁵ Watt’s survey of Gujarat associates the region overwhelmingly with cotton cultivation and black-soil farming,¹⁴⁶ and he further defines date-growing regions as areas of “low humidity and rainfall,”¹⁴⁷ highlighting the sharp ecological contrast between north-western India and the humid forest zone in which jackfruit naturally occurs. Its appearance in the text as a standard “rebirth-body”—a normative biological destiny—implies an intimate familiarity

¹⁴⁰ George Watt, *The Commercial Products of India* (London: John Murray, 1908), 764.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 350.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 788.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁴⁴ M. S. Randhawa, *A History of Agriculture in India*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1980), 40-1.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 21, 24, 235. George Watt, *The Commercial Products of India* (London: John Murray, 1908), 882.

¹⁴⁶ M. S. Randhawa, *A History of Agriculture in India*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1980), 15. George Watt, *The Commercial Products of India* (London: John Murray, 1908), 584.

¹⁴⁷ George Watt, *The Commercial Products of India* (London: John Murray, 1908), 883.

with the mature living tree as a feature of the immediate landscape, rather than mere knowledge of the fruit as a commodity.

The strength of the evidence lies not in the presence of a single species but in the botanical constellation as a whole. The combined occurrence of jackfruit, coconut, and plantain corresponds to a monsoon-fed ecological regime characterized by evergreen or semi-evergreen vegetation. This specific assemblage aligns closely with the agro-ecological systems of the western coastal belt, the Malnad region of Karnataka, and the riverine deltas of the eastern coast,¹⁴⁸ all of which historically supported plantation-style horticulture and homestead-based multi-crop cultivation.¹⁴⁹

Within this larger botanical grouping, the triad of mango, jackfruit, and banana corresponds to a specifically South Indian ritual configuration. In South Indian food-offering traditions, this combination is formalized as *mukkani* (“three fruits”), a defined offering consisting of the juices of these three species. Ferro-Luzzi records *mukkani* as a special *naivedya* associated with the goddess Mariyamman in Tamil Nadu.¹⁵⁰ While coconut does not belong to this ritual triad, its central role in southern homestead economies places it within the same cultural ecology. The overlap between ecological pattern and ritual practice therefore reinforces the inference of a southern peninsular setting.

This botanical signature is especially significant when read alongside the “Gūrjara” reference in chapter 4. Although the inclusion of Gūrjara reflects the conventional Brahminical geo-cultural categories of the Pañcadrāviḍa system, the ecological reality implied by the flora does not correspond to the arid or semi-arid landscapes historically associated with Gujarat. Rather, the plant assemblage suggests that the author writes from, or assumes as normative, a wet tropical environment characteristic of the southern peninsula.

2.3 The Linguistic Convergence: The Evidence of Charcoal

While the botanical evidence points to a tropical ecology, a significant linguistic indicator of the text’s geo-cultural origin lies elsewhere: in a single lexical anomaly. In chapter 5, during the technical exposition of gunpowder artillery (*br̥hannālika*), the author gives the explosive formula:

gandhakādisaṃyukteṅgālādīcūrṇaviśeṣaiḥ...

“...combined with specific powders of sulfur, charcoal (*iṅgāla*), and the like...”

The choice of *iṅgāla* for “charcoal” is telling. Classical Sanskrit consistently uses *aṅgāra* for charcoal or embers, and the appearance of *iṅgāla* signals a vernacular or Prakritic interference in a text otherwise striving for high-register Sanskrit.¹⁵¹ This is not an isolated irregularity or an easy scribal error; it reflects a recognizable phonological pattern associated with the southern linguistic zone.

¹⁴⁸ M. S. Randhawa, *A History of Agriculture in India*, Vol. I (New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1980), 24, 40.

¹⁴⁹ George Watt, *The Commercial Products of India* (London: John Murray, 1908), 87.

¹⁵⁰ Gabriella Eichinger Ferro-Luzzi, *Ritual as Language: The Case of South Indian Food Offerings*, *Current Anthropology* 18, no. 3 (1977): 512.

¹⁵¹ Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), 8.

The mutation from *aṅgāra* to *iṅgāla* involves two shifts typical of Deccan and southern Indo-Aryan contact regions: vowel raising ($a \rightarrow i$) and replacement of r with l or retroflex $ʃ$.¹⁵² Both shifts are well attested in regional speech traditions shaped by prolonged bilingualism and substrate influence. Kannada and Marathi preserve this form almost unchanged, as *iṅgaḷa* in both languages.¹⁵³

A broader comparison of regional lexemes helps distinguish the southern provenance from the northern. In the northern and western Indo-Aryan zones—Hindi and Gujarati, for example—the word remains close to the Sanskrit original, as in Hindi *aṅgār* and Gujarati *aṅgāro*. The sound change under discussion does not occur there.¹⁵⁴

By contrast, the form is well-documented in the neighboring Dravidian regions of the south-east. In Telugu, the lexicon records *iṅgalamu* or *iṅgālamu* as a Prakritic derivative, and pre-modern Tamil lexicons record *iṅkālam* alongside the native Dravidian *kari*.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² The two phonological developments asserted here — vowel raising ($a \rightarrow i$) and lateralization ($r \rightarrow l/ʃ$) — are both directly attested and regionally diagnostic of the southern Indo-Aryan–Dravidian contact zone. Bloch explicitly records Marathi *iṅgaḷ* < Sanskrit *aṅgāra*-, showing both the unexpected raising of a to i and the replacement of r by l : “*iṅgaḷ* (*aṅgāra*-)” is cited among words where “Marathi shows l , whereas Sanskrit has r ,” and again among words where “ i is found... where a was expected.” Jules Bloch, *The Formation of the Marathi Language* (Poona: Deccan College, 1965), §§74, 141, 90, 150. The regional character of $r \rightarrow l/ʃ$ is demonstrated by Bloch’s phonological map, which places retroflex lateral $ʃ$ across the entire Deccan, contrasted with the Ganges valley where it is absent; he further notes that Dravidian languages adjoining this zone likewise possess l as a native category (ibid., §144, 153–54). The areal and historical explanation for this pattern is provided by Emeneau, who shows that retroflex phonemes in Indo-Aryan arose through prehistorical bilingualism with Dravidian, stating that “pre-Indo-Aryan and pre-Dravidian bilingualism provided the conditions which allowed... allophones to be redistributed as retroflex phonemes:” M. B. Emeneau, “India as a Linguistic Area,” *Language* 32 (1956): 7. Southworth further confirms that such changes represent a broader drift whereby Indo-Aryan phonology “moves closer to that of Dravidian” under contact conditions: Franklin C. Southworth, *Linguistic Archaeology of South Asia* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 86. In short, the exact transformation postulated (*aṅgāra* \rightarrow *iṅgāla*) is not hypothetical: its two components are independently documented, areal, and historically grounded within the Marathi–Kannada corridor.

¹⁵³ Kannada and Marathi preserve this form as *iṅgaḷa* in lexical tradition (Kannada *iṅgaḷa*; Marathi dictionary form *iṅgaḷa*), though Marathi normally drops the final vowel in speech, yielding *iṅgaḷ*/*iṅgaḷ*. See Ferdinand Kittel, *A Kannada–English Dictionary* (Bangalore: Basel Mission Press, 1894), 50, s.v. “*iṅgaḷa*, n. heated charcoal; fire”; and J. T. Molesworth, *A Dictionary, Marathi and English*, 2nd ed. (Bombay: Bombay Education Society’s Press, 1857), 137, s.v. “*iṅgaḷa*, n. charcoal.” Both sources attest the same vernacular lexeme with retroflex $ʃ$, establishing its continuity across the Kannada–Marathi corridor.

¹⁵⁴ Hindi and Gujarati preserve the Sanskrit form without Deccan innovations. Hindi dictionaries record *aṅgār* “ember, charcoal” (John T. Platts, *A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English* [London, 1884], 96); Gujarati dictionaries likewise record *aṅgār* “fire; burning coal; ember” (M. B. Belsare, *An Etymological Gujarati–English Dictionary* [New Delhi: AES, 1993], 38, s.v. “*aṅgār*”). Masica places Western Hindi and Gujarati in the “inner” Indo-Aryan sub-branch and assigns Marathi to the “outer” group: “Western Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Rajasthani... constitute an Inner sub-branch,” while the Southern languages form part of the “outer” branch (Colin Masica, *The Indo-Aryan Languages* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 448; see also Fig. II.2, 463–464). Masica further explains that the “outer” languages are defined by shared innovations, whereas the “inner” group is characterized largely by retentions from Old Indo-Aryan (ibid., 450–451), which accounts for the confinement of forms such as *iṅgaḷa* to the Deccan area.

¹⁵⁵ For Telugu, see Charles Philip Brown, *A Telugu–English Dictionary* (Madras: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1903), 131, s.v. “*iṅgalamu*” or “*iṅgālamu*” (noting the derivation from Skt. *aṅgāra*). For Tamil, see *Tamil Lexicon: Supplement* (Madras: University of Madras, 1939), 115, s.v. “*iṅkālam*,” which attributes the form to a loan from Telugu (T. *iṅgālamu*). The presence of these forms confirms that the *iṅgāla* variant had diffused into the south-eastern lexical stream.

The phonological mutation from *aṅgāra* to *iṅgāla* points not merely to the southeastern Dravidian zone but to the broader southern Deccan contact area—including the Marathi, Kannada, Telugu, and Tamil linguistic spheres—where prolonged Indo-Aryan–Dravidian interaction produced stable vowel raising and rhotic–lateral alternations.

Such correspondences are not accidental; they point to a specific sociolinguistic milieu where Sanskrit coexisted with vernacular languages not merely as a literary code, but as a medium of technical practice. This convergence is most visible in the text’s shift between registers: when discussing metaphysics, the Sanskrit is orthodox and controlled; yet in describing powder and ignition, the diction lapses into the "workshop language" of the artisan. Ramprasād Chakravarti notes that such vernacular leakage is “characteristic of Deccan technical literature,” marking a “real continuity between learned and craft traditions.”¹⁵⁶ The author writes from within such a bilingual world, where Sanskrit absorbed the diction of the forge and the workshop.¹⁵⁷

The word *iṅgāla*, then, is not a casual variant but a linguistic fossil of the Deccan contact zone—likely within the Vijayanagara–Maratha–Tanjore cultural orbit, where Sanskrit learning intersected with the vernacular idioms of the forge and the armory.¹⁵⁸

Conclusion

When the various strands of evidence are synthesized, a coherent geo-historical picture begins to take shape. The internal references of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*—the identification of the “Five Dravidian” regions (Pañcadrāviḍa) as the principal cultural horizon, the recurring image of the temple tower (*gopura*) dominating the skyline, the precise botanical markers such as jackfruit (*panasa*) and coconut, and even the lexical intrusion of the word for charcoal (*iṅgāla*)—all suggestively point away from a northern, western, or Himalayan milieu. Crucially, this geographical orientation is anchored chronologically by the text’s casual familiarity with post-Panipat field artillery. This distinct technological signature, indicative of a milieu antecedent to standardized colonial warfare, compels a definitive

¹⁵⁶ For Deccan technical literature specifically, see Ramprasād Chakravarti, “Technical Writing in medieval South India,” in *Traditions of Science in India*, ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya (New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 1986), 218–221, who documents vernacular infiltration into Sanskrit technical prose and notes that such leakage is “characteristic of Deccan technical literature” and reflects a “continuity between learned and craft traditions rather than an opposition between them.”

¹⁵⁷ Nadkarni’s classic study of Karnataka Saraswat Konkani shows how Indo-Aryan syntax can be “virtually Dravidianized” under conditions of long-term bilingualism: “The syntax of the relative clause in the Saraswat Brahmin dialect of Konkani... has been virtually Dravidianized because of the impact of the Dravidian Kannada language, operating through bilingual speakers” (Mangesh V. Nadkarni, “Bilingualism and Syntactic Change in Konkani,” *Language* 51, no. 3 [1975]: 672). He documents that these speakers have been “fluent bilinguals in Kannada” for some 400 years, using Kannada as the language “of early schooling, of business, and administration,” as well as for household commerce and accounting (*ibid.*, 672–73). For a general model, cf. Franklin Southworth, who defines convergence as the diffusion of features “through the medium of bilingual speakers” and notes that high grammatical convergence presupposes “economic-cum-cultural dependence ... part of the daily routine of life” (Franklin C. Southworth, *Linguistic Archaeology of South Asia* [London: Routledge, 2005], 100, 110).

¹⁵⁸ Franklin C. Southworth, *Linguistic Archaeology of South Asia*, 322. While Southworth links linguistic geography to centers like Bijapur and Hampi, the manuscript evidence cited above suggests the text circulated—and was perhaps copied—further south in the Tamil/Telugu region.

displacement of the work from the authorship of Śaṅkara, firmly relocating it instead to the complex socio-cultural landscape of the Southern Peninsula during the sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries.

This internal testimony is corroborated by the external evidence of transmission. The extant manuscript's provenance within the Tamil–Telugu administrative sphere accords closely with the linguistic and cultural indicators of the work itself. While the precise location of composition cannot be fixed with certainty, the convergence of ecological, architectural, linguistic, and bibliographic evidence allows us to situate the *Māyāvivarāṇa* with confidence within the southern Deccan or the wider South Indian cultural world—a landscape defined by temple-centered urban life, linguistic plurality, and mercantile networks.

Having thus established the geo-historical coordinates of the text, we must now turn to its doctrinal content.

Chapter III: Doctrinal Analysis and Doxographical Placement

Building upon the parameters established in the previous chapter, the present study pursues a twofold aim: first, to further refine the text's temporal and geographical boundaries; and second, to undertake a rigorous philosophical analysis that reconstructs the author's underlying architecture of thought.

To achieve this, the investigation moves beyond a continuous, stanza-by-stanza commentary to undertake a task of doxographical placement (*siddhānta-nirṇaya*). By situating the text within the vast and often fractured landscape of post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta, we employ a diagnostic approach, treating specific doctrinal definitions not merely as theological positions, but as precise markers of lineage and historical provenance.

However, applying such a diagnostic framework requires navigating the interpretative fluidity of early Advaita, where the strategic ambiguities left by Śaṅkara regarding the locus of ignorance necessitated the later formation of distinct sub-schools. To systematize this scholastic divergence, this chapter utilizes the taxonomic framework established by P. S. Roodurmun (2002) in *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta*, which identifies fifteen doctrinal tenets serving as shibboleths to distinguish the Bhāmatī school of Vācaspati Miśra from the Vivaraṇa lineage of Prakāśātman.

Yet, rather than forcing the *Māyāvivaraṇa* into a monolithic categorization, this chapter argues that the text represents a specific genre of Pedagogical Syncretism characteristic of the Early Modern period. The structure of this chapter follows a logical progression of diagnosis, exclusion, historical triangulation, and finally, theological positioning:

1. **Contextualization:** we briefly outline the doctrinal fissure that split Advaita into the Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa camps, clarifying the philosophical stakes regarding the locus of ignorance (*avidyā*) and the nature of the reflected self.
2. **Diagnostic analysis:** adopting P. S. Roodurmun's diagnostic tenets—augmented by a soteriological criterion—we analyze the *Māyāvivaraṇa* through five organic clusters (propaedeutic, metaphysical, macrocosmic, epistemological, and soteriological). This morphological analysis demonstrates that the text adopts a sophisticated stratification: it grounds the generative causes of the path in strict Vivaraṇa metaphysics, yet pivots to a functional Bhāmatī architecture regarding the operative mechanics of realization (depowering injunction to empower meditation).
3. **Exclusion:** we negatively define the text's position by ruling out affiliations with three specific currents. First, we clarify the text's use of Vārttika terminology (*cidābhāsa*) as a post-Vidyāraṇya synthesis rather than a doctrinal allegiance. Second, we demonstrate its rejection of the radical idealism of the *drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda* in favor of a realist cosmology. Finally, we highlight its methodological exclusion of the Navya-Nyāya logic dominant in the period, confirming its status as a pedagogical manual designed for accessibility.
4. **Historical triangulation:** having negatively defined the text, we attempt to pinpoint its historical locus. By comparing its definitions to the *Pañcadaśī* (14th C.) and *Vedāntasāra* (15th C.), and contrasting it with the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (17th C.), we argue that the text represents a conservative synthesis rooted in the tradition of

Vidyāraṇya. This suggests one of two possibilities: either the *Māyāvivarāṇa* predates the seventeenth century, or it represents a contemporary conservative stream that actively bypassed the scholastic novelties of the Dharmarāja Adhvarin school.

5. **Sectarian demarcation:** finally, securely situated within this Early Modern chronology, we examine the text's theological orientation. The *Māyāvivarāṇa* opens with a striking invocation to the child Kṛṣṇa (Bālagopāla), a gesture suggesting an affinity with the rising tide of Vaiṣṇava devotion. By contrasting the text with the "theistic Advaita" of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the radical Nāmasiddhānta of the Kaveri delta, we argue that the author constructs a Conservative Smārta Defense: a system that adopts the *forms* of Vaiṣṇava piety but rigorously subordinates them to the *karma-kāṇḍa*, thereby preserving the orthodox hierarchy of knowledge over devotion.

1 - Contextualization: The Post-Śaṅkara Landscape and the Schism of Definition

To accurately diagnose the doctrinal position of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*, one must first understand the interpretive fluidity that characterized post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta. While Śaṅkara is rightly celebrated as the systematizer of non-dualism, his philosophical project was primarily soteriological—focused on the immediate removal of *avidyā*—rather than strictly systematic regarding the ontological status of that ignorance. Consequently, the “master” employed terms like *māyā* and *avidyā* with a conceptual flexibility that prioritized pedagogical efficacy over rigid definition. This hermeneutical openness left critical doctrinal issues—such as the precise locus of ignorance and the causal mechanics of liberation—open to later formalization. Regarding the *jīva*, for instance, Śaṅkara employed diverse metaphors—sometimes comparing the soul to a reflection (*pratibimba*), and other times to space delimited by a jar (*avaccheda*)—without canonizing a single relational theory. Similarly, in the realm of practice (*sādhana*), he asserted the autonomy of knowledge while simultaneously enjoining the necessity of meditation (*nididhyāsana*), leaving the precise causal relationship between the scriptural word and the final intuition less systematically articulated than in later scholastic developments.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 434–435; Paul Hacker, "Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of Śaṅkara: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara," in *Philology and Confrontation*, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 58–59, 65–66, 94–96; Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 3 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 84–87; Andrew O. Fort, *Jivanmukti in Transformation* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 45–46, 196; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 14. The consensus among modern scholarship is that Śaṅkara's methodology was fundamentally exegetical rather than strictly metaphysical. Dasgupta observes that Śaṅkara did not aim to prove Vedānta as a "consistent system of metaphysics" but rather to establish that "ultimate validity does not belong to reason but to the scriptures" (Dasgupta, 434–435). This view is sharpened by Hacker, who, in the translation of his seminal essay, notes that a general "aversion for definitions and a cavalier attitude toward conceptual systematization" is a distinguishing feature of Śaṅkara's thought (Hacker, 95). Regarding *avidyā*, Hacker demonstrates that Śaṅkara provides only fluid definitions—equating it with superimposition (*adhyāsa*) or affliction (*kleśa*)—whereas later Advaitins rigorously defined it as the material cause of error (58–59). Similarly, Śaṅkara often treats *īśvara*, *paramātman*, and *brahman* as interchangeable terms based on intuitive theism (94–96). Potter delineates how this fluidity extended to the *jīva*, where Śaṅkara utilized diverse, sometimes conflicting paradigms—appealing simultaneously to reflection (*ābhāsa/pratibimba*) and delimitation (*pot-space*) analogies (Potter, 84–87).

This interpretative fluidity gradually led Śaṅkara's successors to systematize his implicit doctrines, leading to the gradual differentiation of two dominant hermeneutical streams: the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa. The first response, represented by Vācaspati Miśra (c. 9th/10th century), utilized the 'space/jar' analogy to ground the Bhāmatī school in the theory of limitation (*avacchedavāda*). This school argues that the individual soul is Brahman delimited by adjuncts (*upādhis*), specifically those associated with the internal organ. To explain the persistence of duality, Vācaspati posited the *jīva* itself as the locus (*āśraya*) of ignorance and prioritized the role of meditation (*prasāṅkhyāna*) to stabilize intellectual understanding into final realization.

By contrast, the Vivaraṇa tradition—traceable to Padmapāda and codified by Prakāśātman (c. 10th/11th century)—formalized Śaṅkara's 'Sun/water' imagery into the theory of reflection (*pratibimbavāda*). This school asserts that the *jīva* is a real reflection of Brahman within the medium of ignorance. Rigorously maintaining the non-duality of the substratum, the Vivaraṇa school posited Brahman itself as the support (*āśraya*) of *avidyā*, viewing the "contamination" of the absolute as merely apparent. Consequently, this model championed the immediate efficacy of the word (*śabda-pramāṇa*), arguing that the *mahāvākyas* are the direct instrument of realization (*aparokṣānubhūti*), with meditation serving primarily to remove obstacles. Situated alongside these currents was the Vārttika tradition of Sureśvara, whose theory of semblance (*ābhāsa-vāda*) treated the reflected self as a distinct appearance.

2 - Doctrinal Analysis: A Diagnostic Framework

In order to determine the doctrinal affiliation of the text, it is necessary to establish a stable framework of comparison. P. S. Roodurmun identifies fifteen doctrinal points at which the Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa traditions diverge in a systematic manner. These points serve as diagnostic criteria against which later Advaitic texts can be tested.¹⁶⁰ To this established list, we add a sixteenth point regarding the status of liberation, completing the soteriological arc.

The Diagnostic Criteria (1–16)

1. The Role of Action (*karman*): does action merely generate the desire for knowledge (*vividīṣā*), or does it directly assist in the arising of knowledge itself (*vedanā*)?

2. The Instrument of Knowledge (*karāṇa*): is immediate knowledge produced by the mind (*manas*) or by the scriptural sentence (*śabda*) alone?

3. The Status of Injunction (*vidhi*): is the command to realize the self a restrictive injunction (*niyama-vidhi*) or an explanatory restatement (*anuvāda*)?

Finally, Fort clarifies that while Śaṅkara strictly subordinated yogic practice to the autonomous arising of knowledge, he left the precise causal interplay open, leading his followers to become increasingly "scholastic" and polemical to resolve the conceptual spaces left by the master (Fort, 45–46).

¹⁶⁰ P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 37, 45.

4. **The Primacy of Practice (*aṅgāṅgi-bhāva*):** is the principal means (*aṅgi*) meditative repetition (*prasaṅkhyāna*) or scriptural hearing (*śravaṇa*)?
5. **The Nature of the Individual (*jīva-svarūpa*):** is the soul a reflection (*pratibimba*) or a limitation (*avaccheda*) of Brahman?
6. **The Locus of Ignorance (*avidyā-āśraya*):** does ignorance reside in the individual (*jīva*) or in Brahman?
7. **The Unity or Plurality of Ignorance (*avidyā-ekatva/nānātva*):** is primal ignorance one (*eka*) or manifold (*aneka*)?
8. **The Object of Immediate Knowledge (*viśaya*):** does knowledge apprehend unconditioned Brahman or Brahman conditioned by the mental mode?
9. **The First Discriminative Requirement (*viveka*):** is the initial discrimination between reality/unreality (*satya-anṛta*) or eternity/non-eternity (*nitya-anitya*)?
10. **The Result of Scriptural Study (*svādhyāya*):** does the study injunction culminate in rote learning (*akṣara-grahaṇa*) or understanding of meaning (*arthāvabodha*)?
11. **The Account of Creation (*sṛṣṭi*):** is the world explained through triplication (*trivṛtkaraṇa*) or quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*)?
12. **The Basis of Omniscience (*sarvajñatva*):** is omniscience intrinsic to *īśvara* or dependent upon the mode of *māyā*?
13. **The Status of Mind (*śanas*):** is the mind a sense faculty (*indriya*) or not?
14. **The Ultimate Substrate of Ignorance (*avidyā-adhiṣṭhāna*):** is ignorance grounded in pure consciousness or the *jīva*?
15. **The Final Explanatory Model (*vāda*):** is the relation best explained by the limitation theory (*avaccheda-vāda*) or the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*)?
16. **The Status of Liberation (*mukti*):** does the body persist through a trace of ignorance (*avidyā-leśa*) or is the destruction of ignorance total?

Doxographical Analysis: A Morphological Reconstruction

While the diagnostic points listed above follow Roodurmun's taxonomic enumeration (1–16), the following exegesis adopts a morphological approach suited to the specific internal logic of the *Māyāvivaraṇa*. Rather than adhering to the numerical sequence of the list, this analysis regroups the points into five organic clusters that mirror the pedagogical progression of the text itself: from the qualifications of the subject, to the metaphysics of the self and the world, and finally to the epistemology of the means and the soteriology of the result. Consequently, the points will be analyzed in the following structural order:

I. The Propaedeutic Framework An analysis of Points 1, 3, 9, and 10, establishing the legal and preparatory qualifications of the aspirant (*adhikārin*) and the role of Vedic injunctions.

II. The Metaphysics of the Self An analysis of the ontology and limitations of the individual soul.

- **Subsection 1:** The Nature of the Soul (Points 5 & 15).
- **Subsection 2:** The Locus and Unity of Ignorance (Points 6, 7 & 14).

III. The Macrocosmic Order An analysis of the cosmic structure and the Lord.

- **Subsection 1:** The Physics of Creation (Point 11).
- **Subsection 2:** The Theology of Omniscience (Point 12).

IV. The Epistemology of Realization An analysis of Points 2, 4, 8, and 13, detailing the instrument of liberation and the role of meditation (*nididhyāsana*).

V. The Soteriological Conclusion An analysis of Point 16, determining the status of the liberated being (*jīvanmukta*).

I. The Propaedeutic Framework: Points 1, 3, 9 & 10

The divergences regarding the role of action (point 1), the definition of discrimination (point 9), the result of study (point 10), and the status of injunction (point 3) constitute the preliminary legal and pedagogical framework of the Advaitic system. These four points determine the "pre-philosophical" conditions of inquiry: what role ritual plays in generating competency, how that competency is defined, the scope of the mandatory Vedic study, and the hermeneutical authority governing the path. To understand the *Māyāvivaraṇa's* position, one must first analyze how these points function as prerequisites in the rival schools.

The Bhāmatī Position: The Negative Purgation and the Real (*vividiṣā-satya*)

The Bhāmatī position outlines a path characterized by psycho-intellectual realism and strict object-dependence. It begins with point 1 (role of action), asserting that ritual action serves only to generate the *desire to know* (*vividiṣā*). Action is a remote auxiliary (*ārād-upakāraka*); it cleanses the mind of sin but does not directly assist in the rise of knowledge.

Consequently, regarding point 9 (discrimination), since the preparation is merely purgative, the primary qualification is defined ontologically as the discrimination between the real and the unreal (*satyānṛtavastuviveka*), emphasizing the metaphysical validity of the object over mere duration. Regarding point 10 (result of study), the school insists on the "knowledge of meaning" (*arthāvabodha-pakṣa*). The injunction to study the Veda is not fulfilled by parrot-like memorization but requires intellectual grasp, thereby necessitating *mīmāṃsā* (inquiry) as part of the duty. Finally, regarding point 3 (injunction), consistent with its view that knowledge is object-dependent (*vastu-tantra*), the school rejects the presence of any

scriptural injunction (*avidhi-pakṣa*) regarding the means of realization. Hearing and reflection are descriptive, not prescriptive; one cannot be "commanded" to know.¹⁶¹

The Vivaraṇa Position: The Positive Capability and the Eternal (*vedana-nitya*)

The Vivaraṇa position presents a model of scriptural absolutism and positive accumulation. It argues in Point 1 that action serves the purpose of knowledge itself (*vedanārtha*), not just the desire. Rituals create a positive fitness (*yogyatā*) in the mind, acting as an indirect causal factor in the rise of knowledge. This leads to point 9 (discrimination), where the qualification is defined axiologically as the discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (*nityānityavastuviveka*), strictly separating the transient fruits of ritual from the eternal fruit of *mokṣa*. Regarding point 10 (result of study), the school limits the injunction to "learning by rote" (*akṣara-grahaṇa-pakṣa*), arguing that the command is fulfilled by memorization alone, with understanding being a separate pursuit. To ensure that this separate pursuit leads to Brahman, the school asserts in Point 3 that the command to "hear" is a restrictive Injunction (*niyama-vidhi*). Without this command restricting the means to Vedāntic study, the aspirant might wander into independent reasoning; thus, the path is legally governed by a scriptural mandate.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ P. S. Roodurmum, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 212, 219; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 12–13, 39–40, 373–376; S. N. Sastri, trans., "Points of Difference Between Bhamati and Vivarana" (based on the *Bhumika* of Polagam Sri Rama Sastri), unpublished manuscript, 8. Regarding the role of action (point 1), Roodurmum (212) explains that Vācaspati Miśra restricts the utility of *karman* strictly to the generation of the desire to know (*vividiṣā*), denying it any direct causality in the rise of knowledge. This purgative function informs the school's definition of discrimination (point 9): as Potter (EIP XI, 40) notes, Vācaspati reinterprets the "eternal" (*nitya*) of the standard qualification as "truth" (*satya*)—defined as that which is worthy of care (*āsthā*)—equating the non-eternal with the "unreal" (*anṛta*) or nonexistent. This is corroborated by S. N. Sastri (8), who states that for the Bhāmatī school, mere awareness of transience (*anityatva*) is insufficient for detachment, as ephemeral objects still yield pleasure; true detachment arises only from discerning the ontological falsity of the object (*satyanṛta-vastu-viveka*). Regarding the result of study (point 10), S. N. Sastri (8) confirms that Bhāmatī adheres to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxim that the injunction to study the Veda extends to the "knowledge of the meaning" (*arthāvadodha*) and is not limited to rote memorization. See also Potter (EIP XI, 374–376) for the detailed arguments regarding the scope of the injunction (*adhyayana-vidhi*), where the view that study terminates in mere recitation is rejected in favor of the view that study is the necessary condition for understanding the text's import. Finally, concerning point 3, the school rejects the need for injunctions regarding the means of realization; as Potter (EIP XI, 12–13) and Roodurmum (254) observe, Vācaspati interprets scriptural imperatives like "hear" (*śrotavyaḥ*) and "reflect" as descriptive statements (*anuvāda*) rather than prescriptive commands (*avidhi-pakṣa*), consistent with the view that knowledge is determined by the object (*vastu-tantra*) and cannot be willed.

¹⁶² Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 12–15; P. S. Roodurmum, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 212, 231–233, 254; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 47; S. N. Sastri, trans., "Points of Difference Between Bhamati and Vivarana" (based on the *Bhumika* of Polagam Sri Rama Sastri), unpublished manuscript, 8.

As Potter (EIP XI, 14–15) and Roodurmum (212) note, while action purifies the mind, its utility extends to removing obstacles and creating a fitness (*yogyatā*) that persists until the rise of knowledge (point 1). This

The *Māyāvivarāṇa* Position

Under this precise hermeneutic lens, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* exhibits a sophisticated stratification: it explicitly adopts the *Vivarāṇa* model regarding the generative causes of the path (points 1 & 9), maintains a doxographical silence regarding the technical scope of scriptural study (point 10), yet structurally pivots to a functional *Bhāmatī* architecture regarding the operative force of injunction (point 3).

First, regarding the relationship between action and qualification (Points 1 & 9), the text rejects the *Bhāmatī* view that action merely uncovers a desire. Instead, it validates the *Vivarāṇa* model by establishing a direct causal continuum between merit (*puṇya*)—the product of action—and the attainment of the entire *adhikāra*. In Chapter 2, the text explicitly attributes the rise of the fourfold means to the ripening of merit under divine supervision:

***asyādhikāriṇaḥ sādhanacatuṣṭayaṃ ca bahujanmārjitapuṇyapuñjaparipākavaśād
īśvarānugraheṇa labhyam |***

"For such a qualified [student], the four means (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*) is attainable on account of the ripening of multitudes of merit (*puṇya*) accumulated over many lives, [and] through the grace of the Lord (*īśvara*)."

By asserting that merit produces the *sādhanacatuṣṭaya* itself, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* effectively elevates action to the status of a producer of total competency. Crucially, the "fourfold means" is a comprehensive psycho-intellectual architecture: it encompasses the intellectual faculty of discrimination (*viveka*), the emotional detachment of dispassion (*vairāgya*), the disciplined stability of the six virtues (*ṣaṭ-sampatti*), and the final volitional longing for liberation (*mumukṣutva*). Since *viveka* requires cognitive ascertainment and the *ṣaṭ-sampatti* (tranquility, restraint, etc.) requires ethical mastery, the text's logic implies that ritual action generates a total structural transformation of the mind (*sattva-śuddhi*). It actively constructs the entire psycho-intellectual apparatus required for inquiry, rather than adhering to the *Bhāmatī* view where action serves merely to scour away sin so that a singular, pre-existing desire (*vividiṣā*) may surface.

Consistent with this general orientation, the text defines the specific nature of this

purification facilitates the specific qualification of *nityānitya-vastu-viveka* (point 9): Roodurmun (232) explains that the aspirant must distinguish between the "eternal" (*nitya*) and the transient results of *karman* (defined as *abhyudaya* or non-eternal bliss). S. N. Sastri (8) confirms that, unlike the *Bhāmatī* focus on "truth vs. falsity," the *Vivarāṇa* emphasizes rejecting the *anitya* specifically to attain the *nitya*. Regarding the result of study (point 10), S. N. Sastri (8) observes that *Vivarāṇa* restricts the injunction to study (*adhyayana-vidhi*) to "learning by rote" (*akṣara-grahaṇa*), arguing that the understanding of meaning is not the immediate fruit of the study injunction but the result of subsequent inquiry (*vicāra*), which operates independently of the initial command to study (Roodurmun, 231). To govern this subsequent inquiry (Point 3), the school posits a restrictive injunction (*niyama-vidhi*); as Gupta (47) and Potter (EIP XI, 12–13) explain, the imperative "to hear" (*śrotavyaḥ*) is interpreted as a binding command that restricts the means of realization to Vedāntic inquiry grounded in *śruti*, thereby legally excluding reliance on independent reasoning (*tarka*) or other intellectual disciplines (Roodurmun, 254).

competency (point 9) by strictly adhering to the Vivaraṇa preference for the category of "eternity." The text formally defines the faculty thus:

sādhana catuṣṭayaṃ nāma nityānityavastuvivekaḥ...

"The four means are defined as: discrimination (*viveka*) between the eternal and the non-eternal things..."

Furthermore, it clarifies that this discrimination is "self-arising knowledge" generated by scriptural authority:

nityānityavastuviveko nāma śrutismṛtipurāṇādibhir brahmaiva nityam jagad anityam iti svayam utpadyamānaṃ jñānam |

"The discrimination (*viveka*) between the eternal and the non-eternal things is the self-arising knowledge, by the *śruti*, *smṛti*, *purāṇa*, and so on: 'Brahman alone is eternal, [while] the world is transient.'"

While the text is vocal regarding the *cause* of qualification, it shifts to a position of neutrality regarding the scope of the Vedic study (Point 10). The *Māyāvivaraṇa* remains entirely silent regarding the specific Vedic injunction *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* ("One's own Veda must be studied"). It offers no commentary on whether the command is fulfilled by mere rote memorization (*akṣara-grahaṇa*) or if it strictly necessitates the intellection of meaning (*arthāvabodha*). While chapter 5 classifies "Vedic recitation" (*vedādhyayana*) as a "meritorious verbal action" (*vācikaṃ puṇyakarma*), the text avoids the technical debate regarding the teleological scope of the *vidhi*.

This silence extends to the technical classification of the command to "hear" (Point 3). The text does not explicitly categorize the Upaniṣadic command as either a *niyama-vidhi* (restrictive injunction) or an *anuvāda* (explanatory statement). However, its position is deducible from its soteriological architecture. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent analysis of the Instrument of knowledge (point 2) and the primacy of practice (point 4), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* explicitly downgrades the epistemic efficacy of *śravaṇa*. By asserting that "hearing" generates only indirect knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*) and that the "contrary notion" (*viparītabhāvanā*) persists until it is destroyed by deep meditation, the text rejects the core Vivaraṇa thesis that the scriptural injunction to hear is the direct and sufficient cause of immediate realization. Instead, the text's causal logic strictly necessitates a Bhāmatī-aligned functionalism: because the command to "hear" is explicitly stated to fail in producing the immediate result (*aparokṣānubhūti*), the operative force of the spiritual mandate necessarily devolves upon the act of meditation (*nididhyāsana*). Thus, while the text does not engage the hermeneutical debate *de jure*—maintaining a conspicuous silence on technical categories like *niyama-vidhi*—*de facto* it transfers the effective power of the injunction to the meditative process, as this is the only means admitted by the text as capable of transforming indirect knowledge into direct vision.

II. The Metaphysics of the Self

II.1 The Nature of the Soul and the Theory of Appearance: Points 5 & 15

The fifth and fifteenth points of divergence are ontologically inseparable, concerning the specific theoretical model used to explain the relationship between the individual soul (*jīva*), the Lord (*īśvara*), and Ignorance (*avidyā*). While both schools agree that the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman in essence, they employ different analogies and metaphysical structures to explain the apparent limitation of the Infinite. This debate is formalized as the distinction between the "theory of limitation" (*avaccheda-vāda*) and the "theory of reflection" (*pratibimba-vāda*).

The Bhāmatī Position: The Theory of Limitation (*avaccheda-vāda*)

The Bhāmatī school, following Vācaspati Miśra, employs the "theory of limitation" (*avaccheda-vāda*) to define the nature of the soul. Drawing on the analogy of "pot-space" (*ghaṭākāśa*), they argue that just as infinite space appears limited by a pot without undergoing any actual change or reflection, Brahman appears limited by the adjunct (*upādhi*) of ignorance. In this view, the *jīva* is defined as consciousness conditioned or delimited by ignorance (*avidyāvacchinna-caitanya*). Consequently, the distinction between the individual soul and God (*īśvara*) is one of conditioning: the *jīva* is the conditioned reality, while *īśvara* is the unconditioned Brahman who is not delimited by the adjuncts, remaining pure like the unlimited space (*mahākāśa*) outside the pot.¹⁶³

The Vivaraṇa Position: The Theory of Reflection (*pratibimba-vāda*)

The Vivaraṇa school rejects the limitation theory as insufficient to explain the distinct nature of the *jīva* and *īśvara*, arguing that a mere limitation does not account for the appearance of new qualities (like agency and suffering) in the soul. Instead, they champion the "theory of reflection" (*pratibimba-vāda*). Using the analogy of the Sun reflected in water or a mirror, they argue that the *jīva* is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of the prototype consciousness (*bimba*) in the medium of ignorance. In this model, the *jīva* is defined as consciousness reflected in ignorance (*avidyā-pratibimbita-caitanya*), while *īśvara* is identified as the prototype consciousness (*bimba-caitanya*). Just as the reflected sun acquires the qualities of the water

¹⁶³ P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 139-150; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 7–9; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 83; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 26, 86. Roodurmun explains that the theory of limitation (*avaccheda-vāda*) is grounded in the "pot-space" analogy (*ghaṭākāśa-nyāya*): just as space remains indivisible and unchanged while appearing limited by pots, so Brahman remains one and unaffected while appearing as multiple *jīvas* when delimited by adjuncts that are modifications of *avidyā* (Roodurmun, 139-150). The *jīva* is therefore defined as consciousness delimited by ignorance (*avidyā-avacchinna-caitanya*) and is neither a part nor a transformation of Brahman, just as pot-space is neither a part nor a modification of space. Gupta further clarifies that, within the Bhāmatī framework, the plurality of *jīvas* corresponds to a plurality of empirical *avidyās*, each delimiting consciousness in a distinct manner, while Brahman itself remains untouched and non-participatory in ignorance (Gupta, 86). The pot-space analogy, already employed in earlier Advaita sources to explain apparent plurality without real division, thus receives in Vācaspati a systematic metaphysical role: it underwrites the identity of *jīva* and Brahman while accounting for empirical individuation (EIP III, 83; Gupta, 26).

(trembling, impurity), the *jīva* acquires the qualities of the mind, while the prototype (*īśvara*) remains explicitly distinct and unaffected.¹⁶⁴

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* Position

Regarding the definition of the individual self (point 5) and the final explanatory model (point 15), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* adopts a distinct form of functional syncretism. Ontologically (in chapter 1), it firmly establishes the Vivaraṇa framework, defining both the individual and the Lord as reflections. However, pedagogically (in chapter 3), it validates the Bhāmatī "limitation theory" (*avaccheda-vāda*) as an equally useful analogy (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) for intuiting the final non-difference of the self.

In its primary account of creation (chapter 1), the text explicitly rejects the language of mere limitation and defines the *jīva* using the specific terminology of the Vivaraṇa school: *pratibimba* (reflection).

tadavidyāpratibimbitacaitanyarūpā jīvā apy anantāḥ |

"The living beings (*jīva*), having the nature of consciousness (*caitanya*) reflected (*pratibimbita*) in that ignorance, are also innumerable."

Crucially, the text does not stop at the *jīva*; it extends the reflection theory to God (*īśvara*) as well. This is the diagnostic marker of the later Vivaraṇa tradition (specifically the Vidyāraṇya lineage), which distinguishes the soul from God not by locus (as in Bhāmatī), but by the quality of the reflecting medium. Immediately following the definition of the *jīva*, the text defines *īśvara*:

sā mūlaprakṛtiḥ... māyā avidyā tāmasī tridhā jātā... tatra māyā śuddhasattvapradhānā | tatra pratibimbitaḥ... brahmācāitanyam īśvara ity ucyate... sa eva jagatsraṣṭaḥ | sa eva... tāmasyavacchinna eva san jagadupādānakāraṇam api bhavati ūrṇanābhivat |

"This primary cause... manifests in three forms... illusion (*māyā*), ignorance (*avidyā*), [and] darkness (*tāmasī*). In this context, *māyā* is predominated by pure *sattva*. There, the reflection (*pratibimbita*)... is called *brahmācāitanya* or *īśvara*... he is indeed the creator of the world. Itself... being separated from darkness (*tāmasī*), it also serves as the material cause of the world, like a spider (*ūrṇanābhi*)."

¹⁶⁴ P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 138–139, 150–158; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 81, 85–86, 157; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 415. Roodurmun explains that the Vivaraṇa school employs the *pratibimba-vāda* to demonstrate the non-difference of the soul and the absolute: just as a face (*bimba*) and its reflection (*pratibimba*) in a mirror are essentially identical despite apparent differences, so too are Brahman and the *jīva* (Roodurmun, 138–139, 150–158). Gupta specifies that within this Vivaraṇa framework, *īśvara* is identified as the prototype-self (*bimba*) limited by primordial *avidyā*, whereas the *jīva* is the reflection of that consciousness upon the internal organ or ignorance (Gupta, 85–86, 157). The theory relies on the logic that the defects of the reflecting medium (such as the impurities of a mirror or the agitation of water) affect only the reflection, not the prototype. Thus, the *jīva* appropriates the limitations and agency of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), while the prototype remains pure and omniscient (Gupta, 81; EIP XI, 415).

By defining *īśvara* as a reflection in pure *sattva* (*māyā*) and the *jīva* as a reflection in Impure *sattva* (*avidyā*), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* departs from the early Vivaraṇa view (Prakāśātman) which holds that *īśvara* is the pure prototype (*bimba*). Instead, it aligns with the later Vivaraṇa tradition (specifically the Vidyāraṇya lineage), which posits a supra-cosmic Brahman as the true prototype, rendering *īśvara* as the first 'reflected reality' (*pratibimbita*) endowed with omniscience due to the clarity of his medium.¹⁶⁵ This distinguishes it from the Bhāmatī 'limitation' (*avaccheda*) model while refining the standard reflection theory.

However, having established this rigid Vivaraṇa ontology, Chapter 3 exhibits a remarkable pedagogical tolerance. The text presents both the limitation theory and the reflection theory as valid analogies (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) to be deployed for different instructional purposes.

First, it utilizes the Bhāmatī analogy to explain the problem of the one appearing as many through the lens of containment:

yathā ekaiva pṛthivī kāryarūpeṇa pariṇatā satī...yathā [ca] ākāśa eka eva pṛthivyādikāryopādhiṣu praviṣṭa iva pratīyamāno...tathā mūlaprakṛtir anātmā eka eva kāryaśarīr[ādī]rūpeṇāneko jātaḥ...ayam avacchinnapakṣe dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ ||

“Just as the one earth, being transformed into effects...and just as the one space, appearing as though entered into the limiting adjuncts such as earth...in the same way, the primary cause, the non-self, though one, has appeared as many in the form of effects such as bodies and other manifestations... This is the analogy (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) in the case (*pakṣa*) of delimitation (*avacchinna*).”

Immediately following, it presents the Vivaraṇa analogy, which the text applies to both the objective world (the non-self) and the subjective consciousness (the self):

pratibimbapakṣe tu samudro nadī taṭākāḥ kūpo ghaṭajalam ity ekam eva jalam yathā bahudhā jātaḥ tathā[nā]tmāpi bahudhā jātaḥ | teṣu samudrādiṣu [yathā] āditya eka eva pratibimbataḥ san bahudhā jātas tathaika evātmāntaḥkaraṇasahiteṣu sarveṣv api pratibimbataḥ san aneko jāta ity ubhayatrāpi dr̥ṣṭānto jñātavyaḥ |

“Thus, according to the theory of reflection (*pratibimbapakṣa*), the ocean, a river, a lake, a well, and the water in a pot are all but one and the same water, appearing in many forms; likewise, the non-self appears manifoldly. Just as the Sun, though one, appears as many when reflected in the ocean and other bodies of water, so too the *ātman*, though single,

¹⁶⁵ Vidyāraṇya Svāmī, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967; repr. 1987), pp. 8–11 (1.16–17 and commentaries); Nīscaldās, *Vicār-sāgar* (Ocean of Inquiry), trans. and discussed in Michael S. Allen, *The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2013), 154. In *Pañcadaśī* 1.16, Vidyāraṇya explicitly defines *īśvara* as Brahman reflected in *māyā* characterized by pure *sattva*, while 1.17 identifies the *jīva* as Brahman reflected in *avidyā* marked by impure *sattva*, thereby presupposing a level of Brahman ontologically prior to both reflections and functioning as the true *bimba*. This framework is further developed in later Advaita literature: Nīscaldās systematically contrasts the predominantly sattvic *māyā* constituting *īśvara*'s *upādhi* with the *malina* (tainted) *sattva* of the individual mind, explaining *īśvara*'s omniscience as a function of the exceptional transparency of the reflecting medium rather than identity with the absolute prototype (*vicār-sāgar*, p. 154).

being reflected in all [beings] endowed with the thinking faculty (*antaḥkaraṇa*), appears manifold—in both cases, the analogy (*dṛṣṭānta*) is to be understood accordingly.”

By using the phrase *ity ubhayatrāpi* ("in both cases"), the text confirms that the reflection analogy applies equally to the medium (the non-self/water) and the reflected reality (the self/Sun). This establishes a comprehensive model where:

1. The material cause is one, but appears manifold (like water in many vessels).
2. The efficient cause/self is one, but appears manifold (like the Sun reflected in those vessels).

The text leverages the reflection model specifically to solve the theological problem of agency (*karṭṛtva*)—reconciling the changeless nature of the self with the empirical experience of action:

***yathā [ca] jaladharmāḥ śītalacalanādaya ādityaṃ bimbaṃ na sprśanti
tathāntaḥkaraṇadharmāḥ karṭṛtvabhokṭṛtvādayo’pi tattadantaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭacidābhāsā
eva bhānti bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ na sprśanti |***

“Just as the properties (*dharma*) of water—such as coolness, movement, and so on—do not affect the prototype Sun, so too the properties of the thinking faculty—such as agency (*karṭṛtva*), enjoyership (*bhokṭṛtva*), and the like—appear as reflections of the [single] consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) that are specific to each thinking faculty. They do not touch the prototype self (*bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ*).”

By identifying the *jīva* as *cidābhāsa*, the text assigns agency and enjoyership to the reflected consciousness rather than to the self itself. Just as the trembling of a reflection belongs to the water and not to the prototype Sun, so action and experience arise from the mind’s limitations. The prototype self (*bimba*), by contrast, remains untouched (*na sprśanti*) by these modifications.

This strict separation between the agentive reflection and the immutable prototype constitutes a diagnostic feature of the post-Vidyāraṇya era. Whereas early Vivaraṇa hermeneutics emphasized the fundamental ontological identity (*abheda*) of the reflection (*pratibimba*) with the prototype (*bimba*), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* here aligns itself with the later *ābhāsa-vāda* doctrine systematized in the *Pañcadaśī*. In this framework, the reflection (*cidābhāsa*) is no longer posited as the prototype itself appearing within a limiting adjunct, but rather as an illusory projection that is functionally and ontologically distinct from the *kūṭastha* (the immutable). By asserting that the reflection's properties "do not touch" the prototype, the text validates this scholastic refinement, rigorously distinguishing the mutable agent (*karṭṛ*) from the associationless witness (*sākṣin*).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967), xvi, 132–133, 307–308, 358; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 43–44. As Svāhānanda (xvi) notes, while the classical Vivaraṇa view (*pratibimba-vāda*) regards the reflection as real and identical to the prototype, Vidyāraṇya introduces the *ābhāsa-vāda*, treating the reflection (*cidābhāsa*) as an illusory appearance distinct from the prototype. The *Pañcadaśī* (VI.22–23) structurally defines the *jīva* as this specific "reflection of the *kūṭastha* in the intellect," attributing the properties of transmigration and agency solely to the reflection.

Despite this rigid structural distinction, demonstrating its syncretic character, the text pivots back to the Bhāmatī position for the final instruction on identity (*aikya*). While the reflection analogy is employed to explain the appearance of agency, the limitation analogy is found to be the clearer tool for establishing fundamental non-difference. The section concludes with the simple equation of the limitation theory:

tasmāj jīvātmaiva paramātmā...yathā mahākāśa eva ghaṭākāśa evam iti jānīhi |

"Therefore, the individual self is none other than the supreme self... just as the space in a pot (*ghaṭākāśa*) is nothing other than the great space (*mahākāśa*), thus know it."

Thus, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* maintains a fundamental doctrinal allegiance to the later Vivaraṇa school—defining the ontological status of both *jīva* and *īśvara* through the theory of reflection—yet adopts a methodological syncretism in its instruction. It presents both the limitation (*avaccheda*) and reflection (*pratibimba*) theories without discarding either, utilizing the reflection model to solve the dynamic problem of agency (*karṭṛtva*) and suffering, while validating the limitation model as the most effective pedagogical device for revealing the static truth of Identity (*aikya*).

II.2 The Locus, Unity, and Substrate of Ignorance: Points 6, 7 & 14

The divergence regarding the ontological support (*āśraya*) of ignorance is inextricably linked to the question of its unity. The sixth, seventh, and fourteenth points concern whether ignorance is located in the individual or the absolute, and whether it is numerically one or many. The Bhāmatī school, positing that ignorance resides in the individual soul (*jīva*), is logically compelled to accept the plurality of ignorances (*avidyā-nānātva*): since souls are many, the ignorances residing in them must also be many. Conversely, the Vivaraṇa school, asserting that ignorance is a single cosmic force (*avidyā-ekatva*), must locate it in the only singular reality available—Brahman (Points 6 & 14).

The Bhāmatī Position: The *jīva* as Locus (*jīvāśraya-vāda*)

The Bhāmatī school, motivated by the desire to preserve the absolute purity of Brahman, argues that ignorance cannot reside in the perfect. Vācaspati Miśra contends that since *avidyā* is a defect, locating it in Brahman would contaminate the absolute. Therefore, he posits that the locus of ignorance is the individual soul (*jīva*). Using the logic of mutual dependence (*parasparāśraya*) occurring in a beginningless series (*anādi*), the Bhāmatī school argues that the *jīva* is the support of ignorance, while ignorance is the cause of the *jīva*'s limitation. Consequently, since the individual souls are manifold, this school is compelled to accept the plurality of ignorances (*avidyā-nānātva*); each soul has its own

Vidyāraṇya explicitly argues that the "enjoyer" (*bhokṭṛ*) cannot be the immutable prototype (*kūṭastha*), which is associationless (*asaṅga*), but must be the *cidābhāsa* rooted in the changing intellect (VII.194–197). Sastri (43–44) confirms that this structural isolation of the "witness-intelligence" (*sākṣi-caitanya*) from the agentive *jīva* represents a specific scholastic refinement of the post-Vidyāraṇya era.

specific nescience. Thus, for this school, the locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viśaya*) of ignorance are distinct: ignorance resides in the *jīva* but veils Brahman.¹⁶⁷

The Vivaraṇa Position: Brahman as Locus (*brahmāśraya-vāda*)

The Vivaraṇa school rejects the *jīva* as the locus on the grounds of logical circularity. Since the *jīva* is itself a product of ignorance—established only after ignorance has delimited or reflected consciousness—it cannot serve as the support of its own cause. Prakāśātman argues that the locus and the object of ignorance must be identical: just as darkness in a room hides the room and resides in the room, so too *avidyā* resides in pure consciousness (Brahman) and conceals that very consciousness. Since the locus (Brahman) is one and secondless, the ignorance residing in it must also be a single, universal entity (*avidyā-ekatva*). They uphold the maxim: "The 'I' notion is the effect of ignorance; therefore, the pure self is its locus." Thus, ignorance is supported by Brahman (as *āśraya*) and covers Brahman (as *viśaya*).¹⁶⁸

The Māyāvivarāṇa Position

Under these specific viewpoints regarding the locus, unity, and substrate of ignorance, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* aligns with the Vivaraṇa position (*brahmāśraya-vāda*), holding that ignorance is a singular entity superimposed directly upon the pure reality (*vastu*), and that the *jīva*—being a content contained within ignorance—cannot be its support.

¹⁶⁷ P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 36, 143–144; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 7–9, 19; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 26, 86. Vācaspati Miśra, following Maṇḍana Miśra, emphatically maintains that the individual soul (*jīva*) is the locus (*āśraya*) of ignorance, while Brahman is its object (*viśaya*), a distinction posited to preserve the absolute purity of Brahman from the defect of nescience (EIP XI, 7–9). Addressing the charge of mutual dependence (*parasparāśraya*)—that the *jīva* is a product of ignorance yet supposedly its support—Vācaspati argues that the series of *jīva* and *avidyā* is beginningless (*anādi*) like the seed and the sprout (*bījāṅkura-nyāya*), thus avoiding logical circularity (Roodurmun, 143; EIP XI, 8). Furthermore, to account for the distinction between bound and liberated souls and to avoid the paradox of "universal liberation upon the release of one" (*ekamuktau sarvamukti-prasaṅgaḥ*), Vācaspati posits a plurality of ignorances (*avidyā-nānātva*): there are as many primal ignorances (*mūlāvidyā*) as there are *jīvas*, with each soul's specific ignorance being destroyed only upon its own realization (Roodurmun, 36, 143; EIP XI, 9, 19; Gupta, 86).

¹⁶⁸ Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 7, 19, 361–362, 415; P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 119–120, 161; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 26–27. The Vivaraṇa school rejects the view that the individual soul (*jīva*) is the locus of ignorance, arguing that since the *jīva* is itself a product of ignorance—established only after the appearance of individuality—making it the locus would result in the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya-doṣa*): the *jīva* depends on *avidyā* for its existence, and *avidyā* would depend on the *jīva* for its support (EIP XI, 7; Roodurmun, 119–120). Consequently, they maintain that Brahman is both the locus (*āśraya*) and the content (*viśaya*) of ignorance, just as darkness resides in and conceals the same space (EIP XI, 7, 362, 415; Gupta, 26–27). Since the locus (Brahman) is one, the Vivaraṇa school posits a single, universal *mūlāvidyā*, explaining the apparent plurality of bound souls through distinct "capacities" (*śaktis*) or states (*avasthājñāna*) of that single ignorance, rather than through a plurality of primary ignorances as held by the Bhāmatī (EIP XI, 19; Roodurmun, 119, 161).

First, the text defines the act of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) as occurring directly upon the "true reality" or "pure consciousness," thereby identifying Brahman as the substrate. In Chapter 1, it states:

ayam adhyāropo vastvajñānādāropaḥ |

"This superimposition is the superimposition of ignorance (*ajñāna*) upon the true reality (*vastu*)."

This is reiterated even more explicitly at the conclusion of the cosmological exposition, where the "true reality" is glossed as "pure consciousness":

evam ākāśavan nirmalacaitanyavastuni mithyābhūtaprapañcakalpanam adhyāropaḥ |

"In this way, like the sky, the illusory projection (*kalpana*) of the unreal multiplicity of elements (*mithyābhūtaprapañca*) is superimposed upon the reality of pure consciousness (*nirmalacaitanyavastu*)."

By designating *nirmalacaitanya* (pure consciousness) as the ground of the projection, the text rejects the Bhāmatī view that the projection rests on the *jīva*.

Second, the text employs a specific cosmological metaphor that simultaneously establishes the unity of ignorance (Point 7) and structurally precludes the *jīva* from being the locus (Points 6 & 14). It describes the causal state (*mūlaprakṛti*) as a single "lump of lac" within which the *jīvas* are embedded like gold flakes:

asyāṃ mūlaprakṛtāv anantakoṭijīvāḥ svasvakarmavāsanābhiḥ saha jatupiṇḍe svarṇareṇava iva sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvaṃ līnā vartante |

"In this primary cause dwell innumerable multitudes of living beings (*jīva*), together with their karmic impressions (*karmavāsanā*), enveloped prior to creation (*sṛṣṭi*) like gold flakes embedded in a lump of lac."

This "Containment Analogy" serves a dual diagnostic purpose:

1. Regarding unity (point 7): the text explicitly contrasts the plurality of the "innumerable" (*anantakoṭi*) souls with the singularity of the "lump" (*piṇḍa*) and the singular demonstrative "in this" (*asyām*). By defining the causal entity as a unified aggregate containing all beings, it rejects the Bhāmatī doctrine of plural ignorances distributed among souls.
2. Regarding locus (points 6 & 14): this unity dictates the hierarchy. The "lump" (ignorance) is the container, and the "gold flakes" (*jīvas*) are the contained content. Since the container must exist logically prior to and independently of the content it holds, the *jīva* (the flake) cannot be the support of the ignorance (the lac) that encompasses it.

Third, consistent with its adherence to the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*) established in points 5 and 15, the text implies that the medium must rest on the underlying substance,

not on the reflection. Since the text defines the *jīva* as "consciousness reflected in that ignorance" (*tadavidyāpratibimbitacaitanyarūpā jīvāḥ*), the *jīva* is an effect of the interaction between the prototype (Brahman) and the medium (*avidyā*). As an effect, it cannot support its cause. Therefore, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* consistently maintains that *avidyā* relies on Brahman alone for its existence, confirming the Vivaraṇa tenet that the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the locus (*āśraya*) are one and the same.

III. The Macrocosmic Order

III.1 The Mechanics of Cosmogenesis and Elemental Evolution: Point 11

The eleventh point of divergence concerns the specific cosmological mechanism by which the subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhūtāni*) constitute the gross elements (*sthūlabhūtāni*) of the perceptible world. While both schools accept that the material world is a product of *māyā/avidyā* and that creation proceeds from the subtle to the gross, they differ fundamentally on the number of elements involved and, consequently, on the mathematical formula of their combination. The debate centers on whether the scriptural account of "triplication" (*trivṛtkaraṇa*) is the final model, or whether it implies a more comprehensive process of "quintuplication" (*pañcīkaraṇa*) involving distinct proportional ratios.

The Bhāmatī Position: The Theory of Triplication (*trivṛtkaraṇa*)

The Bhāmatī school, adhering closely to the wording of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6.2.3–4), accepts the doctrine of triplication (*trivṛtkaraṇa*) as the scriptural account of cosmic formation. In this passage, being (*sat*), having resolved to become manifold, successively projects fire (*tejas*), water (*āpas*), and food/earth (*annam* or *pṛthivī*), and the Upaniṣad confines its description of differentiation to these three elements alone. Vācaspati Miśra argues that while space (*ākāśa*) and air (*vāyu*) are indeed created entities, the process of grossification applies primarily to the three visible elements.

On this reading, each gross element arises through a determinate mode of intermixture appropriate to a tripartite scheme: it predominates in its own subtle nature while incorporating the remaining two in lesser measure. Thus, the formula for a gross element (e.g., fire) is one-half of its primary subtle element plus one-quarter of each of the other two. Space and air, though ontologically acknowledged, do not enter into this proportional mixing and are therefore treated as underlying categories rather than as active constituents in the process of triplication.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ Gerald James Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 83–84; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 88, 264–265; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 110. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6.2.3–4), as discussed by Larson, presents a cosmogonic sequence in which being (*sat*), rejecting derivation from non-being, resolves to become manifold and successively produces fire, water, and food, thereby restricting the description of material emergence to a tripartite sequence (Larson, 83–84). This formulation, which anticipates later Sāṃkhya reflection on causality, is taken up in Advaita through Śaṅkara's commentary, where the passage is read as supporting a theory of triplication (*trivṛtkaraṇa*): each gross element is analyzable into three constituents, one predominant and two subordinate, such that the apparent

The Vivaraṇa Position: The Theory of Quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*)

The Vivaraṇa school advances a more comprehensive account of material formation by bringing the triadic cosmology of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* into alignment with the pentadic framework of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.1.1), which explicitly enumerates five elements—space, air, fire, water, and earth. Since both the physical body and the empirical world unmistakably exhibit the qualities associated with all five elements—sound, touch, form, taste, and smell—the Vivaraṇa argues that any adequate theory of grossification must account for the participation of each of them.

On this basis, the Vivaraṇa elaborates the doctrine of quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*) as an extension of earlier compounding models. While retaining the principle that a gross element predominates in its own subtle nature, the school holds that this predominance must now be understood in relation to four additional elements. Accordingly, the mixing ratio shifts from quarters to eighths: the formula for a gross element is one-half of its primary subtle element plus one-eighth of each of the other four.

This account came to function as the standard cosmological model in later systematic Advaita, not as a rejection of the *Chāndogya*'s triadic presentation, but as its supplementation in light of other Upaniṣadic materials. By incorporating all five elements into the process of grossification, the Vivaraṇa provides a more detailed analysis of the constitution of the empirical world, while preserving the underlying Advaitic commitment to scriptural coherence.¹⁷⁰

The Māyāvivaraṇa Position

Under this specific viewpoint regarding the account of creation, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* strictly aligns with the Vivaraṇa position (*pañcīkaraṇa*), explicitly rejecting the limitation of the

unity of a given element dissolves upon analysis into its constituent factors (Potter, 264–265). Potter further notes that this model reflects the *Chāndogya*'s restriction of cosmogony to fire, water, and food, even though other Upaniṣadic passages speak of space and air; accordingly, Śaṅkara does not deny the existence of these latter elements but treats them as lying outside the specific explanatory scope of the tripartite model (Potter, 88). As Gupta observes, later Advaitic tradition sought to systematize these divergent scriptural accounts by articulating a doctrine of *pañcīkaraṇa*, which incorporates all five elements into a more comprehensive schema of material manifestation, while still preserving the *Chāndogya*'s triadic structure as an authoritative scriptural foundation (Gupta, 110).

¹⁷⁰ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 108, 110; Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, chap. 4, vv. 4–5, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), 96–97; Sadānanda Yogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), vv. 98–102. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.1.1), explicitly enumerating the sequential emergence of space, air, fire, water, and earth, provides the primary scriptural basis for a pentadic cosmology, a basis that later Advaitins treat as requiring systematic reconciliation with the *Chāndogya* account. Gupta shows that within post-Śaṅkara Advaita—especially in the Vivaraṇa lineage—this reconciliation takes the form of *pañcīkaraṇa*, motivated by the empirical fact that the gross body and world exhibit all five elemental qualities (sound, touch, form, taste, and smell), which cannot be accounted for by a strictly triadic model (Gupta, 108, 110). Vidyāraṇya explicitly affirms the fivefold creation sequence of the *Taittirīya* while preserving the Upaniṣadic formula “*bahu syām*” as the common teleological impulse underlying both accounts (*Pañcadaśī* 4.4–5). Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra*, drawing on this later systematic tradition, codifies *pañcīkaraṇa* as the standard doctrine of grossification, specifying the proportional structure whereby each gross element consists of one-half of its own subtle element and one-eighth of each of the remaining four (vv. 98–102).

cosmological process to three elements and detailing the mathematical formula of quintuplication.

First, the text unequivocally lists five elements as the constituents of the gross creation, incorporating space and air which are excluded from the Bhāmatī's *trivṛtkaraṇa* model. In describing the creation of the subtle world, it lists the sequence from space to earth:

tatra vikṣepasaktir eva sūkṣma ākāśo'bhūt ākāśād vāyuḥ | vāyoragniḥ | agnerāpaḥ | adbhyaḥ pṛthivī |

"It is indeed the projecting power that gave rise to subtle space (*sūkṣmākāśa*); from space [arose] air (*vāyu*), from air fire (*agni*), from fire water (*āpas*), [and] from water earth (*pṛthivī*)."

Second, the text details the specific mechanism of grossification (*sthūlasṛṣṭi*) using the exact methodological definition of *pañcīkaraṇa* found in Vivaraṇa manuals like the *Vedāntasāra*, confirming the "one-eighth" distribution ratio.¹⁷¹ It describes the division of each element into two equal parts and the subsequent distribution of the fractional parts:

atha sthūlasṛṣṭir ucyate | tamoguṇapradhānāni pañcabhūtāni pañcīkṛtāni ākāśādīni pañcāpi bhūtāni pratyekaṃ dvidhā vibhajyaikaikam ardhamaṃ caturdhā vibhajya svārdhabhāgaṃ vihāyetaṛdhabhāgeṣu saṃyojanaṃ pañcīkaraṇam | evaṃ kṛte pañcāpi pañcīkṛtāni bhavanti |

"Now the process of gross creation (*sthūlasṛṣṭi*) is explained.

The five elements (*pañcabhūta*), predominated by the quality of *tamas* and quintuplicated—space (*ākāśa*) and so on—are each divided into two; each half is [further] divided into four. Leaving aside one's own half-part, [it] undergoes joining with the half-portions of the others. [This is called] *pañcīkaraṇa* (quintuplication).

Thus having been done, [all] five become quintuplicated."

By defining the physical world as the result of mixing five elements through this specific fractional recombination—where the secondary elements are present in eighths rather than quarters—the text firmly situates its physics within the Vivaraṇa framework.

III.2 The Ontological Foundation of Divine Omniscience: Point 12

The twelfth point of doctrinal divergence concerns the ontological provenance of the omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) attributed to the qualified absolute (*īśvara*). While all Advaita schools accept the axiom that the creator must be omniscient, they dispute the mechanism by which this specific capacity arises in the qualified state. The debate centers on whether omniscience is derived from the essential nature of Brahman as the independent witness of the *jīvas'* ignorance (Bhāmatī), or whether it is structurally generated by the specific constitutive modes (*guṇa*) of the adjunct itself (Vivaraṇa).

¹⁷¹ Sadānanda Yogīndra, *Vedāntasāra*, ed. and trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Mylapore, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1931), vv. 99–100.

The Bhāmatī Position: Omniscience Derived from Essential Nature

The Bhāmatī school posits that the omniscience of *īśvara* is derived directly from the essential nature of Brahman. For Vācaspati Miśra, the ignorance (*avidyā*) that covers reality resides solely in the individual soul (*jīva*), not in the Lord. *īśvara* is the object (*viśaya*) of this ignorance, not its locus. Consequently, the Lord's omniscience is not the result of a specific type of adjunct; rather, it is the inherent luminosity of the self—which remains structurally separate from and uncovered by the ignorance of the *jīvas*—shining upon the totality of nescience. *īśvara* knows all not because of a special medium, but because he is the substratum that illumines the ignorance located in others.¹⁷²

The Vivaraṇa Position: Omniscience Based on the Modes of *avidyā*

The Vivaraṇa school, in contrast, argues that *īśvara* is the locus of the adjunct (*māyā*) and that his omniscience is strictly dependent on the specific modalities of that adjunct. To explain why the Lord is not deluded by the adjunct he possesses, this school enforces a rigid distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. It defines the adjunct of *īśvara* as *māyā*, characterized by pure *sattva* (*śuddha-sattva-pradhāna*). Since *sattva* is the material mode responsible for knowledge, the reflection of consciousness in this pure medium results in the immediate cognition of all things. In this view, omniscience is inextricably bound to the mode of the adjunct: the "knower" status exists specifically because the mirror (*māyā*) is constituted of pure light.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 3, Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 498; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 7; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 18. The Bhāmatī ascription of omniscience to the essential nature of Brahman—rather than to a specific adjunct—rests upon the definition of the self as the self-luminous witness (*sākṣin*) established in the earlier tradition. As Potter notes (EIP III, 498), the self is designated as "light" (*jyotiḥ*) precisely because it is self-evident (*svayaṃ-jyotiḥ*) and distinct from the modifications of the intellect (*buddhi*); it is the witness by whose mere presence these modifications are illumined. In Vācaspati Miśra's framework, this witness-consciousness is structurally insulated from nescience, as *avidyā* is located exclusively in the *jīva*, leaving Brahman as its pure object (*viśaya*) (EIP XI, 7). Consequently, *īśvara*'s knowledge does not depend on the mediation of a mental mode (*vṛtti*). Instead, it operates through the intrinsic mechanism of *sākṣi-jñāna*, which, as Gupta (18) explains, differs from ordinary cognition by directly revealing all objects—whether "known" or "unknown" to the individual—thereby constituting an immediate, non-psycho-intellectual omniscience.

¹⁷³ Lance E. Nelson, "Krishna in Advaita Vedānta: The Supreme Brahman in Human Form," in *Krishna: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 317; Michael S. Allen, *The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta* (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013), 155; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 70, 104. As Nelson (317) observes, the attributes of lordship and all-knowingness rely on the specific distinctions of these adjuncts, without which the self remains devoid of relations (*nirguṇa*). The specific mechanism that allows this adjunct to generate omniscience rather than delusion is its constitution of "pure *sattva*" (*śuddha-sattva*). As Nīścaldās explains (Allen, 155), the Lord's adjunct is *māyā*, defined specifically as the quality of *sattva* that is "not overwhelmed by the qualities of *tamas* and *rajas*." Since this pure *sattva* is inherently luminous, there is no veil between the reflection of consciousness in *māyā* and the objects it illumines, resulting in an unobstructed, immediate cognition of all things (Allen, 155). Madhusūdana Sarasvatī further systematizes this by defining the Lord's agency and omniscience as the possession of knowledge in the form of a mode (*vṛtti*) of *māyā*, through which the creator is directly connected to and cognizant of every evolving effect (Gupta, 104).

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* Position

On the question of the provenance of divine knowledge, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* decisively rejects the essentialist view of the Bhāmatī and adopts the structural definition of the Vivaraṇa school. While the text accepts the theological necessity of omniscience, it grounds this capacity in the specific material constitution of the primary cause.

First, the text defines the material constitution of the Lord's adjunct as pure *sattva* (*śuddha-sattva-pradhāna*). Critically, the text does not merely assume *sattva* to be the principle of illumination; it proves this explicitly in its cosmological derivation of the subtle body. By asserting that the "organs of knowledge" (*jñānendriya*)—the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose—are generated exclusively from the *sattva* portion of the elements, the text establishes a strict material causality between this mode and the faculty of cognition:

eteṣāṃ ākāśādīnāṃ pṛthak pṛthak sattvaguṇāṃśāc chrotraṃ tvak cakṣur jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca jñānendriyāṇi krameṇa jātāni |

Of these—space (*ākāśa*), etc.—from the respective portions of the quality of *sattva* (*sattvaguṇāṃśa*), the five sensory organs (*jñānendriya*)—ear (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eye (*cakṣu*), tongue (*jihvā*), nose (*ghrāṇa*)—were successively manifested.

Having established *sattva* as the "knowledge-substance," the text then applies this definition to the Lord. By identifying his adjunct (*māyā*) with this very mode—in stark contrast to the *rajas* and *tamas* of the individual soul—the text identifies the structural mechanism that makes unobstructed knowledge possible:

tatra māyā śuddhasattvapradhānā | tatra pratibimbitaṃ... brahmacaityanam īśvara ity ucyate |

"In this context, *māyā* is predominated by pure *sattva*. There, the reflection... is called *brahmacaityana* or *īśvara*..."

This implies that *īśvara* is omniscient not merely because he is the witness, but because the "mirror" in which he is reflected is composed entirely of the principle of manifestation. This is further confirmed by the text's contrasting definition of the individual soul (*jīva*), whose limitation is attributed to the mode of *rajas*—the principle of kinesis and obscuration:

pūrvoktāvidyā rajaḥpradhānā bahuprakārānantā | tadavidyāpratibimbitacaitanyarūpā jīvā apy anantāḥ |

"As previously stated, ignorance (*avidyā*), predominated by *rajas*, manifests in innumerable forms. The living beings (*jīva*), having the nature of consciousness (*caityana*) reflected in that ignorance, are also innumerable."

Second, the text links this structural capacity to the Lord's creative power, adopting the Vivaraṇa model of split causality. The text asserts that *īśvara* is the material cause specifically through the medium of the adjunct:

sa upādhiprādhānyenopādānakāraṇaṃ svaprādhānyena nimittam |

"By virtue of the predominance of the adjuncts (*upādhi*), it is the material cause, and by virtue of its own predominance, it is the efficient cause (*nimitta*) [of creation]."

This definition is the key to establishing the necessity of omniscience. It operationalizes the teleological logic established by Śaṅkara in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* 1.1.2.¹⁷⁴ If the Lord is the material cause (*upādāna*), he must pervade the effect. Since the text has already defined the material of his adjunct as *sattva* (pure knowledge), his pervasion of the universe is synonymous with his cognition of it.

Thus, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* guarantees omniscience structurally: *īśvara* does not merely "know" the universe as an external object; as the sattvic material cause, he constitutes the very reality he cognizes.

IV. Epistemology and the Status of the Mind: Points 2, 4, 8 & 13

The divergences regarding the Instrument of knowledge (point 2), the primacy of practice (point 4), the object of realization (point 8), and the status of the mind (point 13) form a complex, interlocking epistemological system. These four points determine the precise mechanism of liberation: *what* instrument removes ignorance, *which* practice yields that instrument, *what* specific content is revealed, and *how* the mind is categorized within this process. To understand the syncretism of the *Māyāvivaraṇa*, one must first grasp how these points function as coherent systems in the two rival schools.

The Bhāmatī Position: The Mind as the Sense-Organ of Realization (*mano-karaṇa*)

The Bhāmatī position represents a coherent system of psycho-intellectual realism where the mind is the central agent. The logical sequence begins with point 2 (instrument): it argues that verbal testimony (*śabda*) generates only indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*). Therefore, the mind (*manas*) acts as the special instrument (*karaṇa*) required to transform this indirect data into direct realization. This necessitates point 4 (practice): since the mind is the instrument, the mental act of meditation (*nididhyāsana*) becomes the principal means (*aṅgi*), while hearing is merely subsidiary. To support this epistemologically, point 13 (status

¹⁷⁴ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.2: *asya jagato nāmarūpavyākṛtasya anekakartṛbhokṛtsamyuktasya pratīnyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya manasāpy acintyaracanārūpasya janmasthitibhaṅgaṃ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇād bhavitum arhati tad brahmeti vākyaśeṣaḥ |* "Of this world—which is differentiated by names and forms (*nāmarūpavyākṛtasya*), which is connected with various agents and enjoyers (*anekakartṛbhokṛtsamyuktasya*), which is the abode of the fruits of actions regulated as to specific places, times, and causes, and the nature of whose design cannot be conceived even by the mind (*manasāpy acintyaracanārūpasya*)—[that from which] the origin, maintenance, and dissolution proceeds, from that omniscient (*sarvajña*) and omnipotent (*sarvaśakteḥ*) cause, it is appropriate that it should proceed. That is Brahman—such is the completion of the sentence."

of mind) classifies the mind as an internal sense organ (*indriya*), for only a sense organ can generate direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Consequently, regarding point 8 (object), the final realization is technically a "mental perception" (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), meaning the object apprehended is Brahman conditioned by the mental mode (*vṛtti-sahita*), just as a pot conditions the space inside it.¹⁷⁵

The Vivaraṇa Position: The Scripture as the Revealer of the Pure (*śabda-karaṇa*)

The Vivaraṇa position represents a strict scriptural absolutism. It begins with the assertion in point 2 that the scriptural word (*śabda*) is the sole direct instrument (*karaṇa*) capable of producing immediate realization, provided obstacles are removed. This shifts the focus in point 4 to hearing (*śravaṇa*) as the principal means (*aṅgi*), relegating meditation to a secondary role of removing obstacles. Ontologically, this view strictly separates the mind from the senses in point 13, classifying it as a non-sense organ (*anindriya*) or auxiliary aid, denying it the power of independent perception. Therefore, regarding point 8, the object of knowledge is pure Brahman (*svarūpa*) itself, self-luminous and unconditioned. The mental mode serves only a negative function to destroy the veil, without persisting as a conditioning adjunct.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 9–13; P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 1, 35; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 34. Potter provides a systematic breakdown of Vācaspati Miśra's epistemological realism, confirming the logical interdependence of these four positions. Regarding the instrument (point 2), Potter notes that for Vācaspati, *śabda* (Vedic testimony) yields only "indirect and mediate knowledge," which must be "strengthened and intensified through incessant practice of meditation" to achieve realization (Potter, 10). Because the scriptural word is insufficient for immediacy, the mind (point 13) is elevated to the status of a "sense organ" (*indriya*) that "intuits the real," thereby generating "direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) of the self" (Potter, 11). Consequently, in terms of practice (point 4), *nididhyāsana* (meditation) functions as the "principal organum" (*aṅgi*) of knowledge, while *śravaṇa* and *manana* are merely secondary aids (Potter, 10–12). Finally, regarding the object (point 8), Potter explains that for Vācaspati, "pure Brahman cannot be the content of any awareness"; rather, the final intuition apprehends only the "conditioned Brahman" (*upahita*), as the mind can objectify only that which is associated with the mental mode (Potter, 12). Sanjukta Gupta clarifies the metaphysical logic underlying this distinction: since pure consciousness is self-revealed, it cannot strictly be the content of a *vṛtti*; if consciousness becomes the subject (*viśeṣya*) of a cognitive mode, it "no longer remains pure" but becomes limited (*upahita*) by that very qualification (Gupta, 34). Roodurmun corroborates this entire sequence, identifying it with the doctrine of *prasaṅkhyāna*, where mediate knowledge is transmuted into immediate realization through the continuous operation of the mind (Roodurmun, 1, 35).

¹⁷⁶ Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 10–12; P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 1–2; Dharmarāja Adhvarin, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Adyar: Adyar Library, 1942), xvii–xviii; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 34. Potter articulates the Vivaraṇa rejection of the Bhāmatī model: regarding the instrument (point 2), the school holds that "immediate cognition may result even from verbal testimony" without sensory mediation (Potter, 12). Consequently, practice (point 4) is reoriented such that *śravaṇa* becomes the "principal incentive" (*aṅgi*) toward realization, while meditation serves only to effect concentration (Potter, 12). Ontologically, regarding the mind (point 13), Potter notes that Padmapāda explicitly argues that "the mind is not a sense organ," a position reaffirmed in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, which states that since immediacy depends on the manifestation of non-difference, the "sense-character of *manas*" is irrelevant (Sastri, xviii; Potter, 12). Finally, regarding the object (point 8), Potter contrasts this with Vācaspati by noting that for the Vivaraṇa, "pure Brahman, unenveloped by any adjunct... is

The *Māyāvivarāṇa* Position

Under this specific set of viewpoints, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* exhibits a striking functional dualism. Regarding the *process* of knowledge (points 2 & 4), it aligns with the Bhāmatī position, insisting on the mind as the instrument and meditation as the cause. However, regarding the *content* and *classification* of that knowledge (points 8 & 13), it reverts to the Vivaraṇa position, asserting the object is unconditioned and the mind is not a sense organ.

1. The Process: Mind and Meditation (Bhāmatī Alignment)

First, regarding the instrument and the primacy of practice, the text rejects the Vivaraṇa view that the word alone suffices. It explicitly categorizes scriptural hearing as generating only indirect knowledge:

atra gurumukhād vedānta[śravaṇa]janyam parokṣajñānam | idam eva śravaṇam |

"Here, indirect knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*) arises from [listening to] Vedānta at the *guru*'s mouth. This, indeed, is *śravaṇa* (listening)."

Because hearing leaves the knowledge indirect, the text establishes a causal sequence where meditation (*nididhyāsana*) acts as the principal means (*aṅgi*) to destroy the final obstacles. It states that even after hearing and reflection are "accomplished," the "contrary notion" (*viparītabhāvanā*) persists due to latent impressions:

evam śravaṇe manane ca kṛte'pi anādyavidyāvāsanayā sarvasyāpi yathāpūrvam satyatvapratītir viparītabhāvanā |

"Even when hearing (*śravaṇa*) and reflection (*manana*) have been accomplished, owing to the latent impressions (*vāsanā*) of beginningless ignorance (*anādyavidyā*), there still persists in everyone, as before, the apprehension of reality (*satyatva*) [in the unreal]—this is [the obstacle called] the 'contrary notion' (*viparītabhāvanā*)."

This obstacle is removed only by meditation:

sā brahmaikākārapratyayappravāharūpanididhyāsanena naśyati |

"It is dispelled through deep meditation (*nididhyāsana*), which takes the form of a continuous current of cognition having Brahman alone as its content."

Consequently, the final immediate realization is positioned as the result of this meditative process, confirming the Bhāmatī stance that the purified mind is the instrument:

an object of a mental awareness" (*akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*) (Potter, 12). Sastri clarifies the mechanical purity of this revelation: the final intuition "destroys itself as well" as the veil, analogous to the powder of a clearing-nut (*kataka-reṇu*) precipitating mud, ensuring that the mental mode does not persist as a conditioning adjunct (Sastri, xvii). Gupta supports this distinction by noting that in such transcendental experience, "*avidyā* does not play any role" and the knowledge is "unaccompanied by any flaw (*doṣa*)," thereby ensuring that the content is the unconditioned reality rather than an illusory projection (Gupta, 34).

śravaṇena saṃśayaṃ mananenāsambhāvanāṃ nididhyāsanena viparītabhāvanāṃ [ca] nivartayitvā dehātmajñānād brahmātmajñānaṃ jāyamānam aparokṣajñānam |

"Having removed the doubt (*saṃśaya*) through listening (*śravaṇa*), the non-acceptance (*asambhāvanā*) through reasoning (*manana*), [and] the contrary notion (*viparītabhāvanā*) through profound meditation (*nididhyāsana*), [there] arises, in place of the false identification of the self with the body, the direct knowledge (*aparokṣajñāna*) that the self is Brahman (*brahmātmajñāna*)."

2. The Content and Status: Pure Essence and Non-*indriya* (Vivarana Alignment)

However, despite identifying the mind as the instrument of this direct knowledge, the text refuses to accept the Bhāmatī corollary that the object is conditioned by the mind. Instead, it systematically dismantles the "mental perception" model through three distinct argumentative steps: epistemological definition, ontological grounding, and mechanical operation.

First, regarding the epistemological definition, the text defines the content as the pure, undivided essence (*akhaṇḍaikaṛasa*), categorically distinct from any object of perception (*aviśaya*). It employs the mark of "novelty" (*apūrvatā*) to assert this transcendence:

akhaṇḍaikaṛasasya pratyakṣādipramāṇāntarāviśayatvam apūrvatā tṛtīyam |

"The fact that the one, undivided essence (*akhaṇḍaikaṛasa*) is not an object (*aviśayatvam*) of any other means of knowledge, beginning with perception (*pratyakṣādi*), represents novelty (*apūrvatā*), the third [indicator]."

By explicit defining the essence as "not an object" (*aviśaya*), the text decisively rejects the Bhāmatī framework where realization is a form of "mental perception" (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). It denies that Brahman becomes "conditioned" or "objectified" by the mind, maintaining instead that it remains the pure essence (*akhaṇḍa-rasa*), distinct from the cognitive grasping characteristic of sensory experience.

Second, regarding the ontological grounding, this stance is supported by the text's adherence to the reflection theory (*pratibimbavāda*). In chapter three, it maintains that the mental faculties do not "touch" the prototype (*bimba*) which is the true object of knowledge:

tathāntaḥkaraṇadharmāḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvādayo'pi... bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ na sprśanti |

"...so too the properties of the thinking faculty—such as agency (*kartṛtva*), enjoyership (*bhoktṛtva*), and the like... do not touch the prototype self (*bimbabhūtam ātmānaṃ*)."

This phrasing is incompatible with the Bhāmatī "limitation theory" (*avacchedavāda*), where the adjunct directly conditions the consciousness like a pot limiting space. By explicitly identifying the self as the untouched prototype, the text relies on the "optical distance" of

the reflection metaphor to claim that the object of knowledge remains ontologically aloof from the instrument that reveals it.

Third, regarding the mechanical operation, the text explains how the mind can reveal this pure object without conditioning it. The function of the mental mode is described negatively as the destruction of the veil, analogous to a self-consuming fire:

sadya evāgnis tṛṇam ivāvidyāṃ tatkāryam api sarvaṃ dagdhuṃ śaknoti |

"...immediately—like fire that [at once] consumes grass—[the fire of knowledge] is able to burn up ignorance together with all its effects."

By specifying that the fire destroys "all effects" (*kāryam api sarvaṃ*)—which includes the mental mode itself—the text aligns with the Vivaraṇa doctrine of the self-extinguishing *vṛtti*. This ensures that no "conditioner" remains in the final state, effectively distinguishing it from the Bhāmatī view, where the mental mode persists as a conditioning adjunct.

Finally, regarding the status of the mind (point 13), the text creates a logical tension with its own epistemology. While Bhāmatī logic dictates that if the mind is the instrument of direct knowledge, it must be a sense organ (*indriya*), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* strictly excludes the mind from the category of senses, aligning with Vivaraṇa cosmogony.

First, the senses are said to arise from the respective portions of *sattva*, explicitly enumerated as a closed set of five:

eteṣāṃ ākāśādīnāṃ pṛthak pṛthak sattvaguṇāṃśāc chrotraṃ tvak cakṣur jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca jñānendriyāṇi krameṇa jātāni |

"Of these—space (*ākāśa*), etc.—from the respective portions of the quality of *sattva* (*sattvaguṇāṃśa*), the five sensory organs (*jñānendriya*)—ear (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eye (*cakṣu*), tongue (*jihvā*), nose (*ghrāṇa*)—were successively manifested."

In contrast, the mind is said to arise from the aggregate (*samaṣṭi*), separating it structurally from the senses:

ākāśādisattvasamaṣṭiyāntaḥkaraṇaṃ jātam | manobuddhicittāhaṅkārabhedena tac caturvidham |

"From the aggregate (*samaṣṭi*) of the sattvic [portions] of space and so on, the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) came into being. This (inner organ) is fourfold, distinguished into mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), memory (*citta*), [and] ego (*ahaṅkāra*)."

This separation is confirmed in the definition of the subtle body, where the mind is listed alongside the senses, not within them:

etaj jñānendriyapañcakaṃ karmendriyapañcakaṃ manobuddhiś caikībhūya sūkṣmaśarīraṃ liṅgākhyam u[cyate] |

"This subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*)—[comprising] the five sensory organs, the five organs of action, and mind and intellect, unified into one—is called the *liṅga*."

Thus, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* presents a syncretic epistemology: it adopts the Bhāmatī praxis—requiring meditation to transform indirect scriptural knowledge into direct realization—yet retains the Vivaraṇa metaphysics—insisting that the mind is not a sense organ and that the final object is the unconditioned, self-luminous prototype, revealed but not constituted by the mental fire that burns the veil.

V. The Nature of Liberation and the Status of the Knower: Point 16

The sixteenth point of divergence concerns the ontological status of the liberated being while still embodied. Having established the means of knowledge in previous sections, the debate here centers strictly on the definition of the result: does the rise of *brahma*-knowledge result in the total and instantaneous annihilation of ignorance, or must a remnant of nescience survive to sustain the physical body?

The Bhāmatī Position: The Theory of the Trace of Ignorance (*avidyā-leśa*)

The Bhāmatī school maintains a conservative realism regarding the liberated state. Because Vācaspati Miśra views ignorance (*avidyā*) as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the physical body, he faces a strict causal dilemma: if the cause (ignorance) were totally destroyed by knowledge, the effect (the body) should instantaneously perish. To resolve the contradiction of a liberated being who continues to live, Vācaspati posits the theory of *avidyā-leśa* (a trace or remnant of ignorance). According to this view, the "living liberated" is not yet entirely free from the clutch of *māyā*. While the dense ignorance that causes rebirth is destroyed, a thin "trace" persists to fuel the *prārabdha karma* that sustains the current body. Consequently, for the Bhāmatī school, the term *jīvanmukti* is used in a secondary or figurative sense (*gauṇārtha*). True, unconditioned liberation is strictly equated with *videhamukti* (liberation after death), which occurs only when the trace of ignorance is finally extinguished along with the collapse of the physical frame. Thus, in this system, the persistence of the body is proof of the persistence of ignorance.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 14, 23, 398, 701; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 16, 103; Andrew O. Fort, *Jīvanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedānta* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 49; Dharmarāja Adhvarin, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Adyar: Adyar Library, 1942), 217. As Potter (EIP XI, 23) notes, the Vivaraṇa school explicitly accepts the doctrine of *avidyā-leśa* (a remnant of ignorance) in the liberated person, a concept also approved by the school of Maṇḍana and Vācaspati (Bhāmatī) to account for the persistence of the body. Since *avidyā* is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of physical existence, its total destruction would necessitate the immediate fall of the body; thus, to explain the "living liberated" (*jīvanmukta*), Vācaspati must posit that a "trace" or impression (*saṃskāra*) of ignorance survives to fuel *prārabdha-karman* (Fort, 49). Consequently, the Bhāmatī school regards *jīvanmukti* as figurative or secondary (*gauṇārtha*): as Potter (EIP XI, 14) observes, for Vācaspati, "liberation while living is impossible" in the strict sense because meditation (*prasaṃkhyāna*) is required until death, implying that true release is *videhamukti*. Suryanarayana Sastri (217) further clarifies that for Maṇḍana (whose views Vācaspati largely adopts), "*jīvanmukti* can be only figurative," as the very existence of a residual trace (*vāsanā*) proves

The Vivaraṇa Position: The Theory of Momentum (*saṃskāra*)

The Vivaraṇa school vigorously defends *jīvanmukti* as a literal and primary state of liberation (*mukhya*). Prakāśātman argues that knowledge is antithetical to ignorance; like light and darkness, the former destroys the latter instantaneously and completely. He rejects the Bhāmatī notion that a "part" of ignorance can survive knowledge, as ignorance is not a composite substance that can be split into a "destroyed portion" and a "remaining trace." To explain the persistence of the body without admitting the persistence of ignorance, the Vivaraṇa school utilizes the analogy of the potter's wheel (*cakrabhramivat*). Just as a wheel continues to spin due to momentum (*saṃskāra*) even after the potter has removed the driving rod, the body continues to function due to the momentum of past action (*prārabdha*), even though the ignorance that created it is utterly destroyed. Thus, the knower is literally and fully liberated here and now. Prakāśātman describes the knower's experience using the metaphor of the "burnt cloth" (*dagdha-paṭa*): just as a cloth consumed by fire may retain its weave and shape for a moment but crumbles at a touch, the body continues to appear to the knower but is recognized as unsubstantial ash, ontologically nullified even while biologically active.¹⁷⁸

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* Position

Regarding the status of the liberated being, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* aligns decisively with the later Vivaraṇa tradition by adopting a specific hierarchical definition of liberation that is foreign to the Bhāmatī system.

While the Bhāmatī school operates on a binary distinction where the living knower is always qualified by the "trace of ignorance" (*avidyā-leśa*)—making a hierarchy of living liberation

the persistence of nescience. Thus, the persistence of the body is ontologically linked to the persistence of a fragment of ignorance (Gupta, 16; EIP XI, 701).

¹⁷⁸ Andrew O. Fort, *Jīvanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedānta* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 9, 60–61, 65–66, 71; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 11, Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 23, 396; P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 41; Gerald James Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 275. As Fort (60–61) details, Prakāśātman vigorously defends the immediate and total destruction of ignorance by knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*), rejecting the notion that ignorance itself can survive. To explain bodily persistence, Vivaraṇa employs the concept of *saṃskāra* (momentum/trace) as distinct from *avidyā* itself: just as a potter's wheel (*cakrabhramivat*) continues to spin due to past momentum even after the cause is removed (Larson, 275; Fort, 9), the body persists due to *prārabdha* even though its root cause is destroyed. This allows the school to maintain that the knower is fully liberated (*mukhya*) while living. Prakāśātman and his followers further illustrate this with the "burnt cloth" (*dagdha-paṭa*) analogy (Potter, EIP XI, 396; Fort, 66): the body of the *jīvanmukta* is like a cloth consumed by fire that retains its shape but lacks substantiality (*satyatva*), appearing to the knower as "burnt" and incapable of binding, unlike the "real" cloth seen by the ignorant. Roodurmun (41) confirms that for Prakāśātman, even the apparent object is produced from this *anirvacanīya* source for the sake of fruitful activity (*arthakriyā*), but is recognized as metaphysically cancelled. Appayya Dīkṣita (Fort, 71) classifies this Vivaraṇa view as defining the trace (*avidyā-leśa*) not as a part of ignorance, but as a *saṃskāra* or form (*ākāra*) that lingers like the smell in an empty garlic pot.

logically impossible—the *Māyāvivarāṇa* explicitly adopts the fourfold classification formalized by Vidyāraṇya in his *Jīvanmuktiviveka*.

The text classifies knowers into four grades based on their level of mental absorption:

1. *brahmavid* (knower)
2. *brahmavid-vara* (excellent knower)
3. *brahmavid-varīyān* (more excellent)
4. *brahmavid-variṣṭha* (most excellent)

Crucially, the text defines the highest grade (*variṣṭha*) as being *videhamukta* (liberated without body), stating:

eteṣāṃ madhye brahmavidvariṣṭha eva videhamuktaḥ | asau variṣṭha eva vṛttiśūnyaḥ | tasya na vidhir na niṣedhaś ca |

"Among these... it is only the most excellent knower who is [termed] *videhamukta* (liberated without body). That most excellent [knower] is indeed free from all mental activity (*vṛttiśūnya*). For him, there is neither injunction nor prohibition."

This passage serves as the definitive structural proof of the text's affiliation, establishing that *videhamukti* is here redefined not as a biological event of death, but as a psycho-intellectual state accessible to the living. This interpretation becomes undeniable when placed against the structural map of the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, where Vidyāraṇya explicitly correlates these four types of knowers with the last four of the seven stages of gnosis (*sapta-bhūmikā*).¹⁷⁹ In this scheme, the *brahmavid* corresponds to the fourth stage (*sattvāpatti*), while the *variṣṭha* ascends to the seventh and final stage of "transcendence" (*turyagā*). By defining the *variṣṭha* as *vṛttiśūnya* ("void of mental modifications"), the *Māyāvivarāṇa* locates him precisely in this seventh stage, where the mind is dissolved (*manonāśa*) and the perception of the external world is entirely absent. Significantly, Vidyāraṇya categorizes even this highest stage of 'transcendence' strictly within the domain of *jīvanmukti*—liberation while living—stating explicitly that "the three stages beginning from the fifth are only sub-divisions of *jīvanmukti*."¹⁸⁰

The text validates the unique status of the *variṣṭha* by contrasting him with the lower three grades. Regarding the lower grades, the text clarifies that although they are technically "not bound" (*na tu niyamyate*) by injunctions due to the majesty of their knowledge, their active minds compel them to participate in worldly dealings (*vyavahāra*); thus, they "should remain established in righteous conduct for the welfare of the world." The *variṣṭha*, conversely, is distinguished by the total cessation of such transaction. This aligns perfectly with Vidyāraṇya's analysis: he asserts that the description of the sage who is utterly oblivious to the body applies "only with reference to the condition of such a *yogin* [the *variṣṭha*/7th stage]."¹⁸¹ Because such a sage has transcended the agency required for self-

¹⁷⁹ Vidyāraṇya, *The Jīvan-Mukti-Viveka: The Path to Liberation-in-this-Life*, ed. and trans. S. Subrahmanya Sastrī and T. R. Śrīnivāsa Ayyangar (Adyar: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1935), 170.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 172.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 173.

preservation—let alone social duty—the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* explains that his body is sustained not by voluntary effort, but by the "vital breath introduced by the supreme Lord."¹⁸² Vidyāraṇya explicitly compares this state to that of a "drunkard, blind with intoxication" (*matto-unmatta-vat*), who, though physically alive, remains oblivious to whether his clothes are on or off.¹⁸³ As Sanjukta Gupta confirms, in this state "God keeps him alive and well while the ordinary physical functions are discharged with the help of others."¹⁸⁴

This profound absorption provides the philosophical justification for the terminology. As Gupta notes regarding Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (who follows this same lineage), "even this seventh stage can be called *videha-mukti*, insofar as the *jīvanmukta* has no consciousness of his physical body and surroundings." Because the pluralistic world has become non-existent to him, "the existence and non-existence of the physical body do not feel any different to the *jīvanmukta*,"¹⁸⁵ rendering the biological status irrelevant to his liberation.

Thus, when the *Māyāvivaraṇa* titles this highest knower *videhamukta*, it does so not because he is physically dead, but because he is subjectively dead to the world. By placing him at the summit of a hierarchy of knowers, the text fundamentally rejects the binary logic of the Bhāmatī school—where *videhamukti* implies the total erasure of the individual at death—and instead embraces the yogic-Advaita synthesis of Vidyāraṇya. Here, the "bodiless" liberation is the limit-case of the living *yogin*: one who retains the physical form required to be ranked as a "knower," yet possesses a mind so utterly dissolved that the body, for him, has ceased to exist.

3 - Comparative Exclusions: Defining the Text by Negation

I. Terminological Clarification: The Post-Polemical Use of *cidābhāsa*

Before delineating the text's doctrinal rejections, a precise clarification is necessary regarding its terminology. In a single, isolated instance within the discussion on the individual self, the author employs the term *cidābhāsa* ("reflection of consciousness"):

...tattadantaḥkaraṇaviśiṣṭacidābhāsā eva bhānti... ("...they appear as reflections of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) specific to each thinking faculty...")

From a strict doxographical perspective, this lexeme signals the Vārttika school of Sureśvara, for whom the *ābhāsa* was a technical category of specific ontological weight. However, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* frames this term within the diagnostic locative *pratibimbapakṣe* ("in the theory of reflection"), explicitly equating the *cidābhāsa* with the water-Sun analogy (*jala-sūryaka*).

¹⁸² Ibid., 169.

¹⁸³ Ibid. (quoting *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.13.36)

¹⁸⁴ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 117.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 118.

This juxtaposition—using a Vārttika term to illustrate a Vivaraṇa analogy—constitutes a decisive chronological marker. In the pre-Vidyāraṇya era (c. 8th–12th centuries), employing *cidābhāsa* as a synonym for *pratibimba* was systematically avoided due to conflicting ontological commitments. As Sanjukta Gupta observes, the early tradition was sharply divided: the *ābhāsa* of Sureśvara was defined as a "semblance" or "phantom" (*chāyā*), distinct from the real and essentially false (*mithyā*); conversely, the *pratibimba* of the Vivaraṇa school was defined as a "reflection" identical to the prototype (*bimba*) and therefore real (*satya*).¹⁸⁶ In this early polemical context, using the term "semblance" (*ābhāsa*) to describe the cognitive agent would have constituted a concession that the agent is illusory—a position the Vivaraṇa school strictly denied.

The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, however, belongs to a later milieu where this polemical boundary had eroded. This is evidenced by the way late-Advaita authors began to prioritize the defense of "mirror theories" (reflection and semblance) against the rival "pot theory" (*avaccheda-vāda*). In his study of the 19th-century manual tradition, Michael Allen observes that the terms eventually reached a state of functional identity; despite any lingering negative connotations of "falsity" associated with the word *ābhāsa*, it came to fulfill "exactly the same role as a reflection of consciousness" (*pratibimba*) within the practical logic of the manuals.¹⁸⁷

The precedent for this usage is established by the seminal manuals of this synthetic era. Vidyāraṇya, the great harmonizer, effectively merged the vocabularies in the *Pañcadaśī*. In the *Kūṭastha-dīpa* (8.32), he declares that "the reflection is likewise" (*pratibimbataṭhāvidhaḥ*). By defining both *ābhāsa* and *pratibimba* as "partial manifestations" (*iśad-bhāsana*) that "resemble the real entity," Vidyāraṇya stripped the term *ābhāsa* of the negative ontological connotations it carried in the earlier Vārttika tradition.¹⁸⁸

This synthesis is codified even more rigorously by Sadānanda in the *Vedāntasāra* (c. 15th century), which provides the exact template found in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*. Sadānanda effectively bifurcates the terminology based on function.

On the one hand, he retains *cidābhāsa* specifically for the epistemological function of object-cognition. In the sequence leading to verse 178, Sadānanda establishes a functional contrast: while Brahman is "self-luminous" (*svayaṃ-prakāśamāna*) and therefore requires no external light to be known (verse 176), the cognition of inert objects (like a jar) explicitly requires the "reflection of consciousness" (*svagata-cidābhāsa*) to dispel darkness.¹⁸⁹ In

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 84–86. See also p. 91, where Gupta notes that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī later "combined the *avaccheda-vāda* with *ābhāsa-vāda*" and *pratibimba-vāda*, effectively mixing these originally distinct traditions in his *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* framework.

¹⁸⁷ Michael S. Allen, "The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013), 126. Allen observes this functional collapse in the context of Niścaldās's *Ocean of Inquiry*, noting that the terms perform the same role regardless of their etymological baggage.

¹⁸⁸ Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967), 361–62. In the commentary to verse 8.32, Swahananda notes: "Here the author's concern is to show the necessity of postulating *cidābhāsa* to explain the process of cognition. This is done whether *jīva* is taken either as a shadow (*ābhāsa*) of reality or a reflection (*pratibimba*). So he ignores the fine distinction between the two theories, *ābhāsavāda* and the *pratibimba-vāda*."

¹⁸⁹ Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), 102.

verse 178, he writes that the mind "manifests the inert jar by the reflection of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) inherent in it."¹⁹⁰

This usage constitutes a definitive break from the rhetorical strictures of the early period. For Sureśvara, the term *ābhāsa* was a polemical designator, inextricably bound to the concept of error (*mithyā*) and used primarily to flag the illusory nature of the agent. Sadānanda, however, effectively sanitizes the term, employing it as a neutral, technical category. By treating the *cidābhāsa* not as a stigma of falsity but as the functional "light" necessary for valid empirical cognition (*pramā*), Sadānanda adopts the standard Vivaraṇa epistemology while retaining the Vārttika terminology—a hybridization characteristic of the post-Vidyāraṇya manual tradition.

On the other hand, regarding the ontological definition of the *jīva*, he upholds the Vivaraṇa doctrine of identity via the water-Sun analogy. In verse 116, he declares the identity of the individual and cosmic selves (*viśva* and *vaiśvānara*) using the simile of "reflections of the sky in the quantities of water and the lake" (*jalāśaya-jalavad-tadgata-pratibimba-ākāśavacca*).¹⁹¹

By employing *cidābhāsa* for the functional agent of cognition (verse 178) while using *pratibimba* for the ontological identity of the self (verse 116), Sadānanda standardized the "neutralized" terminology. The *Māyāvivaraṇa* adheres strictly to this later convention. It utilizes *cidābhāsa* not to invoke Sureśvara's theory of illusion, but—like Sadānanda—to designate the agentive element (*kartṛtva*) within the intellect. Thus, the presence of the term is not a doctrinal signal of the Vārttika, but a chronological marker of the text's status as a post-Vidyāraṇya manual.

II. Doctrinal Exclusion: The Rejection of Subjective Idealism (*drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda*)

The placement of the *Māyāvivaraṇa* within the early modern period (c. 16th–18th centuries) demands a critical differentiation from the radical idealist current known as *drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda* (the doctrine of perception-as-creation). While germinal forms of subjective idealism existed in earlier Advaita literature—traceable most notably to the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha*—it was not until the late medieval period that this view crystallized into a formidable scholastic rival.

Systematized by Prakāśānanda (c. late 15th–16th century) in his seminal *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda* posits that the universe possesses no existence independent of its cognition (*jñātasattā*). In this paradigm, perception is identical to creation; the world does not await the observer but arises simultaneously with the cognitive modification (*vṛtti*). This doctrine inevitably collapses into *ekajīvavāda* (solipsism of the single self), rendering the distinction between the bound soul (*jīva*) and the creator (*īśvara*) a mere fiction within the dreamer's ignorance.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 65–66.

¹⁹² Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 16–17, 270; Andrew J. Nicholson, *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual*

The repercussions of this radicalism were pervasive, compelling subsequent doxographers to reconfigure the hierarchy of Advaitic theories. Appayya Dīkṣita (16th C.), in his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, legitimized *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* as a valid, albeit advanced, option for the highest aspirant (*uttama-adhikāri*). Similarly, the great dialectician Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th C.), in his *Siddhāntabindu*, acknowledged its logical rigor, famously classifying *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* as the "final conclusion" (*mukhya-siddhānta*) while relegating the realist view to a "provisional acceptance" (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) for novices.¹⁹³

This elevation of subjective Idealism created a bifurcated milieu for authors of the period, who were compelled to choose between the "high road" of solipsism (ideal for immediate ego dissolution) and the "broad road" of realism (necessary for ethical and ritual instruction). The *Māyāvivaraṇa* decisively opts for the latter. In doing so, it aligns itself with the conservative pedagogy of *sṛṣṭidr̥ṣṭivāda* (creation-then-perception), upholding the provisional empirical realism (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) favored by Śaṅkara. This realism is soteriologically necessary: it validates the objective moral field required for *karma-yoga* and establishes *īśvara* as the independent material cause of the universe, thereby preventing a premature descent into nihilism.¹⁹⁴

History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 61–64; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 87–89. As Dasgupta (II, 17, 270) notes, Prakāśānanda (c. late 16th century) systematized the *dr̥ṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*, drawing inspiration from the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha*, to deny the existence of objects when unperceived (*ajñāta-sattv-ānabhyupagama*). In this view, the existence of the universe is strictly coterminous with its cognition. Nicholson (63) observes that Prakāśānanda is extreme even among Advaitins, reducing the ontological hierarchy to two levels and collapsing the distinction between *anirvacanīya* and *tuccha* (completely unreal), a stance Vijñānabhikṣu labeled "crypto-Buddhist." This radical idealism inevitably leads to *ekajīvanvāda* (solipsism); as Gupta (87–89) explains, in this framework, *īśvara* is removed from the creative process, and the single *jīva* becomes the creator of the universe through its own *avidyā*, rendering the distinction between God and soul a product of imagination.¹⁹³ Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 4, 101–2; vol. 2 (1937), li; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), 256; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 89. Suryanarayana Sastri (I, 4) notes that Appayya Dīkṣita systematically arranges Advaitic views as valid gradations. This legitimation is explicit in the text's structure: the analytical table (I, 101) formally categorizes the doctrine that "*dr̥ṣṭi* is itself *sṛṣṭi*" (sec. 3.72) alongside the conventional view that "*dr̥ṣṭi* is of the created" (sec. 3.8). Furthermore, the index of cited works (II, li) confirms that Appayya integrates Prakāśānanda's *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*—the seminal text of subjective idealism—directly into this doxography (referencing it in sec. 3.72), thereby establishing *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* as a recognized scholastic option. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī similarly validates this view; as Dasgupta (IV, 256) and Gupta (89) explain, Madhusūdana defends *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* against realist objections by arguing that the causal order of the world is comparable to the order seen in dreams. While acknowledging *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* as the final or principal conclusion (*mukhya-siddhānta*) that dissolves the distinction between *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* existence, Madhusūdana retains the conventional view (*sṛṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi*) as a provisional validity to safeguard the empirical coherence of God's creation and the ethical field (Gupta, 89).

¹⁹⁴ Andrew J. Nicholson, *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 63–64; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 89. As Nicholson (64) argues, the *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* view (held by Prakāśānanda) risks reducing the world to a hallucination where "Brahman is not really a cause," whereas the mainstream view (Vācaspati, Vivaraṇa) maintains that Brahman is the cause of an "unreal effect," preserving the causal structure necessary for *vyāvahāra*. Gupta (89) highlights that the *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* approach effaces the difference between the pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*) and the illusory (*prātibhāsika*), a distinction the *Māyāvivaraṇa* implicitly upholds to maintain the validity of *īśvara* as the independent material cause and to support the pedagogical injunctions of the *karma-kāṇḍa*.

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* rejects the solipsistic innovations of the *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* school not through polemics, but through a structural commitment to a cosmological framework incompatible with subjective idealism. The most decisive evidence appears in chapter IV, where the text distinguishes between the cessation of the *jīva*'s body and the persistence of the material world. Unlike the rigorous solipsism (*ekajīvavāda*) of Prakāśānanda, where the dreamer's liberation necessitates the instantaneous annihilation of the cosmos (*sarvamukti*), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* explicitly argues that the elemental substrate remains even after the individual's liberation.

The text states:

***kiṃca [yathā] mṛdi satyām api kulālavayāpārābhāve ghaṭotpattyabhāvaḥ tathā
īśvarasr̥ṣṭapañcabhūteṣu satsv api ātmajñānena karmasu naṣṭeṣu tasya jñāninaḥ śarīraṃ
notpadyate |***

"Furthermore, just as, even when the clay exists, no pot is produced in the absence of the potter's activity, so too, even when the five elements created by *īśvara* are present (*satsv api*), once all *karmas* are destroyed through self-knowledge, no body arises for the wise."

The use of the locative absolute *satsv api* ("even while they exist") attributes an unknown existence (*ajñātasattā*) to the elements, granting them an ontological status independent of the liberated sage's cognition. Crucially, the text qualifies these elements as *īśvarasr̥ṣṭa* ("created by the Lord"). This specific compound preempts any interpretation of the world as a "shared dream" (*nānā-jīva-vāda*) sustained by collective ignorance. In the idealist paradigm, *īśvara* is logically posterior to the *jīva*, existing only as a projection within the dreamer's ignorance; however, by establishing *īśvara* as the antecedent creator of the "stage" prior to the actor's embodiment, the text posits an objective hierarchy in which God precedes the elements, and the elements precede the individual soul (*jīva*). This linear causal order is fundamentally incompatible with the idealist reduction of God to a mere mental projection.

The text solidifies this realist stance by attributing the arising of the body to a specific dual causality:

***yathā [ca] dr̥ṣṭānte mṛdupādānakāraṇaṃ kulālavayāpāro nimittakāraṇaṃ evaṃ
dār̥ṣṭāntike'pi śarīrasya pañcīkṛtabhūtāny upādānaṃ | tattatkarma nimittam ||***

"And as in the analogy the clay serves as the material cause while the potter's activity serves as the efficient cause, so too, in the parallel, the quintuplicated elements are the material cause [of the body] and the respective *karmas* are the efficient cause."

By explicitly designating the elements as the material cause (*upādāna*) and *karman* merely as the efficient cause (*nimitta*), the text enforces a rigid separation between "matter" and "mind" that Idealism seeks to collapse. In the radical simultaneity of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, where "seeing is creating," this distinction is obliterated; *karman* becomes the sole projector of the dream. In contrast, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* validates *karman* as a genuine operative principle functioning within an antecedent, objective order. Moreover, the specific invocation of the

clay-potter analogy (*mṛd-kulāla-dṛṣṭānta*) acts as a doxographical signal, aligning the work with the classical realism of Śaṅkara and Prakāśātman. While a *dṛṣṭiśrṣṭi* theorist would eschew this analogy because it implies a creation temporally prior to perception, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* employs it to establish the world as a "given" field constructed of quintuplicated elements—a structure merely inhabited by the agent, not instantaneously projected by them.

III. Methodological Exclusion: The Rejection of the "New Logic" (Navya-Nyāya)

The final diagnostic marker situated in the text's exclusion of contemporary scholastic norms is its linguistic register. Throughout the Early Modern period (c. 16th–18th centuries), the discourse of Advaita Vedānta underwent a distinct "Navya-Nyāya Turn." As Daniel Ingalls (1951) has demonstrated, this dialectical revolution originated in the northern centers of Mithilā and Navadvīpa. Its rigorous integration into the southern peninsula was driven specifically by the exigencies of polemical warfare initiated by Vyāsātīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta*, a work which effectively "set the intellectual agenda" for the era. This pressure created a visible gradient in the scholarship of the period: while dialecticians like Appayya Dīkṣita and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī were compelled to master the content of the neo-logicians to refute the dualists, it was the later systematizer Dharmarāja Adhvarin who explicitly appropriated the technical syntax of the "new logic" to formally re-define and standardize Advaita epistemology.¹⁹⁵

However, a distinct cleavage remained between this evolving polemical register and the traditional pedagogical methods. While the "avant-garde" of the period began to embrace dense relational chains and terms like "limitor" (*avacchedaka*) and "counter-positive" (*pratiyogin*), the conservative pedagogical stream—to which the *Māyāvivaraṇa* belongs—remained conspicuously devoid of such stylistic apparatus.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 4–6; Michael T. Williams, *Existence and Perception in Medieval Vedānta* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024), 3–4, 36–38; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 2–3, 11–12; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, introduction to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā by Dharmarāja Adhvarin* (Adyar: Adyar Library, 1942), xiii. Ingalls (4–6) identifies Mithilā and Navadvīpa as the centers where Gaṅgeśa (c. 13th C.) and later Raghunātha Śīromaṇi (fl. 1510) revolutionized the method of Indian logic. Williams (3–4, 36–38) argues that the integration of this logic into Southern thought was catalyzed by Vyāsātīrtha, whose *Nyāyāmṛta* became a "governing text" that "set the intellectual agenda" for Early Modern Vedānta. As Gupta (2–3, 11–12) details, this polemical pressure forced Advaitins like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to adopt the "neo-logical style of disputation" to answer the dualists on their own ground. Sastri (xiii) confirms that this trend culminated in Dharmarāja Adhvarin (17th C.), a scholar of weight in both schools, who wrote a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and utilized this expertise to standardize Vedāntic epistemology.

¹⁹⁶ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 124–25; Michael T. Williams, *Existence and Perception in Medieval Vedānta* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024), 8, 94; Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 44; Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 52. Dasgupta (124–25) contrasts the earlier Vedāntic debates with the post-Gaṅgeśa era dominated by "logical formalism." Williams (8) lists the borrowing of terms like "limitor" (*avacchedaka*) and "describer" (*nirūpaka*) as defining features of this "analytic" style. Matilal (52) and Ingalls (44) identify the "counterpositive" (*pratiyogin*) as the central term for defining absence. Williams (94) illustrates the "avant-garde" application of these terms in the dense definitions of illusoriness (*mithyātva*) debated by the scholastic giants. For instance, Vyāsātīrtha formulates Citsukha's definition using the complex

A philological control confirms that this exclusion is not merely lexical, but structural. As Matilal (1968) observes, Navya-Nyāya developed a "property-location language" wherein standard quantification is replaced by a system of "relational abstracts." The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, however, neither employs nor requires this complex syntax. By comparing the text's formulations against the definitions provided by Ingalls and Matilal, we can identify a systematic refusal to engage with the relational terminology that defined the new scholasticism.¹⁹⁷

In the post-Gaṅgeśa Navya-Nyāya register, the 'limitor' (*avacchedaka*) became the universal tool for delimiting the scope of any property. In the context of causality, for instance, a logician would not simply discuss a 'cause,' but would specify the 'limitor of causal-ness' (*kāraṇatā-avacchedaka*) to isolate the exact property residing in the cause.¹⁹⁸ The *Māyāvivaraṇa* ignores this pivotal expedient entirely. In chapter 3, when establishing the causal sequence of the elements, it utilizes the simple ablative case found in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*:¹⁹⁹

***tatra vikṣepasaktir eva sūkṣma ākāśo'bhūt ākāśād vāyuḥ | vāyoragniḥ | agnerāpaḥ |
adbhyaḥ pṛthivī |***

"It is indeed the projecting power that gave rise to subtle space (*sūkṣmākāśa*); from space [arose] air (*vāyu*), from air fire (*agni*), from fire water (*āpas*), [and] from water earth (*pṛthivī*)."

From the standpoint of the new logic, this formulation is radically under-specified,

relational chain *svasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratīyogitvam* ("being the counterpositive of a constant absence, which constant absence shares a common locus with that thing itself"). Williams (94) further notes that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in the *Advaitasiddhi*, adopts Vyāsatīrtha's technical re-analysis of this definition: *svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva pratīyamānatvam* ("[something's] being experienced only in the locus of its own constant absence").

¹⁹⁷ Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1; Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 32, 52. Ingalls (1) characterizes Navya-Nyāya by its "unusual power of abstraction" and its method of "universalizing" without quantifiers like 'all' or 'some.' Instead, as Matilal (32, 52) observes, the system employs a technical "property-location language" relying on "relational abstracts" such as "conditioner-ship" (*nirūpakatā*) and "limitor-ship" (*avacchedakatā*) to precisely map the relations between entities, a structural complexity entirely absent in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*.

¹⁹⁸ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 160; Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1; Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 56; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā by Dharmarāja Adhvarin* (Adyar: Adyar Library, 1942), 202–3. As Ingalls (1) notes, the new logic "does not distinguish names from descriptions," but "it distinguishes the entities that describe from the entities described," necessitating precise abstract terms. Matilal (56) explains that to define a property without circularity, one must specify the "limitor" (*avacchedaka*) that determines the scope of the relation. In the context of causality, Sastri (202–3) highlights that while the Vedāntins appeal to "potency" (*śakti*), the Logicians reject this extra-logical category, seeking explanation instead in the "nature of things" (*svabhāva*) or invariable antecedence. However, as Dasgupta (160) details, older dialecticians like Citukha demonstrated that without a precise determinant, definitions based on mere antecedence fall prey to logical faults, such as the "washerman's ass" being mistaken for a cause of fire.

¹⁹⁹ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1.

containing no reference to causal efficacy (*kāraṇatā*) nor any attempt to isolate the specific property of space that produces air. This avoidance of causal formalism is consistent throughout the text. In chapter 4, when identifying the cause of the physical body, the author states simply: *karmasahitāny eva śārīrasya kāraṇāni* ("It is only the [elements] conjoined with *karman* that serve as the cause of the body"). For a Navya-Naiyāyika, such a broad causal assertion would be vague. This typically requires distinguishing the elements' 'material causality' (*upādāna-kāraṇatā*) from the instrumental role of *karman*. Similarly, in chapter 5, the text attributes 'instigating power' to attachment (*rāgāder eva... prerakatvaṃ*) using a simple genitive. This approach sidesteps the technical precision of Navya-Nyāya. In that tradition, one would typically use an *avacchedaka* (delimiter) to define *prerakatva*, thereby distinguishing instigation from agency.

This linguistic conservatism is equally pronounced in the logic of negation. Matilal demonstrates that for the new Logic, an absence (*abhāva*) is not a simple term but a relation involving two distinct entities: the "counterpositive" (*pratiyogin*), which is the object negated, and the "subjunct" (*anuyogin*) or locus where the absence resides. Ingalls confirms that in this system, "all relations... are conceived as subsisting between two terms," specifically the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin*.²⁰⁰ The *Māyāvivaraṇa* bypasses this dyadic structure completely, treating negation not as a relational abstraction but as a grammatical predicate. Evidence of this non-relational syntax appears in various doctrinal contexts. In Chapter 1, the text describes the realization that the effect is non-existent using standard predication: *kāraṇavyatirekeṇa kāryaṃ nāstīti* ("Without the cause, the effect does not exist"). Here, the negated object (*kārya*) serves simply as the grammatical subject of the verb "is not" (*nāstīti*), rather than functioning as the technical *pratiyogin* (counterpositive) of a relational absence. Similarly, when denying that the self is the agent of action (chapter 5), the text avoids defining the self as the "locus" (*anuyogin*) of an absence. Instead, it employs a simple genitive construction: *evam ātmanah kartṛtvaṃ kārayitṛtvaṃ ca nāstīti* ("Thus... the self has neither agency (*kartṛtva*) nor instigation (*kārayitṛtva*)"). If formalized in the Navya-Nyāya register, such a negation would be analyzed by defining the self as the *anuyogin* of the *atyantābhāva* of agency. The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, however, does not articulate this technical machinery, identifying the locus through the intuitive genitive case (*ātmanah*) and treating the negation as a direct doctrinal realization (*niścaya*) rather than a relational abstract.

Finally, the text does not employ the "relational abstracts" essential for the semantic analysis of cognition. Matilal notes that Navya-Nyāya classifies "content-ness" (*viśayatā*), "qualifier-ness" (*prakāratā*), and "describer-ship" (*nirūpakatva*) as the technical constituents of a judgment. In this system, a cognition is defined as a "describer" (*nirūpaka*) of a specific "content-ness" (*viśayatā*), which is further analyzed into a "qualifier-ness" (*prakāratā*)

²⁰⁰ Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 52; Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 44, 57. Matilal (52) explains that in Navya-Nyāya, "pure negation" is not accepted; an absence is always an "absence of something," and this object of denial is technically termed the "counterpositive" (*pratiyogin*). Ingalls (44, 57) confirms that this system conceives of negation as a relation "subsisting between two terms," specifically the *pratiyogin* (counterpositive) and the *anuyogin* (subjunct). Consequently, on this view, a formal definition of absence must specify a "counterpositive... limited by the limiter... and by the limiting relation of the *sādhyā*," thereby replacing simple predicative negation with a rigorous dyadic structure.

resident in the adjective.²⁰¹ The text defines the means to liberation simply as *brahmajñānāt* ('through knowledge of Brahman'). By using this basic *tatpuruṣa* compound, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* avoids the complex Navya-Nyāya syntax that would frame cognition as the describer (*nirūpaka*) of an objecthood delimited by Brahman-ness. Moreover, the text speaks of the 'enjoyment of objects' (*viśayabhoga*) by listing concrete entities like garlands and sandalwood, treating the object (*viśaya*) simply as the material target of experience. This bypasses the epistemological formalism of Navya-Nyāya, which would typically analyze such an experience not merely as contact with an object, but as a cognition determined by a specific 'content-ness' (*viśayatā*). In addition, it describes attributes using simple adjectives—such as *bahuprakāra* ("many kinds")—without resorting to the meta-language of 'qualifier-ness' (*prakāratā*) that logicians use to map the internal structure of such judgments. Admittedly, the Navya-Nyāya lexicon extends well beyond the categories examined here. Yet, the specific terms absent in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*—namely the structural determinants (such as the *avacchedaka* and *nirūpaka*), the dyadic logic of negation (*anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*), and the relational abstracts of cognition (*viśayatā* and *prakāratā*)—constitute the irreducible core of the scholastic method. As Matilal notes, these specific concepts functioned as the pivotal "expedient" required to disambiguate truth conditions in the absence of formal quantification;²⁰² their total omission, therefore, signals not merely a lexical gap, but the rejection of the fundamental syntax required for neo-logical argumentation.

This 'methodological silence' regarding the era's dominant intellectual fashion confirms the text's specific orientation. The absence of Navya-Nyāya terminology in the *Māyāvivaraṇa* is likely a deliberate pedagogical choice. By avoiding the rigid technical framework of the new logic, the author has ensured the text's accessibility, aligning with the opening declaration that it is composed 'for the benefit of beginners' (*bālānām upakārāya*).

4 - Historical Triangulation: Chronology, Doxography, and the Theistic Synthesis

²⁰¹ Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 16, 29; Michael T. Williams, *Existence and Perception in Medieval Vedānta* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024), 8. Matilal (16) details how Navya-Nyāya analyzes cognition through the category of "content-ness" (*viśayatā*), which is a complex composed of "three different denominations," most notably "qualifier-ness" (*prakāratā*) and "qualificand-ness" (*viśeṣyatā*). Furthermore, Matilal (29) illustrates that these elements form a complex structure defined by the "conditioner-conditioned" relation (*nirūpya-nirūpakabhāva*); for instance, a cognition is described as having a qualificand-ness that is "conditioned" (*nirūpita*) by a specific "qualifier-ness" (*prakāratā*). Williams (8) confirms that the use of such terms, specifically "describer" (*nirūpaka*), constitutes the distinct "analytic" style of the period which the text in question eschews.

²⁰² Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 80; Michael T. Williams, *Existence and Perception in Medieval Vedānta* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024), 8; Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 44. Matilal (80) explicitly identifies these "relational abstracts"—specifically "limitorship" (*avacchedakatva*) and "counterpositive-ness" (*pratiyogitā*)—as the "expedients" developed to resolve the ambiguities inherent in non-quantified language. Ingalls (44) confirms that this system necessitates a "dyadic" view where relations subsist strictly between two terms (e.g., the *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*). Williams (8) similarly characterizes the "new, highly analytical style" of the period (exemplified by Vyāsātīrtha) specifically by the borrowing of Navya-Nyāya terms—listing *avacchedaka* ("determiner"), *nirūpaka* ("describer"), and *vyāpti* ("pervasion")—which served to "quantify relations precisely."

I. The Reception of the Vidyāraṇya Synthesis: The Structural Redefinition of the *jīva*

This chapter presents a comprehensive philological analysis demonstrating the textual dependence of the *Māyāvivarāṇa* upon one foundational text of the later Advaita tradition: the *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka*. Through a synoptic comparison of the Sanskrit source material, this analysis reveals a pattern of verbatim appropriation, structural mirroring, and deliberate terminological synthesis that situates the *Māyāvivarāṇa* decisively within the post-Vidyāraṇya scholastic period.

The primary diagnostic marker for this classification is the text's adherence to the "tripartite soul" (*jīva-traya*) typology. While earlier Vedāntic literature, including Śaṅkara's commentaries, discussed the three states of consciousness (*avasthā-traya*), the terms *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* were traditionally used as predicates of existence (*sattā*) regarding the external world. The crystallization of these terms into a rigid classification of the soul itself—dividing the *jīva* into absolute, empirical, and illusory modes of self-identification—is a specific innovation that standardizes in the *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka* (presumed 14th c.).²⁰³

Part I: The Structural Architecture and the Threefold *jīva*

The first indicator of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s dependence on the *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka* is found in the taxonomy of the individual soul (*jīva*). While the *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka* introduces the three grades of the *jīva* sequentially across three verses to explain their epistemological relations, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* consolidates these distinct verses into a single, static definition.

The *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka* begins this progression in Verse 40:

***prātibhāsikajīvo yas taj jagat prātibhāsikam | vāstavaṃ manyate'nyas tu mithyeti vyāvahārikah* ||** "He who is the illusory (*prātibhāsika*) *jīva* thinks the illusory world as real, but the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) *jīva* thinks [that world] as unreal."²⁰⁴

It advances the hierarchy in Verse 41:

²⁰³ Lance E. Nelson, "Krishna in Advaita Vedanta: The Supreme Brahman in Human Form," in *Krishna: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 311–12; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 83–84; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 71, 168; Apadeva, *Vedantasara of Sadananda with the Commentary Balabodhini*, ed. and intro. K. Sundararama Aiyar (Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1911), xxxviii–xxxix. As Nelson (311–12) and Aiyar (xxxviii–xxxix) note, Śaṅkara originally used the terms *vyāvahārika* (empirical) and *prātibhāsika* (illusory) as ontological predicates of existence (*sattā*) to distinguish the status of the world and illusory objects from the *pāramārthika* (absolute) reality of Brahman. Gupta (83) confirms that this threefold distinction of *sattā* became standard for describing external reality. However, as Sastri (168) and the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* (71) detail, the *Ḍṛgḍṛśyaviveka* specifically standardized a "three-fold division" (*trividha-pariccheda*) of the *jīva* itself—classifying it into absolute (*pāramārthika*), empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and apparent (*prātibhāsika*) entities—a structural innovation distinct from the earlier usage that applied these terms primarily to the objective world.

²⁰⁴ Swami Nikhilananda, trans., *Ḍṛg-Ḍṛśya Viveka: An Inquiry into the Nature of the 'Seer' and the 'Seen'* (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1931), 56.

vyāvahārikajīvo yas taj jagad vyāvahārikam | satyaṃ pratyeti mithyeti manyate pāramārthikaḥ || "He who is the empirical *jīva* sees this empirical world as real. But the absolute (*pāramārthika*) *jīva* knows it to be unreal."²⁰⁵

Finally, Verse 42 establishes the highest standpoint:

pāramārthikajīvas tu brahmaikyam pāramārthikam | pratyeti vīkṣate nānyad vīkṣate tv anṛtātmanā || "But the absolute *jīva* knows its identity with Brahman to be [alone] absolute. He does not see the other; [if he sees the other] he knows it to be illusory."²⁰⁶

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* extracts these exact headings—stripping away the dialectic of who perceives whom—to present a consolidated list. In the Third *varṇaka*, the text unites the metaphor with the doctrinal terminology:

nanu jīvātmanaḥ kalpitatvāt kalpitasya cāsatyatvāt kathaṃ tasya satyaparamātmābheda iti cet pāramārthiko vyāvahārikaḥ prātibhāsikāś ceti jīvas trividhaḥ | ete jīvāḥ suṣuptijāgratsvapnābhimāninaḥ |

"If [it be asked], "But, since the individual self (*jīvātman*) is imagined, [and] since what is imagined is unreal, how then is there a non-difference between it and the supreme self (*paramātman*)?"—the *jīva* is threefold: the absolute (*pāramārthika*), the empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and the illusory (*prātibhāsika*). These *jīvas* identify themselves [respectively] with [the states of] deep sleep (*suṣupti*), waking (*jāgrat*), and dream (*svapna*)."

Part II: The Water-Wave Analogy (The Metaphorical Substrate)

By adopting this specific metaphor, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* provides a concrete illustration for its anthropology. It effectively equates the "wave" with the "reflected agent" (*cidābhāsa*)—which the text previously defined as the locus of agency distinct from the prototype—thereby establishing a rigid functional homology:

- **Water (*jala*) / *pāramārthika*:** represents the *kūṭastha* (the immutable)—the absolute substrate found in deep sleep. It corresponds to the *bimba* (prototype) which remains intrinsically formless and untouched by the motion of the wave. Notably, whereas the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka*—in the context of the metaphor—substitutes the classification *pāramārthika* with the relational term *sākṣin* (witness), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* explicitly rejects this shift, using instead the compound *kūṭasthapāramārthika*. By doing so, the author employs the specific technical nomenclature of the post-Vidyāraṇya synthesis to define the nature of the substrate, yet—crucially—preserves the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka*'s distinctive taxonomy which locates the absolute within the threefold category of the *jīva*.
- **Wave (*taraṅga*) / *vyāvahārika*:** represents the *cidābhāsa* (reflected consciousness). While the text does not explicitly formulate the sentence "The *vyāvahārika* is the *cidābhāsa*," this identity is established through a strict functional equivalence regarding agency (*kartṛtva*). Earlier, the text defined the *cidābhāsa* as the specific

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 56-57.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 57-58.

locus of agency and enjoyership (*kartṛtva-bhokṛtva*), distinct from the prototype; here, it identifies the *vyāvahārika* specifically with the waking state (*jāgrat*)—the domain where such agency occurs. By depicting the "empirical soul" as a wave—a distinct formation separate from the water, yet substantially nothing but water—the text validates the *cidābhāsa* as a generated entity.

- **Foam (*phena*) / *prātibhāsika*:** represents the illusory self—a fleeting modification resting upon the empirical (*cidābhāsa*), lacking the substantiality of the wave but ultimately grounded in the water.

The direct textual dependence of this homology on the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka* becomes evident when we confront the source verses with the *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s prose. The *Māyāvivarāṇa* collapses two distinct verses of the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka* (43 and 44) into a single synthetic statement.

The *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka* establishes the analogy of attributes (Verse 43) and then applies it to the transfer of *Saccidānanda* (Verse 44):

mādhuryadravaśaityāni nīradharmās taraṅgake | anugamyātha tanniṣṭhe phene'py anugatā yathā || sākṣisthāḥ saccidānandāḥ sambandhād vyāvahārike | tadvāreṇānugacchanti tathaiva prātibhāsike ||

"As such characteristics of water as sweetness, fluidity and coldness appear to inhere in the wave (*taraṅga*), and then also in the foam (*phena*) of which it is the substratum, so also existence, consciousness, and bliss (*saccidānanda*), which reside in the witness (*sākṣin*), appear in the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) [self] due to the connection (*sambandhāt*); and through that [empirical self], they similarly follow into the illusory (*prātibhāsika*) [self]."²⁰⁷

The *Māyāvivarāṇa* mirrors this logic precisely, combining both steps while performing a crucial doctrinal edit:

yathā mādhuryadravaśaityāni paramārthato jalaniṣṭhāny eva santi taraṅge bhānti tadvā phene'pi bhānti tadvat saccidānandāḥ kūṭasthapāramārthikaniṣṭhāḥ santo vyāvahārike bhānti [tadvā ca prātibhāsike] |

"Just as sweetness, fluidity, and coolness (*mādhuryadravaśaityāni*) truly belong only to water, yet appear in the wave and also in the foam, so too existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*), and bliss (*ānanda*), abiding in the immutable absolute self (*kūṭasthapāramārthika*), appear in the empirical self (*vyāvahārika*) [and in the illusory one (*prātibhāsika*) as well]."

This passage reveals two distinct layers of editorial activity. First, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* lifts the specific Sanskrit compound *mādhuryadravaśaityāni* (sweetness, fluidity, and coolness) verbatim. This specific compound formulation is a distinctive signature of the *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka*'s pedagogical method; its appearance here, alongside the striking structural parallel between the passages, suggests that the *Māyāvivarāṇa*'s author was transposing

²⁰⁷ Swami Nikhilananda, trans., *Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka: An Inquiry into the Nature of the 'Seer' and the 'Seen'* (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1931), 59-60.

the verses directly into prose while consulting the source treatise or, at the very least, a commentary that reproduced these specific verses verbatim.

Second, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* demonstrates its synthetic methodology by retaining the *Ḍṛgdr̥śyaviveka*'s verse structure while surgically substituting its subject, *sākṣin* (witness), with the term *kūṭastha* (immutable). While *kūṭastha* is a canonical Vedāntic term found in the *Bhagavad Gītā*,²⁰⁸ its specific deployment here—as the ontological substrate for the *cidābhāsa*—aligns the text with the specific technical register of the post-Vidyāraṇya manuals.²⁰⁹ Crucially, this substitution serves a structural purpose within the analogy. While the *Ḍṛgdr̥śyaviveka* unequivocally identifies the *sākṣin* as the non-dual Brahman, the term 'witness' primarily highlights the *epistemological* function of the self—its role as the illuminator of the changing states. The *Māyāvivarāṇa*, by contrast, adopts the term *kūṭastha* to emphasize the *ontological* status of the self as the changeless substrate. This terminological shift serves to accentuate the substantial aspect inherent in the water-wave metaphor. While the term *sākṣin* effectively captures the epistemological distance of the self, the water analogy emphasizes a substantial relationship: just as water is the constitutive reality of the wave rather than a distinct observer of it, the *kūṭastha* is the immutable ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) upon which the empirical reflection is superimposed.

Furthermore, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* betrays its role as a later systematic adaptation through a distinct structural insertion preceding this attribute argument. In the *Ḍṛgdr̥śyaviveka*, the text leaps directly from the definition of the *jīvas* (verses 40–42) to the transfer of attributes in verse 43. The structural metaphor—that foam sits on a wave, and a wave on water—is presupposed as the substrate for the argument but is not explicitly stated as a premise in the verse itself.

The *Māyāvivarāṇa*, however, inserts a pedagogical bridge immediately preceding the attribute argument:

***yathā jale taraṅgaḥ kalpitaḥ taraṅge ca phenāḥ kalpitaḥ tathā pāramārthike vyāvahāriko vyāvahārike prātibhāsikāś ca kalpitaḥ* | “Just as a wave is imagined in water and foam is imagined in a wave, so too, in the absolute self, the empirical self is imagined, and in the empirical, the illusory self is imagined.”**

This sentence has no direct counterpart in the *Ḍṛgdr̥śyaviveka*'s verses. The insertion performs a necessary doctrinal function: by explicitly premising that the wave is imagined (*kalpita*) in water, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* lexically defines the relationship as superimposition (*vivarta*), thereby blocking the potential interpretation of the wave as a real modification (*pariṇāma*). While the *Ḍṛgdr̥śyaviveka* is undeniably non-dualist in intent, its unmediated

²⁰⁸ *Bhagavad Gītā* 6.8.

²⁰⁹ Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967), 132–34. As Swahananda (132-133) translates, *Pañcadaśī* VI.22 defines the *kūṭastha* specifically through the metaphor of the "anvil" (*kūṭavat*): it is the "immovable" and "immutable" consciousness that serves as the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which the bodies are superimposed. Verses VI.23–24 (133–34) structurally distinguish this immutable ground from the *jīva*, which is defined strictly as the "reflection" (*pratibimbaka*) of the *kūṭastha* in the intellect/nescience. This establishes the *kūṭastha* not merely as a witness, but as the motionless ontological limit (analogous to the *ghaṭākāśa* or pot-space) against which the "mutual superimposition" (*anyonyādhyāsa*) of the transmigrating agent occurs (VI.25).

use of the water-wave analogy may structurally suggest a transformation of substance to an uninitiated reader. The *Māyāvivaraṇa*'s specific addition of the term *kalpita* forces the metaphor to conform strictly to the definition of illusory appearance (*adhyāsa*). This suggests the hand of a posterior systemizer ensuring the pedagogical model aligns with rigid ontological definitions before introducing the transfer of attributes.

Finally, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* concludes its appropriation of the *Dr̥gdr̥śyaviveka* by fusing two distinct verses (45 and 46) into a single logical statement. In doing so, it transforms the source text's sequential description of dissolution (*laya*)—a temporal process occurring in deep sleep or liberation—into a rigid statement of invariable concomitance (*anvaya-vyatireka*).

The *Dr̥gdr̥śyaviveka* establishes the metaphor in verse 45, describing the physical merging of attributes:

laye phenasya taddharmā dravādyaś syus taraṅgake | tasyāpi vilaye nīre tiṣṭhanty ete yathā purā || "With the disappearance of the foam (in the wave), its characteristics such as fluidity etc. merge in the wave; again, with the disappearance of the wave in the water, these characteristics merge, as before, in the water."²¹⁰

Immediately following this, verse 46 applies the metaphor to the hierarchy of the soul, culminating in the *sākṣin* (witness):

prātibhāsikajīvasya laye syur vyāvahārike | tallaye saccidānandāḥ paryavasyanti sākṣiṇi || "With the disappearance of the *prātibhāsika jīva* (in the *vyāvahārika jīva*), existence, consciousness, and bliss (which are its characteristics) merge in the *vyāvahārika jīva*. When that also disappears (in *sākṣin*), these characteristics (finally) merge in *sākṣin*."²¹¹

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* synthesizes both verses into a single prose exposition. However, it replaces the temporal concept of "merging" (*laya/vilaya*) with the ontological concept of "non-existence without" (*vinā nāsti*). It also standardizes the terminology, replacing the relational term *sākṣin* with the absolute term *pāramārthika* (which it has previously identified with the *kūṭastha*):

yathā phenas taraṅgaṃ vinā nāsti taraṅgo'pi jalaṃ vinā nāsti jalaṃ tu paramārthabhūtam eva bhāty evaṃ prātibhāsiko vyāvahārikaṃ vinā nāsti vyāvahāriko'pi pāramārthikaṃ vinā nāsti |

"Just as foam cannot exist without (*vinā nāsti*) the wave, and the wave cannot exist without water, while water itself, being the ultimate reality, alone truly is, so too, the illusory (*prātibhāsika*) self cannot exist without the empirical (*vyāvahārika*), nor the empirical without the absolute (*pāramārthika*)."

The textual confrontation presented above establishes that the *Māyāvivaraṇa* is likely not

²¹⁰ Swami Nikhilananda, trans., *Dr̥g-Dr̥śya Viveka: An Inquiry into the Nature of the 'Seer' and the 'Seen'* (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1931), 61.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

an “original revelation” but a scholarly synthesis, operating as a “digest” that navigates between distinct scholastic models. The philological evidence—most notably the verbatim appropriation of the compound *mādhuryadravaśaityāni*—confirms that the author utilized the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* as his primary structural template. By explicitly selecting the “tripartite *jīva*” typology (*jīva-traya*)—a classification distinct from the “quadripartite” division (*jīva-caturvidha*) standardized in the *Pañcadaśī*—the text aligns itself with the pedagogical strategy of the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka*. This adherence to a tripartite structure based on the water-wave analogy is not merely a stylistic choice but a diagnostic marker; as Sastri notes, Appayya Dīkṣita explicitly contrasts the four-fold model of the *Pañcadaśī* against this specific “three-fold division” (*trividha-jīva*), identifying the latter as the hallmark of the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* school.²¹²

However, the text’s relationship with the *Pañcadaśī* is more complex and reveals a deliberate syncretic choice. While the *Māyāvivarāṇa* adopts the *Pañcadaśī*’s signature technical term—*kūṭastha* (immutable)—to define the highest reality, it rejects the *Pañcadaśī*’s taxonomic separation of *kūṭastha* and *jīva*. In the *Pañcadaśī* (chapter VI), Vidyāraṇya rigorously distinguishes the *kūṭastha* from the *jīva*, creating a four-fold ontology where the *kūṭastha* is never classified as a “soul.”²¹³ The *Māyāvivarāṇa*, by contrast, forces this new technical term into the older *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* framework, classifying the *kūṭastha* explicitly as the ‘absolute *jīva*’ (*pāramārthika jīva*)—a specific taxonomic alignment that Sastri identifies as the unique diagnostic marker of the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* school.²¹⁴

This reliance on the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* reinforces the chronological stratification established in earlier chapters, where the text’s dependence on the Vidyāraṇya corpus was demonstrated through its definition of *īśvara* as a reflection and its strict attribution of agency to the *cidābhāsa*—distinct from the *kūṭastha*—in alignment with the *Pañcadaśī* (Section 2.II.1). Moreover, the text’s functional appropriation of the term *cidābhāsa*—diverging from the Vārttika polemic (Section 3.I)—and its adoption of the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*’s specific hierarchy of liberation, which reclassifies the *variṣṭha* knower as a living *videhamukta* (Section 2.V), anchor the *Māyāvivarāṇa*’s status as a post-14th-century text.

II. Stratigraphy of the *śaḍvidhaliṅga*: Internal Indicators Suggesting the Posteriority of the *Māyāvivarāṇa* vis-à-vis the *Vedāntasāra*

²¹² Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 162–163, 168; Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967), 131. As Sastri (168) notes, Appayya Dīkṣita explicitly distinguishes the structural models within the post-Vidyāraṇya tradition. This distinction is grounded in the *Pañcadaśī* itself, where Vidyāraṇya (VI.18; Swahananda, 131) explicitly codifies the “quadripartite” model (*cic-caturvidhā*), defining the self as *kūṭastha*, Brahman, *jīva*, and *īśvara*, analogous to the four ethers (*ghaṭākāśa*, *mahākāśa*, *jalākāśa*, and *abhrākāśa* or cloud-ether). In contrast to this four-fold division established in the *Citradīpa* (chapter VI), Sastri observes that the *Dṛgdrśyaviveka* school “adheres to the teaching of a three-fold division” (*trividha-jīva*) based on the analogy of “the sheet of water, waves, and bubbles” (*jalataraṅgabudbudanyāyena*).

²¹³ Ibid., 70. Sastri details the “*Citradīpa* distinction of four forms,” which rigorously distinguishes the *kūṭastha* (the substrate) from the *jīva* (the reflection), thereby excluding the former from the category of the soul.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 71. In sharp contrast to the *Citradīpa*, Sastri notes that the “*Dṛgdrśyaviveka* includes *kūṭastha* under *jīva*,” classifying the soul into three kinds: absolute (*pāramārthika*), empirical (*vyāvahārika*), and apparent (*prātibhāsika*).

The manner in which the two texts incorporate the canonical *ṣaḍvidhaliṅga* verse establishes their relative pedagogical stances. While the core verse is identical, the framing differs significantly, revealing a shift from independent definition to axiomatic commentary.

In the *Vedāntasāra* (15th century), Sadānanda introduces the list first through its own prose definition, utilizing the particle *tu* (indeed/but) to mark a transition to a new topic. It presents its own prose as the primary definition—the "sūtra" of the discussion:

Vedāntasāra 183:

liṅgāni tūpakramopasaṃhārābhyāsōpūrvatāphalārthavādopapattiyākhyāni || "The characteristic signs are: the beginning and the conclusion, repetition, originality, result, eulogy, and demonstration."²¹⁵

Only subsequently does it provide the verse to validate its definition with traditional authority:

Vedāntasāra 184:

tad uktam upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāsōpūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye || "Thus it has been said: 'In ascertaining the meaning, the characteristic signs are the beginning and the conclusion, repetition, originality, result, eulogy, and demonstration.'"²¹⁶

The *Māyāvivarāṇa*, conversely, leads with the verse itself. By following the verse immediately with *iti vacanena* ("by this statement"), the text treats it not as a supporting citation, but as the primary injunction or axiom from which the teaching must proceed:

Māyāvivarāṇa:

upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāsōpūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye || ***iti vacanena ṣaḍvidhaliṅgais tātparyanirṇayaḥ kartavyaḥ*** | "'The beginning and conclusion, repetition, novelty, result, eulogy, and reasoning are the indicatory marks for discerning the intended purport.' By this statement (*vacana*), the ascertainment of purport is to be made through the sixfold indicators (*ṣaḍvidhaliṅga*)"

While the *Vedāntasāra* offers the verse as corroborating proof for its own lesson, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* takes the verse as the textual basis for the lesson. This highlights a functional divergence: the *Vedāntasāra* operates as an instructional manual (*prakaraṇa*), constructing definitions from the ground up, whereas the *Māyāvivarāṇa* occasionally treats the verse as an already established principle and focuses on applying it rather than explaining it from the beginning. A detailed comparison of the exposition of the six signs suggests that the *Māyāvivarāṇa* presupposes the definitions established by the *Vedāntasāra*, often adding specific polemical or scholastic glosses that indicate a later date of composition.

I. *upakrama-upasaṃhāra* (the beginning and the conclusion)

²¹⁵ Sadananda Yogindra, *Vedāntasāra: The Essence of Vedānta*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1997), 104.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

The *Vedāntasāra* acts as a manual, providing the abstract definition first. The *Māyāvivaraṇa* skips the definition entirely, moving directly to the specific application in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

Vedāntasāra 185:

prakaraṇapratipādyasyārthasya tadādyantayor upapādanam upakramopasaṃhārau | yathā chāndogye śaṣṭhādhyāye prakaraṇapratipādyādvitīyavastuna ekam evādvitīyam ityādau aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam ityante ca pratipādanam || "The 'beginning and conclusion' (*upakrama-upasaṃhārau*) constitute the presentation of the subject matter to be established in a section at its beginning and its end. Just as in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: the presentation of the non-dual reality (*advitīya-vastu*)—which is the subject matter to be established in that section—occurs in the beginning with the words 'One only, without a second' (*Ch. Up. 6.2.1*), and at the end with the words 'All this has that as its self' (*Ch. Up. 6.8.7*)."²¹⁷

Māyāvivaraṇa:

atra chāndogyāśaṣṭhādhyāye sad eva soṃyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyaṃ ity upakramyaitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ ity akhaṇḍaikaṛasa evopasaṃhṛtaṃ ity upakramopasaṃhāraikaṛūpyam ekaṃ liṅgam | "Here, for instance, in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, [the teaching] begins with the text, "O gentle one, in the beginning, this was being alone, one only, without a second", and concludes with, "All this has the nature of that; that is the truth." [The teaching] is concluded as being of a single, undivided essence. Thus, the uniformity of the beginning (*upakrama*) and conclusion (*upasaṃhāra*) is one indicator [for determining the intended purport]."

II. *abhyāsa* (repetition)

The contrast is starkest here. The *Vedāntasāra* bears the burden of defining the criteria for the category: it specifies that *abhyāsa* is not merely repetition, but the "frequent presentation of the subject matter" (*prakaraṇapratipādyasya... pratipādanam*). The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, conversely, provides no definition whatsoever. It functions as a checklist, merely identifying the specific instance ("occurs nine times").

Vedāntasāra 186:

prakaraṇapratipādyasya vastunas tanmadhye paunaḥpunyena pratipādanam abhyāsaḥ | yathā tatraivādvitīyavastuni madhye tat tvam asīti navakṛtvaḥ pratipādanam || "Repetition (*abhyāsa*) is the frequent presentation of the subject matter to be established in a section within that [section itself]. As, for instance, in the same section, the presentation regarding the non-dual reality (*advitīya-vastu*) occurs nine times with the statement, 'that thou art' (*tat tvam asi*)."²¹⁸

Māyāvivaraṇa:

tat tvam asīti navakṛtvas tasyaivābhyāso dvitīyam | "The statement "that thou art" (*tat tvam asi*) occurs nine times; its repetition (*abhyāsa*) constitutes the second [indicator]."

²¹⁷ Ibid., 105.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 105-106.

III. *apūrvatā* (novelty/originality)

In the definition of "novelty," the *Māyāvivaraṇa* exhibits the characteristics of a glossator clarifying a source text. Whereas the *Vedāntasāra* relies on the generic category *mānāntara* ("other means of knowledge"), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* explicitly concretizes this as *pratyakṣādi* ("beginning with perception").

Vedāntasāra 187:

prakaraṇapratipādyasyādviṭīyavastunaḥ pramāṇāntarāviśayīkaraṇam apūrvatā | yathā tatraivādviṭīyavastuno mānāntarāviśayīkaraṇam | | "Originality (*apūrvatā*) consists in the non-dual reality—which is the subject matter to be established in the section—not being an object of any other means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Just as in that very section [of the *Chāndogya*], the non-dual reality is not made known through any other proof [such as perception or inference]." ²¹⁹

Māyāvivaraṇa:

akhaṇḍaikarasasya pratyakṣādīpramāṇāntarāviśayatvam apūrvatā tṛtīyam | "The fact that the one, undivided essence is not an object of any other means of knowledge, beginning with perception (*pratyakṣādi*), represents novelty (*apūrvatā*), the third [indicator]."

IV. *phala* (result)

The treatment of the "result" (*phala*) provides clear evidence of doctrinal layering. The *Vedāntasāra* remains faithful to the Śruti, content to repeat the Upaniṣadic wording almost verbatim. In contrast, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* injects specific technical terminology (*videhakaivalya* and *prārabdhakarma*) to make the scriptural claim more doctrinally precise.

Vedāntasāra 188:

phalaṃ tu prakaraṇapratipādyasyātmajñānasya tadanuṣṭhānasya vā tatra tatra śrūyamāṇaṃ prayojanaṃ | yathā tatra ācāryavān puruṣo veda tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye'tha sampatsya ity adviṭīyavastujñānasya tatprāptiḥ prayojanaṃ śrūyate | | "The result (*phala*) is the purpose heard in various places regarding the self-knowledge which is the subject matter of the section, or regarding its practice. Just as in that [same section], in the words: 'A man who has a teacher knows the Brahman. For him there is delay only as long as he is not liberated [from the body]; then he will merge [with Brahman]' (Ch. Up. 6.14.2)—the purpose is heard to be the attainment of that [Brahman] through the knowledge of the non-dual reality." ²²⁰

Māyāvivaraṇa:

tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye'tha sampatsya ity akhaṇḍaikarasajñānasya prārabdhahogānantaraṃ videhakaivalyarūpaphalavacanaṃ caturtham | "The passage, 'For him, there is delay only so long as [his firm knowledge is]: «I am not yet freed (from the body); then I shall be united (with Brahman),»' expresses the result (*phala*)—[namely,] incorporeal liberation (*videhakaivalya*) immediately after the exhaustion of

²¹⁹ Ibid., 106.

²²⁰ Ibid., 106-107.

prārabdhakarma—arising from the knowledge of the one, undivided essence; this constitutes the fourth [indicator].”

V. *upapatti* (demonstration/reasoning)

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* displays a structural anomaly here: it inverts the traditional order, placing the sixth indicator (*upapatti*) before the fifth (*arthavāda*). This inversion is necessary because the *arthavāda* section has swollen into a massive treatise. Furthermore, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* treats *upapatti* cursorily, assuming the reader already understands the logic of the example, unlike the *Vedāntasāra* which explains it.

Vedāntasāra 190:

prakaraṇapratipādyārthasādhane tatra tatra śrūyamāṇā yuktir upapattiḥ | yathā tatra yathā saumyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syād vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam ityādāv advitīyavastusādhane vikārasya vācārambhaṇamātratve yuktiḥ śrūyate || "Demonstration (*upapatti*) is the reasoning heard in various places for the purpose of establishing the subject matter propounded in the section. Just as in that [same section], in the words: 'Just as, my dear, by one lump of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name arising from speech, while the truth is that it is just clay' (*Ch. Up.* 6.1.4)—reasoning is heard regarding the modification being merely a verbal handle, in order to establish the non-dual reality."²²¹

Māyāvivaraṇa:

yathā somyaikena mṛtpiṇḍenetyādinā dṛṣṭāntakathanaṃ upapattiyākhyam ṣaṣṭham | "The mention of the example, 'O gentle one, it is like this: by knowing a single lump of clay...' and so on, constitutes reasoning, the sixth [indicator]."

VI. *arthavāda* (eulogy)

The most decisive divergence lies in the treatment of *arthavāda*. While the *Vedāntasāra* defines it simply as "praise," the *Māyāvivaraṇa* radically expands it into a "seven-fold system."

Vedāntasāra 189:

prakaraṇapratipādyasya tatra tatra praśamsanam arthavādaḥ | yathā tatraiva uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyo yenāśrutam śrutam bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijñātam ity advitīyavastupraśamsanam || "Eulogy (*arthavāda*) is the praising, in various places, of the subject matter to be established in the section. Just as in that same section [of the *Chāndogya*], the words: 'Did you ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?' (*Ch. Up.* 6.1.3)—constitute the praise of the non-dual reality."²²²

Māyāvivaraṇa:

arthavādas tu pañcamam |
sṛṣṭisthitipralayapraveśasaṃniyamanatattvaṃpadārthasodhanaphalapatipādakā iti

²²¹ Ibid., 107-108.

²²² Ibid., 107.

saptārthavādāḥ... "Eulogy (*arthavāda*) is the fifth. There are seven kinds of eulogies here, which respectively present: creation (*śṛṣṭi*), sustenance (*sthiti*), dissolution (*pralaya*), penetration (*praveśa*), governance (*saṁniyamana*), elucidation of the meanings of the words 'that' and 'thou' (*tattvaṁpadārthaśodhana*), and the declaration of the result (*phalapratiṣṭhā*)..."

This expansion serves to insulate non-duality against the specific epistemological objections that find articulation in texts like the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

The later Advaita tradition faced a critical vulnerability regarding the validity of scripture. As codified in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (17th century), a text is valid *pramāṇa* only if it teaches something novel (*apūrva*). If scripture describes facts already known through perception (such as the physical world), it becomes "repetitive" (*anuvāda*) and thus invalid.²²³

The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (IV.45) explicitly formulates this rule:

tac ca tātparyam vede mīmāṃsāpariśodhitanyāyād evāvadhāryate | loke tu prakaraṇādīnā | tatra laukikavākyānāṁ mānāntarāvagatārthatayā anuvādatvam vede tu vākyārthasyāpūrvatayā nānuvādatvam | |

"And this purport is determined in the Veda only on the basis of principles clearly laid down by the Mīmāṃsā.²²⁴ In ordinary experience, however, it is (determined) by the context (*prakaraṇa*) etc. Of these (two), in the case of statements in worldly experience, because of their sense being known by other evidence, there is repetitive character; in the Veda, however, the sentence-sense being novel, there is no repetitive character."

The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* further refines this in verse IV.46, addressing the specific validity of "accomplished facts" (*siddhārtha*). Against the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, who argue that only "action" (*kārya*) is valid, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* asserts that factual statements—such as "A son is born to you"—are authoritative. Yet, this defense comes with a strict proviso: factual statements are valid only insofar as they possess novelty (*siddhārthānām apy apūrvatayā prāmāṇyam*).

²²³ S. K. Chattopadhyaya, *The Philosophy of Sankar's Advaita Vedanta* (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2000), 141–43. As Chattopadhyaya details, the Advaita position faced severe Pūrvamīmāṃsā objections arguing that if scripture is interpreted as describing an "existential reality" (*bhūtavastu*) rather than enjoining an action (*kārya*), it becomes "redundant and repetitive" (*anuvāda*). The objection posits that since existential objects are decidable by ordinary means (*laukika-pramāṇa*) like perception, scripture loses its status as an extraordinary means of knowledge (*alaukika-pramāṇa*) if it merely restates what is empirically available.

²²⁴ Dharmarāja Adhvarin, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1942), 84. Regarding the text's assertion in verse IV.45 that purport is determined "on the basis of principles clearly laid down by the Mīmāṃsā" (*mīmāṃsāpariśodhitanyāyādevāvadhāryate*), Sastri clarifies in a supplementary note that this specifically denotes the six indicatory marks (*ṣaḍvidhaliṅga*). He explicitly enumerates them as: "(1) harmony of the initial and concluding passages, (2) repetition, (3) novelty of what is taught, (4) fruitfulness, (5) eulogy or condemnation in other passages, and (6) consistency in the light of reasoning" (Ibid., 203, n. 47). Thus, Sastri's annotation serves as textual evidence that the invocation of "Mīmāṃsā" principles in this context is synonymous with the application of the *ṣaḍvidhaliṅga* for establishing textual purport.

This creates a paradox that endangers the Upaniṣads:

1. Brahman is safe: It is an "existent fact" (*siddhārtha*), but because it is invisible to the eye, it remains novel (*apūrva*). It passes the test of verse 46.
2. The world (creation) is trapped: It is also an "existent fact" (*siddhārtha*), but it is known by other means of knowledge (*mānāntara-avagata*), such as perception.

Since the world is already accessible to perception, scriptural accounts of creation (*śṛṣṭi*) inherently fail the strict requirement of novelty (*apūrvatā*)—a standard rigorously maintained in Advaita dialectics and exemplified by texts such as the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Consequently, these narratives risk dismissal as mere *anuvāda* (redundant restatement). The *Māyāvivaraṇa* addresses this intrinsic tension through a strategic expansion of its *arthavāda* section, systematically reclassifying the dualistic portions of the Upaniṣads as eulogy. By stripping these accounts of their status as independent 'accomplished facts' (*bhūtārtha*), the author dismantles the scriptural basis for dualism.

1–3. The Cosmological Triad: Creation (*śṛṣṭi*), Sustenance (*sthiti*), Dissolution (*pralaya*) To neutralize the ultimate ontological status of the world, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* reclassifies cosmogony as *arthavāda*. It states that these texts teach that the world "originates from Brahman alone, abides in Brahman alone, and dissolves into Brahman alone" (*ākāśādeḥ sarvasya brahmaṇy evotpattes tasminn evāvasthānāt tasminn eva layān*). Just as a jar is nothing but clay, these texts indicate that the universe is "nothing but the causal Brahman" (*kāraṇabrahmamātratām*).

4. Penetration/Entry (*praveśa*) Dualists use the text "Having created that, he entered it" to prove the difference between *jīva* and *īśvara*. The *Māyāvivaraṇa* neutralizes this by declaring that "Brahman alone penetrated [creation] in the form of the *jīva*" (*brahmaṇa eva jīvarūpeṇa praveśam*). It employs the analogy of "Devadatta entering a house" (*gr̥he praviṣṭadevadattavat*) to prove that the entry is a metaphor for "non-difference" (*abheda*), not a factual movement of God.

5. Governance (*saṁniyamana*) To deny hierarchical dualism, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* argues that a real ruler-ruled relationship (*niyamanyāmakabhāva*) is "impossible" (*anupapatti*) in non-duality. Therefore, the description of the inner controller establishes "complete non-difference" (*atyantābheda*) rather than a political hierarchy.

6. Elucidation of 'that' and 'thou' (*tattvampadārthaśodhana*) To facilitate the "neti neti" process, descriptions of the body and divine attributes are treated as tools for the "negation of mutually contradictory attributes" (*viruddhadharmanirasana*). This eulogy purges the terms to make intelligible "their oneness alone" (*tayor aikyam eva*).

7. The Result (*phala*) Finally, regarding passages such as "The knower of Brahman attains the supreme," the *Māyāvivaraṇa* treats them as presenting the "unsurpassed fruit" (*niratīśayaphala*). The text states that the function of these promises is to "indicate that non-difference (*abheda*) is the intended purport" (*abhedasya vivakṣitatvaṁ vijñāpayatyas*), confirming that the identity of the self is the primary subject matter.

The internal evidence provided by the comparative analysis of the *ṣaḍvidhaliṅga* offers a compelling case for the posteriority of the *Māyāvivaraṇa* vis-à-vis the *Vedāntasāra*. The divergence between the texts appears to be more than merely stylistic; it likely reflects a systemic shift from a foundational pedagogical phase to a more developed scholastic and polemical phase.

First, the pedagogical stance suggests a chronological hierarchy. The *Vedāntasāra* operates as a legislative manual (*prakaraṇa*), constructing definitions from the ground up to introduce the student to the concepts. In contrast, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* seems to adopt the posture of an advanced gloss (*vṛtti*); the fact that it presupposes definitions—as seen in the lack of explanation for *abhyāsa*—and moves directly to concrete application is consistent with a text refining an established tradition.

Second, the terminological evolution implies a hardening of scholastic categories. The transition in the treatment of the result (*phala*)—from the *Vedāntasāra*'s fidelity to the Upaniṣadic wording to the *Māyāvivaraṇa*'s insertion of specific technical terms like *videhakaivalya* and *prārabdha*—suggests that the *Māyāvivaraṇa* may belong to a later stratum of Advaita that sought to systematize scriptural ambiguities into precise doctrinal mechanics.

Third, structural anomalies within the *Māyāvivaraṇa* may point to the dialectical pressures under which the text was composed. The inversion of the traditional order—placing *upapatti* before *arthavāda*—and the placement of *śravaṇa* at the conclusion of the list (rather than the outset, as it occurs in the *Vedāntasāra*) arguably indicate a text being restructured to accommodate new priorities.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the massive expansion of the *arthavāda* section can be interpreted as a functional response to the epistemological concerns of the Early Modern era. By systematically reclassifying the dualistic "facts" of the Upaniṣads as *arthavāda*, the text neutralizes the realist threat and secures the validity of non-duality.

III. The Doctrinal Divergence of the *Māyāvivaraṇa* from the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*: Key Dimensions of Contrast

To contextualize the *Māyāvivaraṇa* historically and pedagogically, it is useful to compare it with Dharmarāja Adhvarin's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. By integrating the analytic precision of Navya-Nyāya into Advaita epistemology, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* represents one of the most rigorous formulations of seventeenth-century non-dual philosophy. While the two texts diverge in several respects, the present analysis focuses on three areas where their contrast is especially illuminating: the epistemology of immediate realization, the nature of *īśvara*, and the classification of ignorance. By examining how the *Māyāvivaraṇa* refrains from adopting Dharmarāja's highly formalized epistemological structures and instead aligns more closely with post-Vidyāraṇya pedagogical patterns, we can situate it within a comparatively conservative, instruction-oriented strand of early modern Advaita.

1. The Epistemological Divergence: Immediate Revelation vs. Process of Realization

The primary distinction between the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and the *Māyāvivarāṇa* regarding the attainment of knowledge lies in the immediate efficacy of the Vedic sentence (*śabda*). The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* argues that verbal testimony is capable of generating immediate knowledge (*aparokṣajñāna*) directly, provided the object of knowledge is intrinsic to the subject.

Dharmarāja Adhvarin defends the position that the immediacy of knowledge is determined by the object (*prameya*), not the instrument (*karaṇa*). He explicitly refutes the notion that verbal testimony must inherently produce indirect knowledge.²²⁵ Instead, he argues that the criterion for immediacy is whether the object is directly present. Since the self (Brahman) is non-different from the knower, the "great sentences" (*mahāvākyas*) produce direct realization immediately, akin to the sensory perception of the "tenth man," without needing the intermediation of reasoning to change the nature of the knowledge from indirect to direct.

The text first establishes the principle that immediacy is conditioned by the object, not the means of knowledge:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā IX.14:

tatra pūrvācāryāṇām ayam āśayaḥ saṃvidāparokṣyaṃ na karaṇaviśeṣotpattinibandhanam kintu prameyaviśeṣanibandhanam ity upapāditam | "In this (matter) the view of earlier preceptors is thus: the immediacy of cognition is not conditioned by origination through a particular instrument; rather is it conditioned by the particular object of cognition; this has been explained."²²⁶

Based on this principle, the text concludes that knowledge generated by the word (*śabda*) regarding Brahman is immediate:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā IX.15:

tathā ca brahmaṇaḥ pramātrjīvābhinnatayā tadgocaram śabdajanyaṃ jñānam apy aparokṣam | "And thus, Brahman being non-different from the cognising *jīva*, in respect of that as sphere, even word-generated cognition is immediate."²²⁷

This is further supported by the "tenth man" analogy provided earlier in the text:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā I.30:

²²⁵ Dharmarāja Adhvarin, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1942), 157–158. The specific position refuted is articulated in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* IX.16–17: *anyeṣāṃ tv evam āśayaḥ karaṇaviśeṣanibandhanam eva jñānānām pratyakṣatvam na viśayaviśeṣanibandhanam ekasminn eva sūkṣmavastuni paṭukaraṇāpaṭukaraṇayoḥ pratyakṣatvāpratyakṣatvavyavahāradarśanāt | tathā ca saṃvitsākṣāttve indriyajanyatvasyaiva prayojakatayā na śabdajanyajñānasyāparokṣatvam* | "The view of the others, however, is thus: the perceptuality of cognitions is solely conditioned by the instrument; it is not conditioned by the particular content; for, in respect of one and the same subtle object, there is seen the empirical usage of perceptibility and imperceptibility respectively, for those with sensitive and non-sensitive instruments (of cognition). And thus, in respect of the directness (immediacy) of cognition, sense-generation being the sole determinant, there is no immediacy for the word-generated cognition."

²²⁶ Ibid., 156.

²²⁷ Ibid., 156.

iṣṭatvāt daśamas tvam asīty ādau sannikṣṭaviṣaye śabdād apy

aparokṣajñānābhyupagamāt | "For, that is acceptable, since in respect of content in contact, immediate cognition is admitted even from verbal testimony, in 'thou art the tenth' etc."²²⁸

In distinct contrast, as previously highlighted in this chapter, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* posits a graduated epistemological process where the hearing of scriptures (*śravaṇa*) yields only indirect knowledge (*atra gurumukhād vedānta[śravaṇa]janyam parokṣajñānam idam eva śravaṇam*).

2. The Status of *īśvara*: Prototype vs. Reflection

This epistemological difference is matched by a significant divergence in the precise ontological definition of *īśvara* (the Lord) within the framework of reflection theory (*pratibimbavāda*). While both texts utilize the analogy of reflection, they differ fundamentally on the locus of *īśvara*. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* ultimately posits *īśvara* as the prototype (*bimba*), identifying the reflection solely with the *jīva*. The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, following the Vidyāraṇya lineage, posits *īśvara* as a reflection (*pratibimba*) within pure *māyā*, distinct from the *jīva* who is a reflection in impure *avidyā*.

Dharmarāja Adhvarin first considers the opposing view (held by "some") that both *īśvara* and the *jīva* are reflections—*īśvara* being the reflection in the causal adjunct (*māyā*) and the *jīva* in the effect adjunct (*antaḥkaraṇa*).²²⁹ However, he explicitly rejects this view as "unsuitable" (*asvarasa*) because the defects of the adjunct (nescience) would necessarily affect *īśvara* if he were a reflection. Consequently, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* establishes the view that *īśvara* is the prototype (*bimba*), untouched by the medium.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā VIII.60-61:

etanmate avidyākṛtadoṣā jīve iva parameśvare'pi syur upādheḥ pratibimbapakṣapātivāt
| ity asvarasāt bimbatmakam īśvaracaitanyam iti apare | "On this view, the defects due to nescience would, as in the *jīva*, be present in *īśvara* too, because of the adjunct having a leaning to the reflection (i.e., affecting the reflection). Because of this unsuitability, others hold that *īśvara-caitanya* is of the nature of the prototype."²³⁰

Although Dharmarāja attributes this view to "others" (*apare*), it constitutes the accepted doctrine of his text. He validates this position by arguing that only the *bimba* theory ensures that God remains untouched by the flaws of the reflecting medium:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā VIII.62:

upādhikṛtadoṣās ca pratibimbe jīva eva vartante na tu bimbe parameśvara upādheḥ
pratibimbapakṣapātivāt | "The defects caused by the adjuncts exist only in the reflection,

²²⁸ Ibid., 17.

²²⁹ Ibid., 135-136 (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* VIII.58).

²³⁰ Ibid., 136-137.

the *jīva*, but not in the prototype, *parameśvara*, since the adjunct has a leaning to (i.e., affects) the reflection (alone)."²³¹

Furthermore, Dharmarāja defends this *bimba* view against the objection that a prototype cannot be present within the reflection (and thus could not be the inner ruler).²³² He resolves this by asserting that *īśvara* is a pervasive prototype (like the ether/sky) rather than a limited one, thereby confirming his adherence to the *bimba* doctrine:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā VIII.64:

paricchinnabimbasya pratibimbadeśāsambandhe'py aparicchinnabrahmabimbasya pratibimbapradeśāsambandhāvirodhāt | "(It follows that) though for a finite prototype there is no relation to the locality of the reflection, there is no conflict in there being for the infinite prototype, Brahman, relation to the locality of the reflection."²³³

In contrast, as previously demonstrated in this chapter, the *Māyāvivarāṇa* adopts a structural hierarchy where *īśvara* is explicitly identified as a reflection. Rather than removing him from the medium to preserve his purity (as the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* does), the *Māyāvivarāṇa* safeguards his purity by defining his specific adjunct (*māyā*) as "predominated by pure *sattva*" (*śuddhasattvapradhānā*). Thus, the text defines the Lord as the reflection within that pure medium (*tatra pratibimbitaṃ... brahmacaitanyam īśvara ity ucyate*), rendering him the reflected consciousness rather than the absolute prototype.

3. The Ontological Status of Nescience: Unity vs. Functional Stratification

While both texts trace causality to a source composed of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*), they diverge sharply on the causal mechanism. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* adheres to a strict doctrine of parsimony (*lāghava*), asserting that *māyā* is a singular entity identical to *avidyā*, composed of three *guṇas*, from which the elements result directly. Dharmarāja Adhvarin explicitly establishes this oneness (*ekatva*) of *māyā* based on the singular number used in scripture. He argues that instances where scripture uses the plural (e.g., "Indra through *māyās*") do not imply distinct ontological substances (like a separate *māyā* vs. *avidyā*), but rather refer to the diverse powers or the three *guṇas* inherent within the single *māyā*.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā I.71-72:

tac caikam tadupādhibhūtamāyāyā ekatvāt | ... māyābhir iti bahuvacanasya māyāgataśaktiviśeṣābhīprāyatayā māyāgatasattvarajastamorūpaguṇābhīprāyatayā vopapatteḥ | "And that is one, because of the oneness of *māyā*, which is its qualification per accidens. ...the plural 'through *mayās*' is intelligible either on the view of the diverse capacities (*śaktis*) present in *māyā*, or on the view of the *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, present in *māyā*."²³⁴

²³¹ Ibid., 137.

²³² Ibid., 137-138 (*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* VIII.63).

²³³ Ibid., 138.

²³⁴ Ibid., 31.

Crucially, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* maintains that the physical elements are produced directly from this single *māyā*. It defines *māyā* as *triguṇātmikā*—constituted by the three *guṇas*—and asserts that the elements themselves possess all three *guṇas* because they are products of this aggregate cause.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā VII.23:

imāni bhūtāni triguṇamāyākāryāṇi triguṇāni | guṇāḥ sattvarajastamāṃsi | "These elements, the products of *māyā* of three *guṇas*, are (themselves) of three *guṇas*. The *guṇas* are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*."²³⁵

As clarified in the commentary, the *guṇas* are not mere attributes but are constitutive of *māyā*. Unlike the Sāṅkhya system, where elements evolve from *ahaṅkāra*, the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* explicitly defines the elements as "products of *māyā*" (*māyākāryāṇi*), implying a direct causal link. The commentary on this verse supports this reading, contrasting it with Sāṅkhya to affirm that here "the elements result straight from *māyā*,"²³⁶ thereby confirming *māyā* (the aggregate) as the immediate material cause. It follows that the subtle elements themselves possess all three *guṇas* (VII.23). The differentiation of cosmic products arises only *from* these pre-existing subtle elements: the senses (*indriyas*) and mind (*manas*) are extracted from the *sattva* aspect of these elements (VII.24-25), the organs of action and vital airs (*prāṇādi*) from the *rajas* aspect (VII.27–28), and the gross, quintuplicated elements from the *tamas* aspect (VII.29).²³⁷ Yet, the cause of the subtle elements themselves remains the single, unstratified *māyā*.

Even the distinction of deities is attributed to *guṇas* within the single *māyā*, not to different adjuncts:

Vedāntaparibhāṣā I.75:

sa ca parameśvara eko'pi svopādhibhūtamāyāniṣṭhasattvarajastamoguṇabhedena brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarādīśabdavācyatām bhajate | "And this *parameśvara*, though one, is subject to denotation by words like Brahma, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara, because of the difference of the *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, present in *māyā* which is the *accidens* of that [*parameśvara*]."²³⁸

The *Māyāvivarāṇa* rejects this reductionist unity in favor of a functional tripartite division. It posits that at the moment of creation, the single root nature (*mūlaprakṛti*) stratifies into three distinct modes based on the admixture of *guṇas*. Importantly, this is not a posit of three independent substances or a numerical plurality of ultimate causes, but a functional differentiation within the one *mūlaprakṛti*.

Here, the text establishes a rigid correlation between the *guṇas* and their cosmic functions: *māyā* is the specific mode characterized by pure *sattva* (*śuddhasattva*), which serves as the adjunct of *īśvara*; *avidyā* is the mode characterized by *rajas* (*rajaḥpradhānā*), which serves as the adjunct of the *jīva* (*tadavidyāpratibimbitacaitanyarūpā jīvā*); and *tāmasī* is the mode

²³⁵ Ibid., 120.

²³⁶ Ibid., 210, n. 66.

²³⁷ Ibid., 121-122.

²³⁸ Ibid., 33.

characterized by *tamas* (*tamogūnarūpā*), which transforms into the five elements (*pañcabhūta*).

Māyāvivarāṇa Chapter 1:

sā mūlaprakṛtiḥ sṛṣṭikāle paripakvajīvakarmavaśān māyā avidyā tāmasī tridhā jātā | tatra māyā śuddhasattvapradhānā | "This primary cause (*mūlaprakṛti*), at the time of creation (*sṛṣṭikāla*), manifests in three forms due to the force of the accumulated karmic impressions of living beings: illusion (*māyā*), ignorance (*avidyā*), [and] darkness (*tāmasī*). In this context, *māyā* is predominated by pure *sattva*."

The distinction is terminological and structural. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* defines *māyā* as the aggregate material cause, treating *māyā* and *avidyā* as synonyms for the single entity composed of three *guṇas* (*triguṇātmikā*). It refuses to distinguish between the adjunct of *īśvara* and the material cause of the world.²³⁹ The *Māyāvivarāṇa*, conversely, employs a "splitting" ontology (explicitly using the metaphor of a rope formed of three threads); it restricts the term *māyā* specifically to the *sattva*-predominant strand, distinguishing it from the *rajas*-predominant *avidyā* and the *tamas*-predominant *tāmasī*. Thus, while *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* says *māyā* creates the world (because it includes *tamas*), *Māyāvivarāṇa* says *māyā* reflects *īśvara*, while *tāmasī* evolves into the world.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis confirms that the *Māyāvivarāṇa* constitutes a distinct philosophical articulation that resists the systematizing dominance of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Doctrinally, the text rejects Dharmarāja's posture, favoring a stratified ontology of nescience, a reflection-based definition of *īśvara*, and a graduated epistemology that denies the immediate efficacy of the word. Moreover, unlike the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, which formally integrated the technical apparatus of Navya-Nyāya to sharpen Advaita dialectics,²⁴⁰ the *Māyāvivarāṇa* systematically eschews this neo-logical register (as demonstrated in Section III), preserving a traditional pedagogical framework, prioritizing instructional clarity over the scholastic formalism that came to dominate the Early Modern period.

²³⁹ Ibid., 31, 120. Compare I.70-71, where *māyā* is defined as the adjunct of the Lord (*īśvarasākṣī tu māyopahitaṃ caitanyaṃ tac caikaṃ tadupādhibhūtāmāyāyā ekatvāt*), with VII.23, where the same *māyā*, explicitly characterized by the three *guṇas*, is identified as the direct material cause of the elements (*imāni bhūtāni triguṇāmāyākāryāṇi*). Unlike the *Māyāvivarāṇa*, the text does not relegate the material cause to a separate *tāmasī* mode but attributes both functions to the single *triguṇātmikā māyā*.

²⁴⁰ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 54, 199; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, introduction to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* by Dharmarāja Adhvarin (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1942), xiii-xv; Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 21. Dasgupta (54) confirms that Dharmarāja was a specialist in the "new logic," having authored the *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's foundational *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Consequently, Dasgupta (199) concludes that Dharmarāja elaborated his Vedāntic epistemology by utilizing the specific "data worked out by his predecessors"—referring to the dialectical definitions established by the logicians he commented upon. Matilal (21) identifies this as part of a wider trend where authors adopted the "Navya-Nyāya method and style" to achieve precision, even while rejecting its metaphysics. Sastri (xv) similarly notes that the text's detailed analysis of perception adapts these logical categories to define the immediacy of the non-dual Brahman.

5 – Sectarian Demarcation: Devotion, Grace, and the Conservative Synthesis

I. Introduction: The Theological Orientation of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*

The *Māyāvivarāṇa* opens with a sectarian invocation to the child Kṛṣṇa, explicitly soliciting divine presence for epistemic success:

bālānām upakārāya mamāpi jñānasiddhaye | tatra śrībālagopālakṛṣṇaḥ sannihito bhavet
|| "For the benefit of beginners, as well as for the accomplishment of my own knowledge, may Śrībālagopālakṛṣṇa be present therein."

This invocation to Bālagopāla—the intimate, playful form of the child Kṛṣṇa—might initially suggest an affinity with the "theistic Advaita" of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī or the radical Nāmasiddhānta of the Kaveri delta, movements which sought to elevate *bhakti* to a status rivaling, or even surpassing, *jñāna*. The presence of such a specific *saguna* form at the threshold of a non-dual text raises the immediate question of "contamination": has the rigorous monism of the Śāṅkarian lineage here capitulated to the demands of sectarian theism?

This chapter argues that the *Māyāvivarāṇa* represents a conservative Smārta synthesis. While it adopts the external forms of Vaiṣṇava piety and the terminology of the Āgamas, a close philological reading of its invocatory prayer betrays a strict Advaitic allegiance. The deity is invoked not for the sake of eternal service (*kaiṅkarya*) or emotional rapture (*rasa*), but specifically "for the accomplishment of knowledge" (*jñānasiddhaye*). Rigorously subordinating these devotional elements to orthodox non-dual metaphysics, the text establishes a definitive stance: the personal God is not the ultimate goal (*upeya*), but rather the supreme means (*upāya*)—a cosmic administrator who ripens the fruit of merit precisely so the intellect might eventually outgrow and transcend him. To demonstrate this containment strategy and the instrumentalization of the divine, the ensuing analysis is organized according to the logical progression of the aspirant's journey—from the initial cause of eligibility to the final definition of release:

- **Section II (The Causal Economy of Grace)** examines the causal role of *īśvara*. It begins by reaffirming the fundamental Advaitic axiom that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the sole direct cause of liberation. Consequently, the text argues that while grace is necessary, its function is restricted strictly to the "ripening of merit" (*puṇyapuñjaparipāka*); *īśvara* acts not as a savior who overrides the law of *karman*, but as the administrator who grants the *qualification* to know.
- **Section III (The Ritualization of Devotion)** shifts the focus from the divine administrator to the human aspirant, analyzing the text's granular classification of *bhakti*. We demonstrate how the author reintegrates devotional fervor into the Vedāntic framework by defining it strictly as "meritorious action" (*puṇyakarma*), spanning the mental, verbal, and physical faculties. Furthermore, the text prescribes the offering of fruits to God (*īśvarārpaṇa*) as the critical mechanism that neutralizes the binding force of this action, transmuted ritual merit into the purification required for knowledge.

- **Section IV (The Ontology of the Divine Form)** addresses the ontological status of the object of worship. Here, we explore the text’s radical "demythologization" of the deity, wherein even the bodies of the gods are subjected to the theory of limitation (*avacchinnavāda*) and the suffering inherent in embodiment. Nevertheless, the text resolves the resulting theological crisis by validating the eligibility of these finite deities for worship (*upāsyatva*), utilizing the political analogy of a king to bridge the gap between their ontological finitude and their functional authority.
- **Section V (The Soteriological Gradient)** concludes the analysis by mapping the text’s hierarchy of liberation. We show how the author appropriates the Paurāṇic gradations of salvation (*sālokya*, etc.) only to subvert them, redefining the final stage of *sāyujya* not as dualistic union, but as the absolute, attributeless identity of the Upaniṣads.

Thus, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* exemplifies a strategy of hierarchical inclusion: it validates the personal God as the indispensable governor of the empirical world, only to firmly establish that the aspirant’s final destination lies “beyond” him, in the attributeless reality of the self.

II. The Causal Economy of Grace: Qualification (*adhikāra*) and the Ripening of Merit

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* strictly adheres to the classical Advaitic axiom that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the sole direct instrument (*sādhana*) of liberation:

evam yo gurumukhāj jīvātmaparamātmābhedam vicārya jānāti sa eva muktim gamiṣyatīti siddham | “Thus, one who, discriminates and realizes the identity between the individual self (*jīvātman*) and the supreme self (*paramātman*) through the mouth of the *guru*, he alone attains liberation (*mukti*). So it is established.”

However, the text introduces a critical theological modulation regarding the acquisition of this eligibility. As established in our diagnostic analysis (section 2.I), qualification (*adhikāra*) for the rigorous 'fourfold means' (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*) is attributed to the accumulation of merit. Yet, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* explicitly situates the maturation of this *karman* within divine governance. In this schema, *īśvara* functions not as the direct agent of liberation—since the realization of non-duality ultimately collapses the distinction between Lord and soul—but as the indispensable condition that renders the intellect capable of self-inquiry:²⁴¹

²⁴¹ P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 2002), 28, 148, 224; Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 533; Andrew O. Fort, *Jivanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 42; Appayya Dīkṣita, *Śivādvaitanirṇaya: An Inquiry into the System of Śrīkaṇṭha*, ed. and trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1929), 12; Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasi*, vol. 1 (Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 244. Roodurmun elucidates the classical Śaṅkarian position that *jñāna* alone constitutes the immediate cause of *mokṣa*, whereas *bhakti* and *karman* function merely as remote auxiliaries intended for *citta-śuddhi* (purification of the mind) rather than direct liberation (Roodurmun, 28, 224). Potter reinforces this epistemological exclusivity, noting that self-knowledge is autonomous and immediate, unlike action which is bound to *avidyā* (Potter, 533). However, the acquisition of the requisite *sādhanacatuṣṭaya* involves a subtle theological paradox regarding agency. Roodurmun clarifies that the *jīva*’s very capacity to distinguish itself from the mind-body complex is not entirely self-generated; rather, it is *īśvara*, acting as the internal witness, who "quickens intelligence" (Roodurmun, 148). This aligns with the *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*, which asserts that the "firmness of intellect" necessary for intuiting the non-specific Brahman arises only through the

asyādhikāriṇaḥ sādhanacatuṣṭayaṃ ca bahujanmārijitapuṇyapuñjaparipākavaśād īśvarānugraheṇa labhyam iti veditavyam | “And it must be understood that for such a qualified [student], the fourfold means is attainable through the favour of *īśvara*, by force of the ripening of the mass of merit (*puṇya*) accumulated over many lives.”

This formulation resolves the risk of soteriological arbitrariness. The 'grace' of the absolute is not a capricious bestowal overriding the moral order, but functions exclusively within the economy of *karman*. By grounding grace in the 'ripening of multitudes of merit' (*puṇyapuñjaparipāka*), the text establishes a strict causal hierarchy: latent merit cannot ripen autonomously through independent human volition (*pauruṣa*). Consequently, foundational virtues like *viveka* and *vairāgya* are inaccessible to mere egoic effort. The aspirant cannot simply will themselves into competence; rather, these qualifications arise only when past dharmic action is bridged to its efficacious result through the intelligent administration (*niyantrī*) and favor (*īśvarānugraha*) of the Lord.²⁴²

This specific articulation of grace in the *Māyāvivaraṇa* contrasts with the devotional developments of certain late medieval Advaitins, such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Like Madhusūdana (16th/17th century), the text acknowledges a critical limit to human agency, positing that the mind is incapable of securing the *sādhanacatuṣṭaya* without the lawful operation of *īśvara* as the karmic administrator. However, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* firmly resists the soteriological expansion found in Madhusūdana's work, which occasionally elevates *bhakti* to an autonomous status rivaling *jñāna*. Instead, the text retains a strictly conservative subordination: grace is structurally necessary, but implies no bypass of the epistemic requirement of knowledge. It functions solely as the generator of the

specific grace of the Lord (Sastri, 12). Nevertheless, as Krishnananda cautions, this theistic dependency remains within the realm of relative existence; *īśvara* and *jīva* share a correlative ontological status within *māyā*, and with the cessation of the limiting adjuncts (*kośas*), the distinction is ultimately sublated (Krishnananda, 244).

²⁴² Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), 3–4; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 489–90; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 87–88; P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita* (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943), 268; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 354; *Pañcadaśī of Śrī Vidyāraṇya Svāmi*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967), 166–67; Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasī*, vol. 2 (Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 146. Sadānanda and Dasgupta establish that the status of *adhikārin* is predicated on the purification of the mind achieved through the performance of *nitya* and *naimittika karmas* (Sadānanda, 3–4; Dasgupta, vol. 1, 489–90). Yet, the transmutation of this ritual merit into cognitive capacity necessitates a divine administrator. Dasgupta explicates that the law of *karman* (*niyatī*), being inert, cannot operate blindly but requires the superintendence of *īśvara* to "awaken" dormant impressions (*vāsanās*) and allot their specific fruits; in this view, *anugraha* is interpreted not as a subversion of causality, but as an "extension of justice" (Dasgupta, vol. 5, 87–88). Srinivasachari reinforces this, arguing that the Lord functions as the moral governor (*niyantrī*) to ensure that results are not capricious but strictly correlative to the *jīva*'s past actions (Srinivasachari, 268). Accordingly, Appayya Dīkṣita elucidates that the "desire to know" is prompted by the *apūrva* (unseen potency) generated by former practices, linking the hearing of scripture to the fruition of merit (Sastri, *Siddhāntaleśa*, 354). Thus, as Vidyāraṇya concludes, *īśvara* acts as the unattached *antaryāmin* (internal ruler), regulating the devotee's understanding from within the *buddhi* in strict accordance with their spiritual maturity (Swahananda, 166–67; Krishnananda, 146).

qualifications for knowledge, never as the direct agent of liberation.²⁴³

The text explicitly validates this hierarchy by identifying a potential spiritual stagnation: one may possess ethical virtues and be a "devotee of *īśvara*" (*bhaktyeśvaropāsaka*), yet still lack the *adhikāra* (competence) for non-duality. This caveat serves to define *bhakti* not as a parallel path, but as a preparatory discipline that remains insufficient until it ripens into *mumukṣutva* (the burning desire for liberation).

The author demonstrates this through a progressive "ladder of defects," noting that even the pious lack qualification if the specific impulse for freedom is absent:

***loke keṣāṃcin nityānityavastuviveke saty api vairāgyasyādarśanād
ihāmutrārthaphalabhoge virāgeṇāpi bhavitavyam ity uktam | tadubhaye saty api
keṣāṃcid ṛṣīśvarāṇāṃ kopatāpādidarśanāc chamādināpi bhavitavyam ity uktam |
etatritaye saty api keṣāṃcid bhaktyeśvaropāsakānāṃ jñānādhikārādarśanān
mumukṣayāpi bhavitavyam [itī] |*** "It is said that in the world, due to a lack (*adarśana*) of detachment (*vairāgya*) in some people, even though they discriminate between the eternal and the non-eternal, there must also be dispassion (*virāga*) regarding the enjoyment of fruits here and hereafter. It is said that even if both of them [discrimination and dispassion] are there, since we observe the anger, affliction, and the like of some sages (*ṛṣi*) and gods (*īśvara*), there must also be quietude and similar virtues. Even if the three of them [discrimination, dispassion, quietude] are there, since in the case of some devotees of *īśvara* (*īśvaropāsaka*) the qualification for knowledge is not evident, the desire for liberation (*mumukṣā*) must also be cultivated."

This passage is crucial for situating the text's theology. By placing the "devotee of *īśvara*" in a category of potential incompleteness, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* asserts that devotion without the desire for liberation is merely a righteous state, not a liberating one. The qualification "some" here does not introduce an alternative salvific path, but reflects an empirical observation: *bhakti*, like discrimination or asceticism, is insufficient in the absence of

²⁴³ Lance E. Nelson, "Krishna in Advaita Vedanta: The Supreme Brahman in Human Form," in *Krishna: A Sourcebook*, ed. Edwin F. Bryant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 315; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 133–34; T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita: With Special Reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya* (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957), 270; Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Siddhāntabindu*, trans. P. M. Modi (Allahabad: Vohra Publishers, 1985), 9, 15, 157–58; Andrew O. Fort, *Jivanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 122–23. Scholarship generally identifies Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as the pivotal theologian who departed from rigid Śāṅkarian orthodoxy by elevating *bhakti* to an autonomous soteriological status equivalent to *jñāna* (Nelson, 315; Mahadevan, 270). As Gupta notes, Madhusūdana introduces a "doctrine of divine grace" wherein service to the Lord generates the initial "taste" (*ruci*) for the path, acknowledging that the entry into spirituality is not purely volitional (Gupta, 133). However, Madhusūdana expands this reliance into a totalized system where *bhakti* is not merely a preparatory discipline for knowledge but an independent *puruṣārtha* (goal of human life) capable of effecting "immediate liberation" (Modi, 15, 157). In his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, he even suggests that for the *sthitaprajña* (one of steady wisdom), devotion is a natural, spontaneous disposition that persists through *jīvanmukti*, occasionally blurring the distinction between the *nirguṇa* Brahman and the *saguṇa* Lord (Fort, 122–23; Nelson, 315).

mumukṣā. The final transition from devotee to knower requires *mumukṣā*, which the text defines with the vivid urgency of the "house on fire" metaphor:²⁴⁴

mumukṣutvaṃ nāma tatra svagrhe dahyamāne tatrasthadahyamānapuruṣo yathā kalatraputrādikaṃ [tyaktvā] svatāpopaśamanārtham eva bahirnirgatya tāpopaśamanam kartum icchati evaṃ sāmśarikatāpopaśamanam sampādayituṃ tyaktasarvaiṣaṇasya brahmatātmyabhāve tīvrecchā (mumukṣā) |

"*Mumukṣutva* is defined as: just as, when his own house is on fire, a man who is being burned by staying there—[abandoning] wife, children, and so on—goes out only for the sake of quelling his own burning, desiring to effect the cessation of the heat; in the same way, to accomplish the alleviation of wordly affliction (*sāmśarikatāpa*), in one who has renounced all ardent desires (*tyaktasarvaiṣaṇa*), an intense longing (*tīvrecchā*) for one's own nature as Brahman (*brahmatātmyabhāva*) arises."

The text extends this dependence on *īśvarānugraha* to the figure of the *guru*. The preceptor is posited not as a mere human pedagogue, but as the authoritative locus through which the teaching function grounded in *īśvara* and Śāstra operates. On this basis, the text issues a specific injunction regarding the student's proper perception of the teacher:

etattattvajñānapradāyakaṃ gurum īśvaram eva vidyāt |

"[He] should think that the *guru* who imparts the knowledge of this ultimate reality (*etattattva*) is indeed *īśvara* himself."

The *guru* teaches "out of compassion" (*dayayā*). This pedagogical benevolence serves as the immediate, human counterpoint to the cosmic administration of *karman*, though it operates on a distinct causal level. By explicitly identifying the teacher with the Lord (*gurum īśvaram eva vidyāt*), the text invests the act of instruction with absolute epistemic authority. This identification does not imply that the *guru* usurps *īśvara's* role as the dispenser of results (*karmaphaladātṛ*), nor does it establish a permanent theistic enclosure; rather, it ensures that the student approaches the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) with the same unwavering reverence accorded to the goal. The equation of *guru* and God is thus functional and preparatory: it stabilizes the student's cognition, allowing the "favour" of instruction to operate without the obstruction of doubt.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), 103; Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), 17. Dasgupta delineates the hierarchy of spiritual attainment, noting that while Vedic observances and preliminary devotion may yield "inferior grace," the "highest grace" leading to *mukti* is strictly contingent upon knowledge (Dasgupta, 103); thus, devotion devoid of the specific will for liberation (*mumukṣā*) remains soteriologically insufficient. Sadānanda provides the classical Advaitic archetype for the urgency required to bridge this gap, defining the qualified aspirant not merely as a devotee, but as one who rushes to the teacher with the desperation of a man "whose head is on fire" (*dīptaśirā*), seeking the cooling waters of knowledge (Sadānanda, 17).

²⁴⁵ Śaṅkara, *A Thousand Teachings (Upadeśasāhasrī)*, trans. Swami Jagadananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1961), 3, 5; Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), 17–19; Vidyāraṇya, *The Jīvanmuktiviveka*, ed. and trans. S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T. R. Srinivasa Ayyangar (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1935), 175–76; Andrew O. Fort, *Jīvanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedānta* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 41, 54;

III. The Ritualization of Devotion: *bhakti* within the Taxonomy of Action (*karman*)

Having established that the qualification for knowledge relies upon the "ripening of merit" (*puṇyapuñjaparipāka*), the *Māyāvivaraṇa* proceeds to operationalize this merit through a granular analysis of action (*karman*). In the fifth chapter, the text reintegrates devotional practices into the Vedāntic framework by classifying them as specific forms of "meritorious action" (*puṇyakarma*). By subjecting *bhakti* to the rigorous taxonomy of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, the author formalizes a tripartite discipline involving the mind, speech, and body.

The text begins by situating *bhakti* within the mental faculty (*manas*). Significantly, the author refuses to bifurcate the devotional from the abstract, grouping meditation on the personal God (*saguṇa*) and the impersonal absolute (*nirguṇa*) under a single rubric of mental merit. This taxonomy effectively treats *bhakti* as a cognitive discipline akin to *nididhyāsana* (contemplation):

***saviśeṣacintā nirviśeṣacintā paralokacintā bhaktijñānavairāgyacintā ityādivikārāḥ sarve manasā kriyamāṇāni karmāṇi mānasapuṇyakarmāṇi* |** "If [it be asked], 'What, then, are the actions performed by the threefold faculties?'—this is explained: reflections upon the qualified (*saviśeṣa*) [absolute], the unqualified (*nirviśeṣa*) [absolute], the next world (*paraloka*), devotion (*bhakti*), knowledge (*jñāna*), and detachment (*vairāgya*), and similar modifications [of thought]—all these, being performed by the mind, constitute meritorious mental actions (*mānasapuṇyakarmāṇi*)."

By classifying "thoughts of devotion" (*bhakticintā*) alongside "thoughts of knowledge" (*jñānacintā*) as modifications of the mind (*buddhivikārāḥ*), the text asserts that theistic devotion is functionally equivalent in generating the invisible merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) required for epistemic qualification.²⁴⁶

Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasi*, vol. 1 (Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 58–59. Śāṅkara defines the authentic preceptor as one possessed of tranquility and "the sole aim of helping others" (*parānugrahaḥ*), a sentiment echoed in the *Vedāntasāra* which attributes the transmission of knowledge to the teacher's "infinite grace" (*paramakṛpā*) rather than contractual obligation (Jagadananda, 5; Nikhilananda, 19). This compassion is the operative force that bridges the gap between the student's ignorance and the scriptures. Vidyāraṇya explicates the functional necessity of equating the *guru* with *īśvara*, citing the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*: it is through "highest faith" (*parā bhakti*) in the teacher-as-God that the subtle truths become manifest, as this reverence produces the "mental composure" and implicit trust required for the reception of *vidyā* (Sastri/Ayyangar, 176). Fort elaborates that this pedagogical structure is pragmatic; even if the teacher is technically part of the phenomenal projection (*māyā*), the student must attribute authoritative insight to them to have the "blindfold of delusion" removed (Fort, 41, 54). As Krishnananda illustrates, this intervention is akin to a compassionate observer lifting a drowning insect from a whirlpool—an act of external grace that facilitates an internal rescue which the bound soul could not achieve via independent volition (Krishnananda, 58–59).

²⁴⁶ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 125, 131; Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Pañcadaśī*, vol. 1 (Rishikesh: Divine Life Society, 2016), 289–90; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 346–47. Gupta notes that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī defines *bhakti* strictly as a continuous mental mode (*cittavṛtti*), structurally parallel to reflective engagement with *brahmavidyā*, thereby situating devotion within the domain of cognitive modifications rather than as an autonomous soteriological path (Gupta, 125, 131). Modern Advaitins such as Swami Krishnananda corroborate this reading

In the realm of speech, the text acknowledges the entire spectrum of verbal piety, moving from strict Vedic recitation to the more fluid and populist practice of chanting the divine name (*nāmasaṅkīrtana*):

vedādhyayanaṃ śāstragītāsahasranāmādīpaṭhanaṃ pañcākṣarādimantrajapaḥ bhagavannāmasaṅkīrtanaṃ paropakāravārtā satyavākyaṃ mṛdupūrvabhāṣaṇaṃ ca vācā kriyamāṇaṃ puṇyakarma | “Recitation of the Vedas, study of the Śāstras, the *Gītā*, the Sahasranāmas, and similar texts; repetition of mantras such as the five-syllabled (*pañcākṣara*), chanting of the divine names (*bhagavannāmasaṅkīrtana*), discourse on charity, speaking the truth, and gentle speech—all such constitute meritorious verbal action (*vācikapuṇyakarman*).”

However, the specific classification of this practice reveals a critical historical nuance. While the text validates *bhagavannāmasaṅkīrtana*, it strictly catalogues it as “meritorious action” (*puṇyakarma*), functionally equivalent to Vedic study or the repetition of mantras (*mantrajapa*) in its generation of merit. This marks a significant divergence from the Nāmasiddhānta theology developed by Bodhendra Sarasvatī and Śrīdhara Veṅkaṭeśa Ayyāvāl in the Kaveri delta during the late 17th and early 18th centuries.

For Bodhendra and Ayyāvāl, the divine name was not merely *karman*, but a direct, independent means to liberation (*rājamārga*) that transcended ritual injunctions. The *Māyāvivaraṇa*, by contrast, subordinates the divine name to the rigorous taxonomy of the *karma-kāṇḍa*.²⁴⁷

This distinction is diagnostic for the text’s chronology. Since internal evidence locates the *Māyāvivaraṇa* in the Deccan or Southern peninsular region roughly between the 16th and mid-18th centuries, its treatment of *saṅkīrtana* suggests a provenance either prior to the theological revolution of the Thanjavur Trinity or belonging to a conservative Smārta stream that resisted the radical elevation of the divine name. The text captures the *popularity* of the practice characteristic of this period—by splitting *japa* and *saṅkīrtana* in two distinct

by treating the “thought of God” as a salubrious mental function that purifies and stabilizes the psyche without itself constituting liberating knowledge (Krishnananda, 289–90). This classificatory move coheres with the broader Advaitic causal framework articulated by Appayya Dīkṣita, in which disciplined practices and mental dispositions contribute, through *adṛṣṭa*, to *citta-śuddhi* and the removal of obstacles to the rise of knowledge (Sastri, 346–47).

²⁴⁷ C. Ramanujachari and V. Raghavan, *The Spiritual Heritage of Tyagaraja* (Madras: The Ramakrishna Mission Students' Home, 1957), 101, 103, 105–106, 108, 115–16; Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 206–207. Raghavan identifies the Chola Desa (Tanjore district) of the 17th and 18th centuries as the locus of the Nāmasiddhānta revival, led by Śrīdhara Veṅkaṭeśa (Ayyāvāl) and Bodhendra Sarasvatī, who authored foundational treatises such as the *Bhagavannāmahūṣaṇa* and *Nāmāmṛtarasāyana* respectively (Raghavan, 105–106). In this theology, the divine name is elevated above the strictures of the *karma-kāṇḍa*; unlike sacrifices which require specific materials, times, and qualifications, the divine name involves no injury (*ahimsā*) and operates independently of *niyama* (restrictions) regarding time or place (Raghavan, 103). Crucially, the divine name is viewed as the “supreme means of salvation” in the Kali age, functioning not only as the means (*upāya*) but as the end (*upeya*) itself, capable of delivering liberation even when uttered unconsciously (*avaśenāpi*) (Raghavan, 101, 108, 116). Singer corroborates that this tradition explicitly venerates Bodhendra for establishing the “efficacy of the divine name” as a path allowing devotees to cross *samsāra* with “ease and spontaneity,” contrasting this direct path with more arduous ritualistic obligations (Singer, 206–207).

categories—but refuses to grant it soteriological autonomy, insisting instead that it remains, like the Vedas, a generator of *puṇya* destined for the "mixed" economy of action.

Finally, the text validates traditional physical ritualism as the foundational generator of merit. It grounds the aspirant in a life of service and concrete worship:

puṇyatīrthasnānaṃ gurudevātānamaskāraḥ devapūjā pradakṣiṇaṃ sajjanadarśanaṃ tyāgaḥ lokānugrahasaṃcāraḥ evamādīni kāyena kriyamāṇāni karmāṇi kāyikaṃ puṇyakarma | “Bathing in sacred waters, offering homages to [one’s] teacher and to the idols, worship of the gods (*devapūjā*), circumambulation (*pradakṣiṇa*), visiting the virtuous, charity, and going about for the welfare of the world—such actions performed by the body constitute bodily meritorious action (*kāyikapuṇyakarman*).”

Through this threefold structure, the text demonstrates that grace is not a capricious intervention but operates strictly within the moral economy of action. By performing these specific meritorious acts—mental surrender, verbal chanting, and bodily worship—the aspirant contributes to the accumulation and maturation of *puṇya*, under whose ripening the favour of *īśvara* becomes operative as the condition for *adhikāra*.

However, it is in the structural organization of these ritual acts that the text betrays its specific historical provenance. When defining the grades of practice (corresponding to the grades of liberation), the text appropriates the Āgamic tetrad—*caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga*, and *jñāna*. The definition of *caryā* (service) is lexically marked:²⁴⁸

bhagavatkaiṅkaryarūpadāsabhāvaś caryā | “*Caryā* is the attitude of a servant, characterized by service (*kaiṅkarya*) to the Lord (*bhagavat*).”

The use of the term *kaiṅkarya* offers a suggestive, though not definitive, philological marker. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita theology of Rāmānuja, *kaiṅkarya* technically denotes the ontological servitude of the soul (*śeṣa*) to God (*śeṣin*). Its casual usage here by a Smārta Advaitin may indicate a period of "sectarian osmosis," in which the prestige vocabulary of Vaiṣṇava devotion had become available for general religious description—a phenomenon that resonates with the dynamics of early modern South Indian Vaiṣṇava–Smārta interaction.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 132; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 28, 122. Singer explicitly identifies the "Āgamic tetrad" cited in the text, listing *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga*, and *jñāna* as the four canonical "stages of development" or paths for Śaivites, and further notes that these constitute the structural "four parts of all Āgamas" (Singer, 132). Dasgupta corroborates this organizational structure, describing the Śaiva scripture (*śāstra*) as *catus-pāda* ("four-footed" or having four parts) and specifically defining *caryā* as "right conduct" or the "proper worship of Śiva in accordance with the caste rights" (Dasgupta, 28, 122).

²⁴⁹ P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita* (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943), 183, 298, 606; Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 226–27; Rosalind O’Hanlon and David Washbrook, eds., *Religious Cultures in Early Modern India: New Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2012), 148. Srinivasachari explicates that *kaiṅkarya* (consecrated service) functions as the practical corollary of the ontological *śeṣa*–*śeṣin* relationship, wherein the *jīva* realizes itself as an ontologically dependent mode (*śeṣa*) of the Absolute (*śeṣin/svāmin*) (Srinivasachari, 183, 298). The appearance of this technically Vaiṣṇava terminology within a Smārta context is consistent with

Simultaneously, the text maintains a robust Smārta identity by defining *kriyā* (rite) strictly in terms of non-sectarian worship:

śivaviṣṇupūjāvidhiḥ kriyā | "*Kriyā* denotes the prescribed rite of worship (*pūjāvidhi*) to Śiva, Viṣṇu, [and others]."

By juxtaposing the two dominant deities of the southern religious landscape within a single compound, the text presupposes a Smārta Brahmanical horizon of non-exclusive orthopraxy, in which Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava ritual obligations are jointly accommodated. This formulation reflects a practical harmonization of devotional forms, situating ritual plurality beneath a non-dualist metaphysical framework.²⁵⁰

The text recognizes a soteriological danger: acts of devotion such as *pūjā*, *japa*, and *kaiṅkarya*, insofar as they are forms of action (*karman*), generate result-bearing fruits that—when appropriated by the agent—perpetuate *saṃsāric* continuity. To neutralize this tendency and transmute ritual action into the merit required for qualification, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* prescribes *īśvarārpaṇa*—explicitly linking the discipline of *karma-yoga* to a disciplined form of devotional surrender:²⁵¹

the historical processes described by Singer, who notes that South Indian Smārtas, particularly under the patronage of the Tanjore courts, increasingly synthesized sectarian traditions, incorporating Vaiṣṇava *bhakti* forms while maintaining Advaitic universalism (Singer, 226–27). O'Hanlon and Washbrook further identify the emergence of "Vaiṣṇava Smārtas" in the early modern period who upheld Vedic orthopraxy while permeating it with sectarian devotion, a configuration that plausibly accounts for the terminological osmosis evidenced in the present text (O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 148).

²⁵⁰ Vidyāraṇya, *Pañcadaśī*, trans. Swami Swahananda (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1987), 170–72; Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 91–92, 138; Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasi*, vol. 2 (Shivanandanagar: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 168. Vidyāraṇya outlines the various sectarian positions—Bhāgavatas identifying Viṣṇu as the Supreme, Śaivas asserting Śiva, and Gāṇapatyas claiming Gaṇeśa—yet subsumes these distinct theologies under a unified Advaitic framework wherein "*īśvara* is one only" and these deities are merely diverse manifestations (*māyā* modifications) of the same substrate, thus allowing for the worship of any form from the inner ruler to inert objects (Swahananda, 170–72). This theoretical inclusivity is mirrored in Smārta ritual practice as described by Singer, who documents how Smārta Brahmans maintain a "museum" of catholicity, performing *pūjās* for Śiva, Viṣṇu, Gaṇeśa, and Devī throughout the liturgical year without exclusive sectarian affiliation, thereby operationalizing a "practical harmonization" of diverse devotional forms (Singer, 91–92, 138). Krishnananda corroborates this by affirming that the worship of any deity—whether Viṣṇu, Śiva, or even local spirits—is efficacious because all are ultimately indistinguishable parts of the single "supreme *īśvara* consciousness" (Krishnananda, 168).

²⁵¹ Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. III: Advaita Vedānta up to Śamkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 32, 533–34; Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasi*, vol. 1 (Shivanandanagar: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 96, 295; *ibid.*, vol. 2, 149–50; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 452; Lance E. Nelson, "Krishna in Advaita Vedanta," in *Krishna: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 314; Sadānanda, *Vedāntasāra*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931), 7–8. Potter notes the fundamental Advaitic premise that "pure acts bind as much as impure ones," necessitating an escape from the realm of action altogether (Potter, 32). Krishnananda corroborates that even good deeds possess the "character of causing rebirth," as the attainment of heavenly worlds is defective and finite (Krishnananda, vol. 1, 96, 295). To neutralize this binding force, the tradition prescribes the offering of actions to God; as Potter summarizes regarding Sureśvara, by "offering all his actions to God," the aspirant purifies the internal organ (*citta*), polishing away *rajas* and *tamas* like a mirror (Potter, 533). Dasgupta identifies this detached performance as the "art" (*kauśala*) of *karma-yoga*, an indispensable step toward communion (Dasgupta, 452).

tasmād vivekinā puruṣeṇaitat karmaphalatāratamyam vicārya bhūmau manuṣyajanmani miśrakarmotkṛṣṭajanma yathā siddhyeta tathā [sva]svavarṇāśramakarmāṇi kṛtvā phalecchāṃ vihāyeśvarārpaṇam kṛtvātmavicāraṇadvārā mokṣaprāptāṃ eva prayatnaḥ kartavya iti siddhāntaḥ | “Therefore, a discriminative person, having reflected upon this gradation of the fruits of action, should [strive] to attain, in respect to the human birth upon this earth, a birth arising from the most excellent form of mixed action; accordingly, performing one’s own *varṇa* and *āśrama* duties, renouncing desire for their fruits (*phalecchā*), and offering [them] to *īśvara*, he should make effort solely towards the attainment of liberation through reflecting on the self (*ātmavicāraṇa*). This is the established conclusion (*siddhānta*).”

Thus, in the *Māyāvivaraṇa*, *bhakti* functions not as an independent liberating force, but as the modality through which egoic appropriation is relinquished. By attenuating the binding agency of doership, this surrender allows the "mixed economy" of action (*miśrakarma*) to mature—as established in the preceding analysis of grace—into the pure qualification required for the final inquiry into the self.

IV. The Metaphysics of Embodiment: The Ontology of the Divine Form

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* adopts a pragmatic realism regarding the status of the personal deity at the level of *vyavahāra*. While the text employs standard apologetics to defend image worship (*mūrtipūjā*)—contrasting the "filth" of the human vessel with the purity of the consecrated icon—its primary theological contribution lies in the rigorous demythologization of the divine form itself through the *avacchinnavāda* (theory of limitation). Utilizing the analogies of space (*ākāśa*) and earth (*pṛthivī*), the author argues that the relationship between the material cause (*mūlaprakṛti*) and the self (*ātman*) is one of apparent delimitation, wherein the one self appears as distinct beings solely through the mechanism of entering distinct bodily adjuncts:

yathā [ca] ākāśa eka eva pṛthivyādikāryopādhiṣu praviṣṭa iva pratīyamāno’yaṃ ghaṭākāśo’yaṃ maṭhākāśa ityādirupeṇānekadhā bhāti ... tathātmā svayam eko’pi tat tac charīropādhibhis tatra tatra praviṣṭa iva san devo manuṣyo rāmaḥ kṛṣṇo brāhmaṇaḥ kṣatriyo vaiśyaḥ śūdraḥ paśupakṣikṛmikīṭā iti bahudhā bhāti | “Just as the one space, appearing as though entered into the limiting adjuncts such as earth, etc., appears manifold—as ‘the space of this jar,’ ‘the space of this hut,’ ... Likewise, the self, though itself one, through various bodily adjuncts (*śarīropādhi*), being as if entered here and there, appears manifold—as god (*deva*), human (*manuṣya*), Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya*, *śūdra*, animal (*paśu*), bird (*pakṣin*), worm (*kṛmi*), [and] insect (*kīṭa*).”

This passage is diagnostic for the text’s specific Advaitic orientation. By cataloging "God" (*deva*), "Rāma," and "Kṛṣṇa" alongside "human," "worm," and "insect" within a single inventory, the text effects a radical structural leveling: it asserts that the highest deity and

Crucially, this surrender targets the sense of agency; Krishnananda explains that the ego appropriates the work of *īśvara*, creating a false "consciousness of agency" (*karṛtva*), and liberation from this bondage requires realizing that "God does everything" (Krishnananda, vol. 2, 149–50). However, Nelson clarifies that in classical Advaita, such devotion remains preparatory, serving as a means to *citta-śuddhi* (purification of mind) rather than direct *mokṣa*, which is accessible only through *jñāna* (Nelson, 314; *Vedāntasāra*, 7–8).

the lowliest creature are ontologically identical at the level of *avaccheda*, both being merely Brahman delimited by a bodily adjunct (*śarīra*).²⁵²

This prepares the ground for the *Māyāvivaraṇa*'s more radical assertion. While the text defends the practice of worship, it rigidly enforces the Advaitic axiom that all embodiment constitutes bondage. In a striking divergence from the "theistic Advaita" of figures like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī—who argued that the divine form (*vigraha*) is constituted of pure consciousness (*cinmaya*) and thus exempt from material defects—the text insists that even deities are subject to suffering by virtue of embodiment, just as humans are:²⁵³

devānām api vajrahastaḥ purandara ityādinā vedeṣu śarīraparigrahasya darśanād duḥkham asty eva | katham iti cet anyonyam yuddhataḥ kopaśāpābhyaṃ asurārāḥṣasopadravāt puṇyakarmaphalanāse sati bhāvyadhaḥpatanabhayād api duḥkham asty eva | “Even for the gods, since in the Vedas there is mention of their possessing bodies—[such as in the expression] “Purandara, wielder of the thunderbolt,” and the like—sufferance indeed exists. If [it be asked], “How so?”—they also experience sufferance since they engage in mutual conflict, are subject to anger and curses, are afflicted by demons and *rākṣasas*, and, when the results of their meritorious deeds are exhausted, fear their impending fall from heaven.”

Although this argument is explicitly directed at Vedic deities, the *avaccheda* framework established earlier leaves no principled basis for exempting the supreme figures of Purāṇic devotion. By explicitly categorizing Rāma and Kṛṣṇa alongside humans and insects (*kṛmī-kīṭa*) as appearances conditioned by bodily adjuncts (*śarīropādhi*)—comparable to the pot-space that limits the infinite sky—the text implies that even these *avatāras* are products of

²⁵² Swami Krishnananda, *Commentary on the Panchadasi*, vol. 1 (Shivanandanagar: The Divine Life Society, 2016), 56, 308–309; *ibid.*, vol. 2, 168, 191; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 175; P. S. Roodurmun, *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Approach* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2002), 139; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 73, 75, 86. The Advaitic position asserts that the emergence of distinct selves—whether divine or mundane—is solely due to limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*); just as “pot-space” is delimited by a pot, individual consciousness is delimited by the body, rendering the difference between a worm and a god merely a function of the adjunct, not the underlying reality (Roodurmun, 139; Appayya, 175). Swami Krishnananda explicitly articulates this leveling, stating that “right from the creative principle of Brahmā... including all people, humans, animals, etc., among all these there is one consciousness pervading,” and that ultimately, “whatever is in this world,” from the highest gods to “even little grass,” are indistinguishable parts of the same existence (Krishnananda, vol. 1, 308–9; vol. 2, 168). Consequently, as Gupta notes, any conscious entity—whether *jīva* or *īśvara*—is fundamentally Brahman, with their apparent differences being false creations of *avidyā* (Gupta, 75, 86).

²⁵³ Lance E. Nelson, “Krishna in Advaita Vedānta,” in *Krishna: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 321–22; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 128. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī departs from strict Advaitic embodiment theories by asserting that the Lord's “birth” is a voluntary assumption of form controlled by the “light of consciousness,” rendering him explicitly exempt from the merit and demerit (*karman*) that bind ordinary beings (Nelson, 321). Unlike the *jīva*, whose embodiment is a material limitation, the divine form is described as “being-consciousness-bliss through and through” (*saccidānanda-ghana*) and “devoid of the relationship of body and embodied” (Nelson, 322). Gupta corroborates this “theistic” turn, noting that Madhusūdana defines the experience of the deity (*bhagavad-rati*) not as a modification of material object-consciousness, but as a reflection of “pure consciousness in its all-bliss glory,” rendering the divine form essentially “gnosis and bliss” (*bodha-sukhātmaka*) rather than a product of *māyā* (Gupta, 128).

limitation (*avacchinna*). In this strict non-dual analysis, every form is a superimposition upon the one self, and therefore structurally subject to the defects of finitude.

This admission raises a theological problem: "How can they—though themselves subject to sufferance—be worshiped by others?" (*katham duḥkhinām api teṣām itarair upāsyatvam*). The text resolves this through a political analogy of governance. Just as a human king may personally suffer the burdens of statecraft yet still possess the power to protect his subjects, the gods remain valid objects of refuge (*upāsyā*) due to their administrative capacity:

asmin loke rājaprabhṛtīnām duḥkhinām api [svāśritopāsyatvam] svāśritaparipālanādikaṃ yathā tatheti jñeyam | "It is to be understood as follows: just as, in this world, even kings and the like—though themselves afflicted by sufferance—are objects of reverence to their dependents, owing to their protection and so forth, so also [is it in the divine sphere]."

Through this political metaphor, the text validates the "limitation" (*avacchinna*) as the necessary ground for religious transaction (*vyavahāra*). The analogy implies that while the separation of God and soul is as illusory as the distinction between "pot-space" and "hut-space," so long as the limiting adjunct (the "jar") remains, the hierarchical distinction is binding, rendering the "limited" Lord a valid object of worship for the "limited" soul.²⁵⁴

V. The Soteriological Gradient: From Service to Identity

The *Māyāvivaraṇa* resolves the tension between devotional dualism and metaphysical non-dualism not by rejecting the former, but by arranging them into a clearly hierarchical teleology. While the fourfold typology of liberation is most fully elaborated in Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra and Purāṇic sources,²⁵⁵ and the tetradic scheme of *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga*, and *jñāna* is characteristic of the Śaiva Āgamas, the text appropriates and correlates both frameworks within a Vedāntic pedagogical hierarchy, with only *jñāna* culminating in liberation in the strict Advaitic sense:

²⁵⁴ Lance E. Nelson, "Krishna in Advaita Vedānta," in *Krishna: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 317; Appayya Dīkṣita, *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, vol. 1, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935), 41–42; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 79, 83. While affirming ultimate identity, Advaita theology maintains that "within the realm of empirical existence," the Lord functions as the ruler and the soul as the ruled, a hierarchy structurally dependent on the "distinctions of the adjuncts" (*upādhi*)—just as space is differentiated by pots and jars (Nelson, 317). Appayya Dīkṣita explicates this functional distinction within the *avaccheda* framework: although the *jīva* is essentially divine, a qualitative polarity persists because the Lord is the "wielder" of *māyā* while the *jīva* remains under its influence, rendering the difference "great enough to be one of quality" (Appayya, 42). Consequently, Gupta notes that Advaita accepts the "empirical existence of difference" (*vyavahārika bheda*); until the final undifferentiated cognition arises, this pragmatic duality is non-refutable and binding, thereby sustaining the validity of religious intercourse (*vyavahāra*) and the polarity of worshipper and worshipped (Gupta, 79, 83).

²⁵⁵ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 162; Rosalind O'Hanlon and David Washbrook, eds., *Religious Cultures in Early Modern India: New Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2012), 513–14. Gupta identifies the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as the canonical authority for the fivefold typology of liberation (*mukti*): *sālokya* (sharing God's abode), *sārṣṭi* (possessing similar powers), *sāmīpya* (living near God), *sārūpya* (attaining God's form), and *sāyujya* (unification). O'Hanlon and Washbrook confirm that this terminology was centrally articulated by Vaiṣṇava theologians like the Gosvāmīs (cited in the *Caitanya Caritāmṛta*), noting that these forms were often polemically devalued in the period—rejected even by Vaiṣṇava reformers like Caitanya as 'equal to hell' for their selfishness.

sālokyam sārūpyam sāmīpyam sāyujyam ceti caturvidhā muktiḥ | caryā kriyā yoga jñānam iti catvāri sādhanāni | "Liberation is fourfold: *sālokyā* (residence in the same world), *sārūpyā* (attainment of the same form), *sāmīpyā* (proximity), and *sāyujyā* (union). There are [likewise] four means (*sādhana*): *caryā* (ritual service), *kriyā* (religious rite), *yoga* (meditative discipline), and *jñāna* (knowledge)."

The result of *caryā* is *sālokyā*—dwelling in the abode of the personal deity. *Kriyā* yields *sārūpyā* (attaining the divine form). *Yoga*, understood here in terms of the eightfold [discipline] comprising restraints (*yama*), observances (*niyama*), and the remaining limbs, leads to *sāmīpyā*—a form of ontological nearness to the divine.

The text classifies these first three stages as "not primary" (*amukhya*) because they are subject to "return" (*punarāvṛtti*):²⁵⁶

tatrādyās tisro muktayo mukhyā na bhavanti punarāvṛttisadbhāvāt | "Of these, the first three kinds of liberation are not primary (*mukhya*), owing to the possibility of return (*punarāvṛtti*)."

The hierarchy culminates in a radical rupture. For the final stage, *sāyujyā*, the text abandons the language of devotion and reverts to a strict Advaitic reading of the Upaniṣads:

jīva-parayor aikya-sākṣātkāro jñānam | ... sāyujyam eva mukhyā muktiḥ punarāvṛttivarjanāt | "*Jñāna* is the direct realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of the oneness (*aikya*) of the individual self (*jīva*) and the supreme (*para*). ... Only *sāyujyā* constitutes the primary liberation, because it excludes return."

The text further clarifies that the scripture promising *sāyujyā* refers specifically to the "oneness of the attribute-less (*nirguṇa*) Brahman and the individual self (*jīva*)" (*nirguṇabrahmajīvayor aikya-yoga-ṣayam*).

In this definition, the text executes a decisive semantic intervention. It evacuates the term *sāyujyā* of its conventional Paurāṇic resonance—where it typically denotes a dualistic "conjoining" or entry into the divine body while retaining individual agency—and replaces it with the strict Advaitic interpretation of numerical oneness. By forcing the sectarian terminology to yield a non-dual conclusion, the text effectively colonizes the summit of Paurāṇic soteriology, asserting that the only true "union" is the sublation of the duality between the worshiper and the worshiped.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 118, 131. Gupta explains that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, mediating between the *Bhāgavata* tradition and Advaita, explicitly rejects the Madhva/Vaiṣṇava view that all four grades are final. Instead, he reclassifies *sālokyā*, *sāmīpyā*, and *sārūpyā* as "conditional emancipations" (*aparā-mukti*) or "limited salvation," reserving the status of supreme release (*parā-mukti*) solely for the final stage, *sāyujyā*, thereby imposing a hierarchical valuation where the first three stages are subordinate and provisional.

²⁵⁷ Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism* (London: Routledge, 2006), 118, 130–31. Gupta demonstrates that the text "reinterprets Vaiṣṇavite terms... to fit in with monistic thought," specifically executing a semantic intervention on *sāyujyā*. While the *Bhāgavata* accepts *sāyujyā* as a form of identity compatible with difference, the Advaitic reading equates *sāyujyā* strictly with "being Brahman itself" and the

General Conclusion

The rigorous doxographical interrogation undertaken in the previous chapter reveals the *Māyāvivaraṇa* not as a monolithic adherent to a single school, but as a paradigmatic example of Early Modern syncretism. As anticipated by its late provenance, the text exhibits a hybrid doctrinal profile characterized by a distinctive "architectonic bifurcation."

Through a heuristic analysis across sixteen diagnostic loci, the treatise displays a foundational allegiance to the later Vivaraṇa tradition—aligning with it in twelve of fifteen determinate points (specifically points 1, 5–9, and 11–16). This orientation is not merely statistical but structurally profound across the domains of theology, ontology, and cosmology. Evidence for this includes the deployment of the *jatupiṇḍa* (lump of lac) analogy to establish the cosmic unity of ignorance, the adoption of *pañcīkaraṇa* (quintuplication) to map physical evolution, and a rigid definition of both *jīva* and *īśvara* through the reflection theory (*pratibimba-vāda*). Furthermore, the text adheres closely to Vidyāraṇya's soteriology, wherein the culmination of *jīvanmukti* is embodied by the living *variṣṭha* knower.

However, this metaphysical rigidity is effectively accompanied by a profound pragmatic fluidity—an eclecticism plausibly situated within the post-fourteenth-century trajectory of Advaita Vedānta. During this period, while intensified polemical engagement with dualist theologians undoubtedly sharpened Advaita's dialectical self-definition, it simultaneously catalyzed a widespread movement toward doctrinal synthesis. This integrative impulse became a defining feature of the era, especially visible in the increasing prominence of compendial (*saṃgraha*) and manual genres, which frequently exhibited explanatory frameworks drawing freely upon Bhāmatī, Vivaraṇa, and Vārttika lines without rigid sectarian delimitation. Reflecting this broad scholastic shift, the author eschews strict sub-school exclusivity in favor of a methodological synthesis. Here, diverse *prakriyās*—specifically navigating the historically distinct paradigms of the Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa traditions—are deployed as context-sensitive explanatory devices rather than mutually exclusive ontologies.²⁵⁸ Thus, while anchoring its fundamental definitions in Vivaraṇa

total "lack of differentiation" (*bhedābhāva*) between *jīva* and Brahman. By asserting that *sāyujya* alone entails the eradication of *avidyā* (and thus the cessation of the body), the text strips the term of its sectarian dualistic resonance to align it with the Advaitic goal of absolute identity (*kaivalya*).

²⁵⁸ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 53–54; Rosalind O'Hanlon and David Washbrook, eds., *Religious Cultures in Early Modern India: New Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2012), 211–212, 217, 233–234; Sanjukta Gupta, *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* (London: Routledge, 2006), 12; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), 94–95; T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita: With Special Reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya* (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957), 31; Michael S. Allen, "The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013), 122–123, 233. Dasgupta (vol. 2, 53) characterizes the authors of this period as "good compilers" who "revered all sorts of past Vedāntic ideas," pointing to the era's "syncretistic tendencies" wherein thinkers unhesitatingly integrated varied doctrinal strands (54). O'Hanlon and Washbrook (217) argue that this "tendency to synthesize or to reassemble" was an organic response to "new vulnerabilities" exposed by the formidable theological critiques of Mādhva dualists. Dasgupta (vol. 4, 94–95) and O'Hanlon and Washbrook (233–234) trace this polemical urgency specifically to figures like Vyāsatīrtha, whose attacks shattered Advaitin complacency and stimulated the production of new "analytical survey[s]" and compendia that deliberately blurred "the demarcations between these lines of thought" (211–212). Gupta (12)

metaphysics, the text freely interchanges limitation (*avaccheda*) and reflection (*pratibimba*) models to navigate distinct philosophical problems. For instance, the text invokes the limitation theory (*avaccheda*) to effect an ontological leveling via shared bodily adjuncts—structurally equating divine Incarnations with the lowest insect (*kīṭa*). It then pivots to the reflection theory (*pratibimba*) to assign agency (*kartrtva*) to the reflected consciousness (*cidābhāsa*), thereby preserving the purity of the prototype. Significantly, to establish the ultimate identity (*aikya*) between the *jīvātman* and the *paramātman*, the text reverts once more to the logic of limitation. This structural bifurcation extends into operative praxis and epistemology, where the text gravitates toward Bhāmatī-style methodologies. Contra the Vivaraṇa position, which posits the great Vedic sentences (*mahāvākya*) as the direct instrument of immediate realization, the text aligns with the epistemology of Vācaspati Miśra: despite utilizing Vivaraṇa metaphysics—likely denying the mind the ontological status of a physical sense organ (*indriya*)—it functionally elevates the mind to the status of the primary instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) of liberation.

The coexistence of these Bhāmatī epistemological emphases alongside Vivaraṇa metaphysical formulations therefore does not signal doctrinal inconsistency; rather, it suggests a framework where methodological utility is valued above scholastic uniformity.

This synthesis finds its historical prototype in the classical Vidyāraṇya lineage, an allegiance further corroborated by specific doctrinal markers. Terminology such as the adoption of *cidābhāsa* (diverging from the Vārttika school), alongside strict adherence to the classical *śṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi* model (rejecting the rising *dṛṣṭi-śṛṣṭi* idealism), positions the work as a conservative defense of established doctrine.

It is upon this orthodox foundation that the text constructs a decidedly "conservative Smārta synthesis" regarding devotion. Despite an initial invocation to Bālagopālakṛṣṇa, internal evidence decisively refutes any affinity with the "theistic Advaita" championed by contemporaries like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. *Bhakti* is rigidly enclosed within the preparatory sphere of *karman*, and *īśvara* is functionally reduced to a cosmic administrator. The sectarian equivalence of Viṣṇu and Śiva, coupled with the rejection of all grades of liberation save *sāyujya*, confirms the treatise's ultimate project: the demythologization of the personal God and his dissolution into the silence of the self.

Paradoxically, while the *Māyāvivaraṇa* self-identifies as a digest designed for beginners (*bālānām upakāṛāya*), close analysis betrays a far more polemical identity. Our investigation corroborates the sixteenth- to mid-eighteenth-century dating established by historical markers, identifying the *Drṅdrśyaviveka* and the *Vedāntasāra* (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) as a *terminus post quem*. However, the text diverges from the classical *prakaraṇa-granthas*. Where the *Vedāntasāra* operates as a legislative manual, constructing foundational categories incrementally for the novice, the *Māyāvivaraṇa* functions as a

corroborates this dynamic, observing that polemical imperatives drove Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to synthesize "the different opinions existing among the teachers of the Advaita school themselves." Mahadevan (31) identifies similar unifying maneuvers in Bhāratīrtha's work, which readily makes "compromises with the Bhāmatī view" to present an "eclectic conception of Advaita." Finally, Allen (122–123, 233) elucidates the pedagogical utility of these fluid paradigms, noting that later Advaitins adopted an "upāyic approach" wherein diverse *prakriyās* (such as the *avaccheda-vāda* or *pratibimba-vāda*) are not positioned as rigid, competing ontologies, but rather as instrumental methods deemed "correct" (*samīcīna*) strictly insofar as they give "rise to realization for the seeker of knowledge."

polemical digest. It frequently presupposes elementary definitions—evidenced, for example, by the total omission of an explication for *abhyāsa* (repetition)—and moves directly to their doctrinal application. Furthermore, the massive expansion of the *arthavāda* section into a “seven-fold system,” which reclassifies the dualistic declarations of the Upaniṣads as mere eulogy, suggests a deliberate shift from neutral exposition to doctrinal apologetics—a defensive rampart to insulate non-duality, actively sacrificing beginner accessibility to secure the citadel of Advaita against the dualist threat. In this respect, the work also stands in marked contrast to the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, both in its rejection of Navya-Nyāya formalism and in its distinct doctrinal orientation.

Ultimately, while this philosophical interrogation has successfully illuminated the *Māyāvivarāṇa*’s sectarian profile and historical pragmatism, internal doctrinal analysis alone has yielded no finer chronological or geographical resolution than the initial philological and historical assessment. Without external corroboration, further dating within the Early Modern window remains speculative. Consequently, future research must pivot from vertical internal analysis to horizontal comparative philology, especially excavating the broader *prakaraṇa-grantha* corpus of the period. Investigators must scrutinize lesser-known compendia for stylistic genetic markers: idiosyncratic metaphors, linguistic calques betraying vernacular substrates, *hapax legomena*, and distinct citation profiles. Only through such an exhaustive comparative study can scholarship hope to isolate the precise historical and regional coordinates of the *Māyāvivarāṇa*.

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources (Sanskrit Texts & Translations)

- **Apadeva.** *Vedantasara of Sadananda with the Commentary Balabodhini.* Edited with introduction by K. Sundararama Aiyar. Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1911.
- **Appayya Dīkṣita.** *Śivādvaitanirṇaya: An Inquiry into the System of Śrīkaṇṭha.* Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: University of Madras, 1929.
- ———. *The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha of Appayya Dīkṣita.* Translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. 2 vols. Madras: University of Madras, 1935 (Vol. 1), 1937 (Vol. 2).
- **Dharmarāja Adhvarin.** *Vedāntaparibhāṣā.* Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1942.
- **Fazlullah, S. M., and T. Chandrasekharan, eds.** "Māyāvivaraṇam of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya." *Bulletin of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras* 1, no. 1 (1948): 23-48.
- **Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.** *Siddhāntabindu.* Translated by P. M. Modi. Allahabad: Vohra Publishers, 1985.
- **Sadānanda Yogīndra.** *Vedāntasāra.* Translated by Swami Nikhilananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1931.
- **Śaṅkara.** *A Thousand Teachings (Upadeśasāhasrī).* Translated by Swami Jagadananda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1961.
- **Vidyāraṇya (attributed to).** *Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka: An Inquiry into the Nature of the 'Seer' and the 'Seen'.* Translated by Swami Nikhilananda. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1931.
- ———. *The Jīvan-Mukti-Viveka: The Path to Liberation-in-this-Life.* Edited and translated by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T. R. Śrīnivāsa Ayyangar. Adyar: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1935.
- ———. *Pañcadaśī.* Translated by Swami Swahananda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1967.

2. Secondary Literature (Studies & Monographs)

- **Allen, Michael S.** "The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta." PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013.
- **Bhandarkar, R. G.** *Early History of the Dekkan.* Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1957.
- **Bloch, Jules.** *The Formation of the Marathi Language.* Poona: Deccan College, 1965.
- **Chakravarti, Ramprasād.** "Technical Writing in Medieval South India." In *Traditions of Science in India*, edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya, 218–21. New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 1986.
- **Chattopadhyaya, S. K.** *The Philosophy of Sankar's Advaita Vedanta.* New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2000.
- **Dasgupta, Surendranath.** *A History of Indian Philosophy.* 5 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922–1955.
- **Deshpande, Madhav.** "Pañca-Gauḍa and Pañca-Drāviḍa: Contested Borders of a Traditional Classification." *Studia Orientalia* 108 (2010): 29–58.

- **Emeneau, M. B.** "India as a Linguistic Area." *Language* 32, no. 1 (1956): 3–16.
- **Ferro-Luzzi, Gabriella Eichinger.** "Ritual as Language: The Case of South Indian Food Offerings." *Current Anthropology* 18, no. 3 (1977): 507–14.
- **Fort, Andrew O.** *Jivanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedānta*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.
- **Gupta, Sanjukta.** *Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- **Hacker, Paul.** *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta*. Edited by Wilhelm Halbfass. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- **Harle, J. C.** *The Art and Architecture of the Indian Subcontinent*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- **Ingalls, Daniel H. H.** *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- **Khan, Iqtidar Alam.** *Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- **Krishnananda, Swami.** *Commentary on the Panchadasī*. 2 vols. Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society, 2016.
- **Larson, Gerald James.** *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
- **Mahadevan, T. M. P.** *The Philosophy of Advaita: With Special Reference to Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāraṇya*. Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1957.
- **Masica, Colin P.** *The Indo-Aryan Languages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- **Matilal, Bimal Krishna.** *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- **Michell, George.** *Architecture and Art of Southern India: Vijayanagara and the Successor States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- **Nadkarni, Mangesh V.** "Bilingualism and Syntactic Change in Konkani." *Language* 51, no. 3 (1975): 672–83.
- **Nelson, Lance E.** "Krishna in Advaita Vedānta: The Supreme Brahman in Human Form." In *Krishna: A Sourcebook*, edited by Edwin F. Bryant, 309–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- **Nicholson, Andrew J.** *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- **O'Hanlon, Rosalind, and David Washbrook, eds.** *Religious Cultures in Early Modern India: New Perspectives*. London: Routledge, 2012.
- **Pollock, Sheldon.** *The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- **Potter, Karl H., ed.** *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.
- ———, ed. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Vol. 11, *Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995.
- **Ramanujachari, C., and V. Raghavan.** *The Spiritual Heritage of Tyagaraja*. Madras: The Ramakrishna Mission Students' Home, 1957.
- **Randhawa, M. S.** *A History of Agriculture in India*. Vol. 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1980.

- **Roodurmun, P. S.** *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Approach*. Madras: University of Madras, 2002.
- **Sastri, S. N., trans.** "Points of Difference Between Bhamati and Vivarana" (based on the Bhumika of Polagam Sri Rama Sastri). *Sanskrit Documents*. 2013. https://sanskritdocuments.org/sites/snsastri/Points_of_difference_between_Bhamati_and_Vivarana.pdf
- **Singer, Milton.** *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- **Southworth, Franklin C.** *Linguistic Archaeology of South Asia*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.
- **Srinivasachari, P. N.** *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*. Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943.
- **Stein, Burton.** "The Medieval Past: Continuity and Disjunction." In *Vijayanagara, The New Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 1, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- **Thapar, Romila.** *The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003.
- **Watt, George.** *The Commercial Products of India*. London: John Murray, 1908.
- **Williams, Michael T.** *Existence and Perception in Medieval Vedānta*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2024.

3. Reference Works (Dictionaries)

- **Belsare, M. B.** *An Etymological Gujarati–English Dictionary*. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1993.
- **Brown, Charles Philip.** *A Telugu-English Dictionary*. Madras: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1903.
- **Kittel, Ferdinand.** *A Kannada–English Dictionary*. Bangalore: Basel Mission Press, 1894.
- **Molesworth, J. T.** *A Dictionary, Marathi and English*. 2nd ed. Bombay: Bombay Education Society's Press, 1857.
- **Monier-Williams, Monier.** *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.
- **Platts, John T.** *A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English*. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1884.
- **Tamil Lexicon: Supplement.** Madras: University of Madras, 1939.

Appendix: Italian Summary

Introduzione e Oggetto della Ricerca Il presente studio offre la prima traduzione integrale e l'analisi critica del *Māyāvivaraṇa* ("Il Disvelamento dell'Illusione"), un trattato sanscrito di Advaita Vedānta formalmente attribuito a Śaṅkara, ma rimasto finora ai margini dell'indagine indologica. Il testo, accessibile esclusivamente attraverso l'*editio princeps* curata da T. Chandrasekharan (1948) e basata su un unico manoscritto conservato presso la Government Oriental Manuscripts Library di Madras (GOML D. 1021), si presenta come un *prakaraṇa-grantha* (manuale pedagogico). L'opera è strutturata in cinque capitoli (*varṇaka*) che guidano l'aspirante dalla cosmologia dell'ignoranza fino alla cessazione della sofferenza. L'obiettivo della dissertazione è duplice: rendere accessibile il testo attraverso una traduzione filologicamente rigorosa e ricostruirne l'identità storica e filosofica, risolvendo le questioni relative alla sua datazione, provenienza geografica e affiliazione scolastica.

Capitolo I: Traduzione e Struttura del Testo Il primo capitolo presenta la traduzione completa del *Māyāvivaraṇa*, corredata da note critiche ed esplicative. Il testo segue una progressione pedagogica precisa:

- **Primo varṇaka:** Delinea la cosmogonia dell'ignoranza attraverso la dialettica di sovrapposizione (*adhyāropa*) e negazione (*apavāda*).
- **Secondo varṇaka:** Definisce le qualifiche dell'aspirante (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*) e il ruolo della grazia nella relazione pedagogica.
- **Terzo varṇaka:** Analizza l'identità del Sé sintetizzando le teorie della limitazione (*avaccheda*) e del riflesso (*pratibimba*).
- **Quarto varṇaka:** Dimostra la natura avventizia della sofferenza e ridefinisce la liberazione come stato vivente (*jīvanmukti*).
- **Quinto varṇaka:** Distingue il Sé dall'agire (*karṭṛtva*) ed espone il metodo epistemico per la rimozione degli ostacoli alla conoscenza.

Capitolo II: Contestualizzazione Filologica e Storica Attraverso un'analisi interna delle evidenze materiali e linguistiche, la tesi rigetta l'attribuzione tradizionale a Śaṅkara (VIII sec.), ricollocando l'opera nel contesto del Primo Periodo Moderno (Early Modern India). L'argomento decisivo per la datazione è individuato in un anacronismo tecnologico cruciale presente nel quinto capitolo: l'autore utilizza l'analogia di un cannone (*bṛhannālika*) che, caricato con polvere pirica (*gandhakādi-cūrṇa*) e una palla di pietra (*sthūlapāṣāṇa*), distrugge un esercito. L'analisi organologica di questo riferimento permette di datare il testo a un periodo successivo alla diffusione dell'artiglieria campale in India (post-1526, Prima Battaglia di Panipat) e precedente alla standardizzazione bellica coloniale del XVIII secolo. Parallelamente, l'analisi delle coordinate geografiche — basata su marcatori botanici (il frutto *panasa*), architettonici (la centralità del *gopura* templare) e geopolitici (l'uso di categorie regionali come Karṇāṭaka e Āndhra) — situa la composizione del testo nell'India peninsulare meridionale, probabilmente nella regione del Deccan o del Tamil Nadu, in un ambiente caratterizzato da una forte cultura templare e da una pluralità linguistica.

Capitolo III: Analisi Dottrinale e Posizionamento Dossografico L'indagine filosofica ricostruisce l'architettura dottrinale del *Māyāvivaraṇa* applicando un framework diagnostico basato su sedici "shibboleth" (punti di divergenza) che distinguono le scuole

post-Śāṅkariane (Bhāmatī e Vivaraṇa). L'analisi rivela che il testo non aderisce monoliticamente a una singola scuola, ma rappresenta un "Sincretismo Pedagogico" tipico della manualistica tarda. Sebbene l'opera mostri una fedeltà fondativa alla metafisica della scuola Vivaraṇa (adottando la teoria del riflesso, l'unità dell'ignoranza e la quintuplicazione degli elementi), essa integra pragmaticamente elementi dell'epistemologia Bhāmatī, in particolare elevando la meditazione (*nididhyāsana*) a strumento primario per la realizzazione, discostandosi così dall'intellettualismo radicale della Vivaraṇa classica. La tesi dimostra inoltre come il testo definisca la propria identità "per negazione", escludendo le innovazioni radicali del periodo, come l'idealismo soggettivo (*dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*) e il formalismo logico della Nuova Logica (Navya-Nyāya). Infine, l'analisi evidenzia il profilo teologico dell'opera: il *Māyāvivaraṇa* integra il linguaggio della devozione *vaiṣṇava* (evidente nell'invocazione a Kṛṣṇa Bālagopāla) entro una rigorosa cornice gerarchica non-duale, mantenendo nel complesso una posizione agevolmente riconducibile all'orizzonte Smārta.

Conclusione Generale In conclusione, la dissertazione identifica il *Māyāvivaraṇa* come un manuale scolastico del XVI-XVIII secolo, prodotto in un ambiente meridionale segnato dalla modernità militare e dal confronto settario. Lungi dall'essere una mera riproposizione del pensiero di Śāṅkara, il testo si configura piuttosto come una sintesi pragmatica e originale, che seleziona e rielabora in modo consapevole diverse metodologie scolastiche e teologiche.