Security analysis of physical attacks to offshore O&G facilities

Chemical and petrochemical plants are susceptible to malicious acts due to the attractiveness brought by the substances handled, the possibility to thieve secret information, and their strategic importance. Thus, a number of qualitative and semi-quantitative methodologies have been developed for the assessment of vulnerabilities of such sites. Similarly, offshore facilities, that are central in the production of hydrocarbons, were subjected to physical and cyber security events as is outlined in relevant past accident analysis. However, there are just few methodologies tailored for the identification of vulnerabilities in that specific environment. The current study is aimed at closing such gap by building a proper technique for modeling attacks towards offshore sites. The method has been developed just for physical attacks and has been drafted with reference to the ASD model, for rendering the adversary pattern, and to the single path computer model (EASI), for the estimation of the PPS effectiveness. The methodology is intended as a tool for supporting standard SVA/SRA procedures, with particular reference to the API RP 780, therefore its purpose is to provide a systematic approach to the analysis. It has been applied to a case study, represented by an offshore production platform, to point out the results obtained and to outline the link with the API SRA methodology.